US embassy cable - 03HARARE738

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 000738 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR CGURNEY 
PARIS FOR CNEARY 
NAIROBI FOR PFLAUMER 
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR JENDAYI FRAZER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2012 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ZI 
SUBJECT: GROWING SADC ENGAGEMENT ON ZIMBABWE 
 
REF: LILONGWE 361 
 
Classified By: political section chief Matt Harrington.  Reasons: 1.5 ( 
B) and (D). 
 
SADC presidential mission 
-------------------------- 
 
1.  (C) South African High Commissioner to Zimbabwe, Jeremiah 
Ndou, confirmed to the Ambassador on April 14 that President 
Mbeki is planning a joint visit to Zimbabwe with President 
Muluzi on April 24, as reported reftel.  He expressed concern 
that the Angolans -- who should be taking the lead as SADC 
chairman in the search for a solution to Zimbabwe's political 
crisis -- might resent the Muluzi/Mbeki initiative, and 
ensuing bickering within SADC might complicate the proposed 
mission. 
 
2.  (C) Ndou offered his view that only a SADC effort at the 
head of state level stood any chance of alleviating the 
Zimbabwean crisis; foreign ministers, he thought, would be 
able to achieve little of substance.  To be successful, he 
continued, any SADC  mission to Zimbabwe ought to present a 
list of specific verifiable demands, most for the Government 
but some for the opposition MDC (including dropping its court 
challenge of the 2002 presidential election).   Ndou believed 
the ideal composition of a SADC mission would be the heads of 
state from the Troika (Angola, Malawi, Tanzania), plus 
Presidents Mbeki and Chissano.  The Ambassador emphasized the 
importance of South African participation, saying it was the 
SADC country with the most leverage, noting recent press 
reports of ESKOM's growing impatience with Zimbabwean 
non-payment of its electricity bills. 
 
SADC task force 
--------------- 
 
3.  (C) The planning for an Mbeki/Muluzi visit is only the 
latest development in recent SADC efforts to address SADC's 
problem child.  On April 3, 10 SADC foreign ministers 
gathered in Harare under the rubric of the SADC organ on 
defense, security, and politics.  According to Tanzanian High 
Commissioner Alexander Muganda, the group wanted to focus 
primarily on Zimbabwe but Harare blocked it, devising a 
broader agenda which included a range of SADC-related issues. 
 In the end, the SADC foreign ministers did hold a  five-hour 
"off the record" discussion with Zimbabwean Foreign Minister 
Mudenge, which Muganda described as "frank."  Muganda said he 
had not attended that small session but that Mudenge was, in 
the open session meetings, in typical deflective mode in the 
face of a barrage of questions from his colleagues about the 
situation in Zimbabwe, refusing to engage in a genuine 
assessment of events on the ground.  While in Harare, 
Mozambican Foreign Minister Simao was unusually blunt, 
telling assembled journalists that "Zimbabweans are not 
living in peace and harmony...We are concerned and because of 
this, next week a task force should be coming to Zimbabwe to 
deal with the situation...We have an obligation to overcome 
the difficulties Zimbabweans are facing."  Subsequent efforts 
to arrange a SADC task force visit by foreign ministers have 
been hindered by a Zimbabwean government determined to delay 
and control the process to the extent possible, according to 
Muganda. 
 
4.  (C)  South African High Commissioner Ndou did attend 
Mudenge's April 3 closed discussion on Zimbabwe with his 
counterparts, and he told us that Mudenge was franker than 
usual in acknowledging problems in that conversation. 
Whenever he strayed from the party line, however, Mudenge 
emphasized that he was expressing his personal views. 
Comment 
------- 
 
5.  (C)  It is unclear whether the Muluzi/Mbeki initiative 
will displace the effort by SADC foreign ministers or 
complement it.  We strongly agree with Jeremiah Ndou's 
assessment, however, that active engagement by SADC heads of 
state stands the best chance of convincing Mugabe to step 
back from the brink.  Mugabe's arrogance and substantial ego 
would prevent genuine engagement with foreign ministers, and 
ensure that any visit at that level would produce little more 
than the usual anodyne statement.  He would at least listen 
to fellow heads of state, albeit with a keen awareness of his 
own seniority to all but the Angolan.  We also agree that 
SADC leaders must come prepared to hold Mugabe's feet to the 
fire on a specific list of concerns.  Mugabe will take 
advantage of any fuzzy arguments or uncertainties of the 
facts on the ground here to quickly divert the conversation 
to extraneous topics, such as the unfairness of the Lancaster 
House agreement, the centrality of the land issue, or 
Harare's relations with London. 
SULLIVAN