US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI1791

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001791 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR IRAQ TASK FORCE, ALSO NEA/ARP, NEA/RA, 
PRM/ANE, AND IO/UNP 
KUWAIT FOR HOC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL 04/14/13 
TAGS: EAID, PREL, PGOV, PHUM, IZ, TC 
SUBJECT:  TFIZ01: UAE RED CRESCENT SHIP FINALLY 
ARRIVES AT UMM QASR: LESSONS LEARNED 
 
REFS: ABU DHABI 1660 AND PREVIOUS 
 
1.  (U) Classified by DCM Richard A. Albright for 
reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
2.  (C) Summary and comment: The UAE's much-heralded 
shipment of 700 tons of humanitarian supplies arrived 
at Umm Qasr on April 11 -- the first water shipment to 
arrive via civilian vessel into that port since the 
war began.  The political importance of this shipment 
was significant: both as a manifestation of the 
world's (and particularly the Arab world's) commitment 
to alleviate human suffering in Iraq, and -- for the 
domestic UAE audience -- as a demonstration of the 
UAE's effectiveness in promptly getting needed aid to 
its destination.  This is certainly only the first of 
what will be many humanitarian shipments to Umm Qasr; 
we offer up our observations on lessons learned -- 
namely, the importance of coordination and flexibility 
all around -- for other posts which may be asked to 
facilitate such shipments. 
 
3.  (C) Following a reported March 25 attack on UAE 
Red Crescent workers traveling overland from Amman to 
Baghdad (reftel), the RCA decided to coordinate its 
next shipment of 700 tons of foodstuff, family first 
aid kits, four water tankers, two cargo trucks, an 
ambulance, and several passenger vehicles through the 
HOC via Embassy Abu Dhabi.  Well aware of the unstable 
security situation in southern Iraq, UAE Armed Forces 
Chief of Staff Shaykh Mohammed bin Zayid Al-Nahyan 
took over the coordination of the shipment from the 
RCA -- a sign of the high importance attached to this 
effort by the UAE leadership. 
 
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Lesson One: Coordination With HOC, NAVCENT Essential 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
4.  (C) From the beginning, Econoff alerted the HOC, 
CENTCOM (through USLO), and NAVCENT (through the DAO 
Naval Attache) that the UAEG, on behalf of the Red 
Crescent Authority was organizing a shipment of 
humanitarian supplies to Umm Qasr.  NAVCENT and the 
HOC requested a number of documents from the Emiratis, 
including the specifics of the ship (including ship's 
name, flag, registry, and international call sign), 
ship's draft (draft in Umm Qasr is limited from 7.3 to 
9.5 meters due to silt build-up and underwater 
obstacles), owner and agent of the ship, detailed crew 
and passenger manifests with full names and 
nationalities (plus passport information to facilitate 
clearances), and a detailed cargo manifest. 
 
5.  (C) Close coordination with NAVCENT was critical 
to the operation.  Once the vessel was underway for 
Umm Qasr, NAVCENT was able to provide Post with 
updates on the location of the ship, and communicated 
to us what would be required of the ship's crew and 
the UAE delegation along the way.  This line of 
communication helped us sensitize the ship's crew and 
passengers (including four journalists) to the 
thorough security checks and inspections that were 
likely to take place at the checkpoint and/or at the 
port. 
 
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Lesson Two: Prepare For Last-Minute Changes 
------------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C) Post forwarded to the HOC and NAVCENT all 
manifests and ship documentation 48 hours prior to the 
vessel's departure from Dubai.  Due to last minute 
mechanical problems, the UAEG was required to find 
another ship willing to sail to Iraq in less than 24 
hours.  Last minute questions arose concerning the 
offloading capabilities of the vessel (currently, 
there is no power at Umm Qasr), the UAE delegates' 
plans to remain in Umm Qasr to distribute the 
supplies, and significant revisions to the crew 
manifest by the vessel owner -- which required NAVCENT 
to undertake additional security precautions. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Lesson Four: Encourage Direct Contact With ICRC 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
7.  (C) Post relayed to the RCA that it would be 
responsible for the distribution of the items once the 
ship arrived in Iraq.  Indeed, the RCA had insisted 
that its personnel alone would arrange the delivery of 
the relief shipment inside Iraq.  Although the HOC 
provided contact information for the ICRC and the 
Kuwaiti Red Crescent to the RCA, it appears that the 
RCA did not finalize its distribution plans with its 
counterparts in Iraq, leading to delays in getting the 
aid to those who need it.  We understand, however, 
that the HOC has assisted the UAE delegation in 
lashing up with the ICRC/Kuwaiti Red Crescent to 
facilitate distribution of the goods. 
 
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All's Well That Ends Well 
------------------------- 
 
8. (C) We were impressed by the can-do attitude and 
flexibility exhibited by representatives in the HOC, 
who effortlessly managed eleventh hour changes in the 
vessel and its crew, and coordinated the shipment 
between the various branches of the Coalition forces. 
CFLCC and NAVCENT were similarly cooperative and 
helpful, promptly answering even the most arcane of 
questions.  The head of the UAE delegation already has 
contacted Post directly and via the MFA to offer his 
thanks to all involved for facilitating the shipment 
(which has received stellar coverage in the local 
media), and noted specifically the professionalism and 
courtesy of the troops the UAE delegates encountered 
along the way.  We second his thanks. 
 
Wahba