US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU671

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000671 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL - GURNEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2013 
TAGS: PTER, PREL, EU, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPALI MAOISTS MEET WITH EU MISSION HEAD 
 
REF: (A) KATHMANDU 0621 
 
Classified By: AMB MICHAEL E. MALINOWSKI.  REASON:  1.5(B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C)  The head of the European Union office in Kathmandu 
broke ranks with his diplomatic colleagues and met with 
Maoist ideologue Baburam Bhattarai and other Maoist leaders 
in Kathmandu on April 10.  The EU Charge justified his 
"spontaneous" decision to meet the insurgent leader on 
humanitarian grounds, in order to stress the importance of 
allowing EU-sponsored development work to proceed unhindered 
in the countryside.  He also argued that since he does not 
hold the rank of Ambassador, his meeting did not confer undue 
legitimacy on the insurgents.  While other diplomatic 
missions contacted by the Maoists, including our own Embassy, 
have not yet responded to Maoist requests for similar 
meetings, all agree that any meeting should take place below 
the level of Ambassador or Charge.  End summary. 
 
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EU TETE-A-TETE WITH MILITANTS 
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2.  (SBU)  Maoist insurgent leaders, who have been seeking 
meetings with the heads of the US, UK, Indian, Chinese, and 
EU Missions in Kathmandu for the past week (reftel), scored 
their first victory when Charge d'Affaires Rudiger Wenk, who 
heads the Delegation of the European Commission in Nepal, met 
Maoist ideologue Baburam Bhattarai in Kathmandu on April 10. 
Bhattarai, named by the insurgents to coordinate dialogue 
with the Government of Nepal (GON), was accompanied to the 
meeting by fellow Central Committee members Ram Bahadur 
"Badal" Thapa and Krishna Mahara.  A gaggle of reporters 
followed the Maoists to the EU building, but were prevented 
from entering the compound. 
 
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MEETING DEFENDED ON PROTOCOL, HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS 
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3.  (C) Wenk told the DCM the following day that his decision 
to meet the Maoists was a "spontaneous" one that he defended 
on both humanitarian and protocol grounds.  He felt it 
important to communicate to the Maoist leadership the 
difficulty of continuing EU-sponsored development projects in 
rural areas affected by the insurgency.  Noting that the 
Maoists had burned a number of EU project vehicles in some 
areas, he added that he had wanted to meet with them for some 
time on the matter but could not obtain clearance from the EU 
hierarchy to do so.  When he was contacted with the request 
on the morning of April 10, he thus decided to use the 
opportunity to press those points.  (Note:  Wenk said he had 
been informally contacted before the day of the meeting 
through "leftist channels," but had not recieved the same 
form letter as had the US, UK, Indian and Chinese Embassies 
asking for an appointment.  End note.) 
 
4.  (C) Because he does not hold the rank of Ambassador, Wenk 
further reasoned, his meeting the Maoists would not confer 
undue status or legitimacy on the insurgents.  Because the 
European Commission is "strictly apolitical," he contended, 
the Maoists cannot exploit the meeting for political ends. 
He added that he provided his interlocutors with a detailed 
explanation of the EU's organization--differentiating between 
the EU and the European Commission and pointing out that the 
EU Ambassador is in New Delhi and that Wenk is Charge only 
for the Commission--to underscore his comparatively modest 
rank.  (Note:  These subtleties were apparently lost on the 
Maoists, whose press statements after the meeting crowed that 
the "EU envoy" had met them.  End note.)  He did not alert 
the EU Ambassador in New Delhi, EU headquarters, the Chiefs 
of Mission of EU member nations in Kathmandu, or the GON 
before meeting with the Maoists.  Wenk added that the British 
Ambassador was angry (as are we) when he learned of the 
meeting through the local press.  He promised to brief the 
Foreign Ministry on the meeting next week. 
 
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MAOISTS' MESSAGE 
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5.  (C)  Wenk described the atmosphere of the meeting as 
"friendly" and "relaxed."  The Maoists' main message, 
according to Wenk, was their dissatisfaction with the GON's 
alleged lack of cooperation in the peace process.  They also 
expressed concern about "foreign intervention" in Nepal, 
particularly military assistance.  Wenk said he replied that 
the EU Parliament had passed a resolution in 2002 offering to 
mediate in the conflict between the Maoists and the GON, but 
had received no response.  His Maoist interlocutors blamed 
India and China for squelching any efforts at third-party 
mediation.  (Comment:  Wenk either ignores or is ignorant of 
the sensitivities regarding international mediation here. 
The GON--and the Indians--have a well-known position in 
rejecting international mediation at this time.)  The DCM 
asked if Wenk had pressed the Maoists to work with the 
Parliamentary parties.  Bhattarai had assured him that the 
Maoists support multiparty democracy, Wenk answered, but 
would never join the current interim government. 
 
6.  (C)  Wenk told the DCM he did not rely solely on 
previously cleared EU guidance in his discussion with the 
Maoists.  (According to the UK Ambassador, this guidance 
stipulated that any discussion take place below the level of 
Ambassador; that EU representatives be in "listening mode"; 
that discussion be limited to development topics; and that 
there be no publicity.)  For example, when the Maoists told 
him that they intended to publicize the meeting, he 
acquiesced, stipulating only that they provide the press with 
an accurate read-out.  (Note:  The Maoists appear, for the 
most part, to have done so.  According to Wenk, the only 
inaccuracy--so far--in the press account was the assertion 
that he had "pledged every kind of assistance to the rebels" 
in their efforts toward peace.  End note.)  The DCM asked if 
Wenk pursued with his interlocutors their frequent threats to 
break the ceasefire and return to violence if the GON fails 
to meet their demands.  Wenk replied that he understands the 
Maoists' frustration, charging that the GON is trying to 
"starve them out" by delaying the beginning of negotiations. 
 
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OTHER EMBASSIES' REACTIONS 
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7.  (C) Since receiving the Maoists' request (reftel), we 
have polled other Embassies to hear their views on meeting 
the Maoists.  Like us, the British and Indians believe any 
meeting should take place at a mid-level.  The UK Embassy has 
received clearance from FCO to hold a meeting at that level, 
but, like us, is in no hurry to respond to the Maoist 
invitation.  The Indians have not yet received guidance from 
New Delhi.  The Chinese are not contemplating a meeting at 
any level because, according to First Secretary Cheng Ji, 
they have no wish to interfere in Nepal's internal affairs. 
The Japanese have not been requested to meet. 
 
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COMMENT 
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8.  (C)  The Maoists have been publicizing in the media their 
requests to meet with heads of prominent foreign missions, 
and have been more than a little chagrined at the cool 
reception to their invitations.  The meeting with Wenk, which 
was not briefed to the GON in advance and was not sanctioned 
either by the EU hierarchy, his EU supervisor in New Delhi, 
or by EU member Embassies in Nepal, has provided the Maoists 
some face-saving cover.  Wenk's diplomatic irresponsibility, 
his apparent sympathy for the Maoists' viewpoint and his 
acceptance of their political pretensions at face value 
betray a surprising naivete about the insurgents' real aims 
and intentions.  We will continue to coordinate closely with 
other diplomatic missions on any eventual meetings. 
MALINOWSKI