US embassy cable - 03ANKARA2342

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002342 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2012 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT:  UN/CYPRUS: DEMARCHE TO TURKEY ON US-UK DRAFT 
RESOLUTION FOR SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS ON APRIL 10 
 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 91728 
     B. ANKARA 2155 
 
 
(C) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch.  Reason: 1.5(b)(d) 
 
 
1. (C) D/Polcouns delivered ref A talking points April 10 to 
Necip Eguz, MFA DDG for Cyprus-Greece-Aegean affairs.  Eguz 
noted that, as far as he knew (at 1700 local time) the UN was 
still negotiating the text and that no consensus had been 
reached.  Moreover, he took issue with what he saw as the 
continuing effort to "point fingers at ("TRNC President") 
Denktas," and to make him wear the jacket for the failure of 
the talks. 
 
 
----------------- 
April 9 with Eguz 
----------------- 
 
 
2. (C) In an April 9 meeting with DCM and D/Polcouns, Eguz 
noted several GOT concerns.  First, the Russians, Chinese, 
and French were pushing changes to the resolution that would 
include in the revised text a reference to Resolution 1251 -- 
"essentially an UNFICYP-extending plan" -- and to "reduction 
of foreign troops" on Cyprus. "Why should that be in there?" 
he asked.  "It will only make things worse."  Eguz 
volunteered that USG is working to improve the draft 
resolution, emphasizing that any improvements should "keep 
the door open" to the Annan Plan and the UNSYG's good offices 
mission.  Second, the "beauty contest" by which Denktas would 
be explicitly blamed in the draft for the failure of the 
talks was "absolutely unacceptable, unnecessary, and without 
merit."  Eguz reiterated that, in the meantime, the MFA had 
worked with Denktas to come up with potential 
confidence-building measures, including above all granting 
Greek Cypriots direct access to and trade rights in northern 
Cyprus. 
 
 
3. (C) DCM emphasized that: (1) the UN/EU process had been 
key to maintaining pressure on the Greek Cypriots; with the 
failure of the talks, a key source of leverage against the 
Greek Cypriots had been frittered away by the GOT -- "that's 
the reality of the situation"; (2) that even while elements 
of the MFA are insisting on incorporating the Annan Plan, TGS 
officials have, in essence, pressed us to recognize a 
sovereign and independent "TRNC" (ref B), which does not 
square with Eguz' points (Eguz replied defensively that "I 
never said we didn't have problems with the Annan Plan"); 3) 
it is important, therefore, that Annan Plan be the basis of 
continued negotiations -- and that the GOT accept this as 
gospel even after Cyprus on April 16 signs the EU Accession 
Protocols, which the Turks regard as problematic in that it 
fails to refer to UN-related equities. 
PEARSON