US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU657

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 KATHMANDU 000657 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
STATE ALSO PLEASE PASS USAID/DCHA/OFDA 
MANILA PLEASE PASS USAID/DCHA/OFDA 
LONDON FOR POL/REIDEL 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2013 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, CASC, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: CEASEFIRE BRINGS UNEASY PEACE TO NEPAL'S NORTHEAST 
 
REF: A. 02 KATHMANDU 1970 
     B. 02 KATHMANDU 2151 
     C. 02 KATHMANDU 914 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5(b,d) 
 
1. Summary:  On an April 2-3 trip to northeastern Dolakha 
district, PolOff and PolFSN met with civil servants, police 
and local business owners.  The district has remained quiet 
since the January 29 declaration of nationwide cease-fire, 
though some non-violent Maoist activities continue.  Civil 
servants are returning to most villages, and government 
services are resuming, leading most locals to assume that 
lasting peace is at hand.  Contacted sources said that 
international pressure, internal dissatisfaction and supply 
problems have contributed to the willingness of the Maoists 
to negotiate.  Sources also stated that Maoist support in the 
district derives exclusively from fear, and that 
international pressure will be necessary to ensure that 
Maoist leaders accept election results.  Hope for peace in 
the district sometimes borders on desperation, and is coupled 
with a strong anxiety about what to do with the now-armed 
Maoist soldiers.  Local leaders say that Maoist cadres expect 
to be absorbed into the Royal Nepal Army as part of any 
eventual peace agreement.  End summary. 
 
SECURITY SITUATION: LIVE AND LET LIVE 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (U) On April 2 and 3, PolOff and PolFSN met with 
government leaders and business owners in northeastern 
Dolakha district, seeking information about local conditions 
since the January 29 declaration of a cease-fire between the 
Government of Nepal (GON) and Maoist insurgents.  Prior to 
the cease-fire, Dolakha had experienced a relatively high 
level of Maoist activity for the Eastern region, though the 
number of reported killings--approximately 50--is less than 
in some surrounding districts.  All police posts but two were 
destroyed in the seven-year insurgency, along with all post 
offices.  The District Headquarters at Charikot was the 
target of several small-scale attacks that damaged nearby 
buildings.  In Jiri, the district's second largest town, 
Maoists destroyed an MI-17 helicopter in a night-time raid, 
shot and killed a political activist in the crowded central 
market, and robbed the main bank in broad daylight.  In 
October 2002, Maoists did approximately USD 1 million damage 
to the Norwegian-financed Khimti Hydropower plant on the 
district border (ref A).  The district's highways were the 
scene of several attacks on civilian vehicles, including a 
November 2002 landmine attack on a crowded passenger bus (ref 
B) and a May 2002 attack on a Pepsi truck (ref C).  Sources 
in Charikot (including GON civil servants, police and local 
politicians and business leaders) indicated that Maoists have 
often used Dolakha as a staging ground for attacks into 
neighboring districts, because of its central location and 
good roads. 
 
3.  (C) Since the declaration of a nationwide cease-fire, the 
local Maoists have been living in an uneasy truce with 
government forces and the population.  There have been no 
reported violations of the code of conduct, but according to 
Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Thakur Ram Bartaula, 
armed Maoist cadre still patrol some areas of the district in 
combat dress, demanding food and shelter from villagers. 
Police and Royal Nepal Army (RNA) personnel from the two 
remaining police and army posts do not typically venture more 
than 15-20 kilometers away from their post on patrol, 
returning home each night and deliberately avoiding 
Maoist-populated areas in order to preclude the possibility 
of a clash that might upset the peace.  Activity by the 
security forces has focused on preserving the 
telecommunication infrastructure remaining in Charikot, and 
on "dominating" the Jiri-Kathmandu highway.  Curfews have 
been abolished. 
 
4. (SBU) There are 17 suspected Maoists in police custody in 
Charikot.  Representatives of INSEC, a human rights NGO 
affiliated with the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist 
Leninists (UML), insist that only a few are 'actual' Maoists, 
and the rest are either unfortunate villagers who were 
coerced into Maoist activity, or are simple cases of mistaken 
identity.  In one case, the human rights group alleges, a 
woman has been jailed for 14 months because her husband is a 
known Maoist.  No charges have been filed against any of the 
detainees. 
 
MAOISTS HOLD MASS MEETINGS, 
CONTINUE EXTORTION 
--------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Bartaula reported that Maoists have held several mass 
meetings since the start of the cease-fire.  Police 
intelligence suggests that the meetings have been attended by 
Maoist supporters, criminals, locals dissatisfied with their 
own political parties and some villagers afraid of 
retribution if they do not attend. 
 
6.  (C) Some businesses, schools and travelers have reported 
continued Maoist extortion after the cease-fire, but others 
have been successful in refusing to pay.  One hotel owner 
explained that when a Maoist asked him for a "donation," he 
simply stated that such things weren't allowed under the 
cease-fire.  Even before the truce, some organizations in 
Dolakha had managed to negotiate their own agreements with 
the Maoists.  A large technical school in Jiri remained open 
throughout the State of Emergency by convincing local Maoist 
commanders that the practical training they offer is the type 
of education the Maoists should support.  A community school 
in the same town, established by parents when the local 
private boarding school was forced to close by the 
insurgents, came to much the same arrangement.  A 
U.S.-affiliated medical research station got Maoist 
"permission" to remain open because their clinic provides 
free services to villagers. 
 
GOVERNMENT SERVICES RETURNING TO VILLAGES 
----------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU) Chief District Officer (CDO) Chandeshwore Acharya 
told PolOff that most Village Development Committee (VDC) 
Secretaries who had taken shelter in Charikot have returned 
 
SIPDIS 
to their villages.  (Note:  VDCs are the smallest unit of 
local government. End note.)  Those secretaries whose VDCs 
are heavily populated by Maoists remain in the District 
Headquarters.  Almost all teachers have returned to their 
schools and are holding classes, though Acharya suspects that 
some teachers may be paying extortion money to the Maoists in 
order to stay at their posts.  Programs such as family 
planning clinics, distribution of government funds to the 
elderly and agricultural development assistance have returned 
to some VDCs.  Mail service reportedly has been restored in 
all VDCs, though not all postal buildings have been rebuilt. 
 
8.  (SBU) Though road construction projects continued 
throughout the State of Emergency, other development work had 
been stalled by the lack of government representatives in 
villages.  According to Local Development Officer (LDO) Gopi 
Khanal, work has resumed on conservation, telecommunication, 
microenterprise and other projects throughout the district. 
On April 2, the Local Development Office was full of 
applicants for volunteer positions as project coordinators. 
 
POLITICAL OPINION DIVIDED 
------------------------- 
 
9.  (SBU) The Charikot office of the UML has organized a 
"Campaign for Peace and Democracy," a road show of joint 
meetings including speeches by both UML and Maoist local 
leaders.  Though UML representatives told PolOff that they 
had "pressed the Maoists very hard" on their record of 
violence and terrorism, INSEC representatives who attended 
one of the organized meetings said that Maoist commanders 
refused to apologize for their activities during the 
insurgency.  "Whatever we did, we did," the local commander 
reportedly stated in a speech at the event. "That was all 
during the war, and we're not going to apologize." 
 
10.  (SBU) When asked how local UML representatives viewed 
the decision of their party's central leadership to talk with 
Maoist ideologue Baburam Bhattarai, given the kidnapping, 
torture and murder of several UML party workers in Dolakha, 
UML local party secretary Ananda Pokharel attributed the move 
to "diplomatic relations."  The UML wants to convince the 
Maoists to give up violence in favor of politics, he said. 
Rather than ostracizing the insurgents, the UML wants to 
provide "a warm lap" into which the rebels can climb. 
Pokharel also called on the King to work together with 
political parties in order to preserve democracy.  "The 
parties are coming together," in his estimation, "but there 
is still a big gap between the Palace and the parties.  The 
King should come a little bit down to us." 
 
11. (SBU) Not all local representatives were as supportive of 
policies from Kathmandu. In Jiri, where politicians are also 
hotel owners and trekking guides, Nepali Congress (NC) and 
UML representatives were openly critical of their parties' 
leaders.  "The leadership may blame the King for their 
problems, but they caused their own troubles by not getting 
along, and by focusing too much on the (Prime Minister's) 
chair," said a former VDC representative for Nepali Congress. 
"Here in Jiri, at election time, we all have our own flags 
and our own slogans, and there are differences among us.  But 
after the election, we come together to work for the good of 
the people.  If the politicians at the center can't figure 
that out, they should come here and learn from us."  Other 
local leaders of the predominantly UML town nodded in 
agreement. "Peace is the most important thing," said one. 
"People don't care about an all-party government or 
restoration of the former Parliament.  They just want to be 
able to run their businesses and move around freely." 
 
LOCALS LIVE IN FEAR, HOPE FOR PEACE 
----------------------------------- 
 
12.  (U)  The cease-fire has raised hopes that peace is on 
the horizon.  People in Jiri are pleased to see tourists 
passing through again, and children in Charikot feel safe 
enough to walk through town at night.  With peace potentially 
so close, the thought of returning to the curfews and terror 
that existed prior to the cease-fire is not something that 
the people of Dolakha care to contemplate.  "The peace talks 
have to succeed," said DSP Bartaula, echoing the sentiments 
of government workers and private businessmen alike.  "There 
is simply no other option." 
 
13.  (SBU) Nevertheless, some villagers have been slow to 
leave the safety of the District Headquarters to return to 
their farms.  Maoist commanders in the region reportedly have 
told villagers that they will be safe if they return home, 
but few people trust their motives.  According to contacted 
sources, fear is the insurgents' only source of support. 
"People in Dolakha support the Maoists not from the heart, 
but because of their guns," said LDO Khanal. "If they 
surrender their guns, only one or two percent of the 
population will support them."  Local UML leadership agreed. 
"If you take away their guns, the Maoists won't get a single 
seat in any election," said Ananda Pokharel. "Their support 
is based only on fear." 
 
DOLAKHA'S MAOISTS FACE PRESSURE 
FROM INSIDE AND OUT 
------------------------------- 
 
14.  (U) When asked why the Maoists have elected to pursue 
peace talks, all respondents cited growing international 
pressure as the primary impetus toward a cease-fire.  They 
also said that continued pressure would be necessary in order 
to ensure that the Maoists accept the results of democratic 
elections. 
 
15.  (C) In addition, internal pressure may have played a 
role in forcing the Maoists to seek a settlement.  According 
to DSP Bartaula, police intelligence sources have reported 
food problems and financial problems among the Maoists. 
Local villagers are simply running out of resources to 
extort.  At the same time, said the DSP, the improved 
standard of living of some Maoist commanders has caused a 
great deal of resentment among the rank and file.  The only 
Maoist leader to be killed in the district bought a farm and 
started building a house shortly before his death.  Most 
locals believe that he was subsequently killed by his own 
dissatisfied troops. 
 
PROBLEMS APLENTY IF PEACE BREAKS OUT 
------------------------------------ 
 
16.  (SBU) Though they assume that peace is necessary and 
therefore a given, local leaders are quick to point out a 
host of problems that may arise in the future.  Of primary 
concern is the fact that the rank and file Maoists in Dolakha 
are convinced that if there is a permanent cessation of 
hostilities, they will be given positions in the Royal Nepal 
Army.  The CDO's office has seen a sharp increase in the 
number of Maoists requesting citizenship cards, presumably 
for eventual enlistment.  According to INSEC, most villagers 
are equally convinced.  Their concern is not whether the 
Maoists will be brought into the RNA, but rather how the 
reorganization will be accomplished.  "If the Maoist army is 
just left as it is," warned the INSEC representatives, "peace 
will not come smoothly." 
 
17.  (C)  It won't come smoothly for a number of reasons, 
according to contacted sources.  One possibility is that some 
Maoists simply may not obey orders to stop fighting; another 
is that some Maoists may keep their weapons and turn to a 
life of crime.  "The economy is hard in Dolakha," said the 
CDO.  "A Maoist without a rifle has no chance to make a 
living here at all.  But once he has a gun, he can get a lot 
of things."  Maoists who stop fighting will face problems 
other than economic, say police and human rights activists. 
Those who were directly involved in extortion, kidnappings 
and murder will be recognized, and may face retribution.  DSP 
Bartaula asked one Maoist prisoner why his brother, a local 
unit commander, hadn't returned to his village following the 
cease-fire.  The prisoner reportedly replied, "He used to 
bring 40 or 50 Maoists there to eat all the food.  If he goes 
back now, they'll break his legs." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
18.  (C)  Local leaders in Dolakha are firm in their belief 
that the Maoists are serious about pursuing lasting peace. 
The police seem certain that if they can just prolong the 
cease-fire, the insurgency must necessarily come to an end. 
However, most of the basis for this strongly held view 
appears to come from nothing but the intense desire for it to 
be true.  Rumors of supply problems and dissatisfaction among 
the Maoist soldiers, while offering some insight into 
difficulties faced by the insurgents, do not prove that they 
have lost their ability or their will to fight. 
Nevertheless, the only problem that the local leaders were 
interested in discussing was what to do with the Maoist cadre 
when the war is over. 
 
19.  (C) The deliberate optimism in this northeastern 
district, like the optimism in much of Nepal, is occasionally 
tinged with a bit of desperation.  "The peace talks must 
succeed this time," is repeated like a mantra to ward off the 
unspeakable-- the possibility that they might indeed fail. 
If the Maoists really are as weary of war as the citizens of 
Dolakha, and if the leaders of both sides take heed of that 
fact, then there is every possibility that peace talks may 
succeed.  If they fail, then whoever is to blame will have a 
very hard time explaining himself to the people of Dolakha. 
MALINOWSKI