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| Identifier: | 95ZAGREB1822 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 95ZAGREB1822 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Zagreb |
| Created: | 1995-05-11 17:10:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | MOPS HR HR HR HR HR BK War Crimes |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822
SIPDIS
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ZAGREB 01822 01 OF 05 111610Z
BAKU FOR DCM FINN
FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE
E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00
TAGS: MOPS, HR, HR, HR, HR, HR, BK, War Crimes
SUBJECT: AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS
DECISION ON AIR STRIKES
REF: STATE 112876
1. CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN - ENTIRE TEXT.
-------
SUMMARY
-------
2. AT A MAY 10 MEETING AT UN HQ IN ZAGREB, UNSYG SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE YASUSHI AKASHI TOLD AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH
THAT "RSK PRESIDENT" MILAN MARTIC APPEARED TO HAVE A
"FIRMER GRIP ON REALITY" DURING THEIR DISCUSSIONS THE
PREVLOUS DAY IN BELGRADE AND THAT THE "HIGH POINT OF
TENSIONS" SEEMS TO HAVE PASSED. HE DEFENDED HIS FAILURE
TO INFORM ZAGREB DIPLOMATS OF MARTIC'S THREAT TO BOMB THE
CITY BY SAYING HE BELIEVED IT WAS A BLUFF, ONLY POSTURING.
-
3. FOLLOWING HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH TUDJMAN'S CHIEF OF
STAFF SARINIC EARLIER IN THE DAY, AKASHI SAID HE FELT THE
CROATS "WERE TRYING HARD TO COOPERATE" WITH THE UN IN
"SECTOR WEST." THE UN'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT HAD BEEN
ALMOST COMPLETELY RESTORED AND SARINIC HAD AGREED TO UN
MONITORING OF HUMAN RIGHTS. NEVERTHELESS, AKASHI WAS
CONCERNED ABOUT THE SLOW PACE FOR THE RELEASE OF SERBIAN
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CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ZAGREB 01822 01 OF 05 111610Z
DETAINEES. THE SERBS WERE STILL REQUIRING A "SOLUTION" TO
SECTOR WEST BEFORE THEY WOULD COME TO THE NEGOTIATING
TABLE IN GENEVA.
4. TURNING TO BOSNIA, AKASHI CLAIMED THAT SARAJEVO
COMMANDER GENERAL RUPERT SMITH HAD WAFFLED ON THE DECISION
TO CALL AIR STRIKES, INITIALLY ARGUING AGAINST THEM, LATER
CHANGING HIS MIND, AND FINALLY COMING AROUND TO HIS
ORIGINAL POSITION. THE AMBASSADOR ARGUED THAT THE UN'S
PREFERENCE FOR TALKS AND ACCOMMODATION TO BRING THE SERRS
AROUND HAD BEEN TRIED FOR THREE YEARS AND PROVEN A
FAILURE. THE TIME HAD COME TO SEND TO THE SERBS THE ONLY
KIND OF SIGNAL THEY UNDERSTAND. END SUMMARY.
--------------------------------------------- -
MARTIC LESS "DERANGED"; FIRMER GRIP ON REALITY
--------------------------------------------- -
5. AKASHI TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT HIS MEETING IN
BELGRADE MAY 9 WITH THE "RSK" LEADERSHIP (MARTIC, MIKELIC,
AND BABIC) WAS BETTER THAN THEIR PREVIOUS ENCOUNTER ON MAY
5 IN KNIN. HE FELT THAT THE HIGHEST POINT OF TENSION HAD
PASSED. ON MAY 5, AKASHI FOUND MARTIC "UPTIGHT, NERVOUS,
BITTER, DAZED BY DEFEAT AND SOMEWHAT DERANGED, SHOWING
SIGNS OF HAVING LOST HIS GRIP ON REALITY." ON MAY 9, HE
SEEMED TO HAVE RECOVERED SOME OF HIS COMPOSURE, AND HE
REFRAINED FROM REPEATING MOST OF THE THREATS HE HAD MADE
AT THE EARLIER MEETING (INCLUDING FURTHER ROCKETING OF
ZAGREB). NEVERTHELESS, HE STILL HAD A LONG LIST OF
GRIEVANCES AGAINST THE UN AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.
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CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ZAGREB 01822 01 OF 05 111610Z
6. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE U.S. WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED
THAT MARTIC'S THREAT, IN THE MAY 5 MEETING, TO "FLATTEN
ZAGREB" HAD NOT BEEN COMMUNICATED TO THE DIPLOMATIC
COMMUNITY IN ZAGREB. AKASHI SAID THAT, DURING THE
MEETING, MARTIC HAD INITIALLY THREATENED TO BOMB ZAGREB
WITHIN 24 HOURS, THEN 48, AND FINALLY FOUR DAYS. TOWARDS
THE END OF THE TALKS, HE SEEMED TO BE SAYING THE CROATS
HAD A WEEK TO COMPLY WITH HIS DEMANDS. IN THE END, AKASHI
CLAIMED, HE FELT THAT IT WAS MOSTLY BLUFF AND POSTURING
AND THAT IF MARTIC SAW A SINCERE COMMITMENT AND REASONABLE
SPEED IN RELEASING THE DETAINEES HE WOULD NOT FOLLOW
THROUGH ON HIS THREAT. AKASHI ALSO FELT THAT BY
COMMUNICATING THE THREAT IT WOULD LEAD THE SERBS TO
BELIEVE THAT THEY WERE BEING TAKEN SERIOUSLY, WHICH WOULD
BE PLAYING INTO THEIR HANDS.
7. THE AMBASSADOR INSISTED THAT, GIVEN AKASHI'S
DESCRIPTION OF MARTIC'S STATE OF MIND, SUCH THREATS SHOULD
BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. LITTLE WOULD HAVE BEEN RISKED RY
INFORMING THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY OF HIS CONVERSATION.
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNNPTQ3390
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PAGE 01 ZAGREB 01822 02 OF 05 111610Z
ACTION EUR-01
INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-10 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
PM-00 P-01 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-01
PMB-00 /017W
------------------C49B20 111610Z /38
O 111710Z MAY 95
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5738
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USLO SKOPJE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BAKU
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822
SIPDIS
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ZAGREB 01822 02 OF 05 111610Z
BAKU FOR DCM FINN
FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE
E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00
TAGS: MOPS, UN, HR, BK
SUBJECT: AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS
DECISION ON AIR STRIKES
---------------------------------
CROATS "TRYING HARD TO COOPERATE"
---------------------------------
8. AKASHI SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH TUDJMAN'S CHIEF OF
STAFF SARINIC AND ACTING HEAD OF CROATIA'S ARMED FORCES
GENERAL CERVENKO EARLIER IN THE DAY. HE BELIEVED THAT THE
CROATS WERE "TRYING HARD TO COOPERATE WITH US." THE UN'S
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN "SECTOR WEST" HAD BEEN ALMOST
COMPLETELY RESTORED. NEVERTHELESS, AKASHI WAS CONCERNED
BY THE SLOWNESS OF PROCESSING THE SERB DETAINEES AND
PERMITTING THEM TO LEAVE FOR BOSNIA OR RETURN TO THEIR
HOMES IN CROATIA. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED, RECOUNTING HOW
HE HAD CALLED SARINIC FROM STARA GRADISKA TO OBJECT TO THE
INEXCUSABLE DETENTION OF OLD MEN, WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM
OKUCANI AND THERERY OBTAINED THEIR RELEASE.
9. AKASHI SAID THAT MARTIC SEEMED TO HAVE CUT BACK ON HIS
EXPECTATIONS ALTHOUGH HE WAS STILL INSISTING ON A
"RESOLUTION" IN "SECTOR WEST." IN THE MAY 9 MEETING THE
SERBS HAD FOCUSSED ON THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE BEING HELD,
THEIR TREATMENT, AND THE PROCEDURES FOR SCREENING. (NOTE:
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ZAGREB 01822 02 OF 05 111610Z
ICFY AMBASSADOR ALFREDO MATACOTTA TOLD US THAT AT THE
MEETING ON MAY 9 EVEN MILOSEVIC WAS STILL INSISTING ON A
RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO BEFORE THE CONFLICT IN SECTOR
WEST.) SARINIC HAD TOLD AKASHI THAT ONE OF THE DETAINEES
WAS SUSPECTED OF KILLING 18 CROATS AND MAY BE TRIED FOR
WAR CRIMES. SINCE THE MAY 3 CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES
AGREEMENT CALLED FOR THE RELEASE OF ALL PRISONERS WITHOUT
ANY EXCEPTIONS, AKASHI WAS CONCERNED THAT THE SERRS WOULD
REACT VERY NEGATIVELY IF THE CROATS FAIL TO COMPLY.
--------------------------------------------- ------------
CROATS AGREE TO MONITORING OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN SECTOR WEST
--------------------------------------------- ------------
10. IN THE SARINIC-AKASHI MEETING IT WAS AGREED THAT THE
UN COULD MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SECTOR.
SPECIFICALLY, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE UN WOULD:
- SUPPORT AND FACILITATE THE RETURN OF PEOPLE TO THEIR
HOMES OR HELP TRANSPORT THEM TO BOSNIA IF SO DESIRED,
- MONITOR THE RETURN OF DISPLACED PEOPLE TO THE SECTOR,
- ASSIST WITH DEMINING AND IMPLEMENTING THE ECONOMIC
AGREEMENT,
- ASSURE PASSAGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN FRIENDS AND
RELATIVES,
- MONITOR PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTERS,
- PROTECT MINORITIES, AND
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CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 ZAGREB 01822 02 OF 05 111610Z
- MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN GENERAL.
THESE NEAR- TERM TASKS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN COOPERATION
WITH UNHCR, ECMM, AND ICRC. TO THAT END, A COORDINATION
GROUP HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED.
----------------------------------------
SERBS STILL BALKING AT TALKS WITH CROATS
----------------------------------------
11. AFTER "SECTOR WEST," AKASHI SAID HIS NEXT PRIORITY
WAS TO EASE TENSIONS IN THE OTHER SECTORS, ESPECIALLY
SECTOR EAST. THE CROATS HAVE PROPOSED A MEETING OF THE
MILITARY COMMANDERS BUT THE SERBS HAVE BEEN DRAGGING THEIR
FEET, INSISTING ON A SOLUTION IN "SECTOR WEST" FIRST.
MILOSEVIC HAD ARGUED THAT THERE COULD BE NO MILITARY
SOLUTION WITHOUT A POLITICAL SOLUTION COMING OUT OF FACE
TO FACE TALKS IN GENEVA.
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNNPTQ3391
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3391
PAGE 01 ZAGREB 01822 03 OF 05 111610Z
ACTION EUR-01
INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-10 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
PM-00 P-01 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-01
PMB-00 /017W
------------------C49B34 111610Z /38
O 111710Z MAY 95
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5739
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USLO SKOPJE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BAKU
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822
SIPDIS
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ZAGREB 01822 03 OF 05 111610Z
BAKU FOR DCM FINN
FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE
E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00
TAGS: MOPS, UN, HR, BK
SUBJECT: AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS
DECISION ON AIR STRIKES
12. AKASHI SAID THAT SARINIC WAS WILLING TO HOLD BOTH
MILITARY AND POLITICAL TALKS AND AGREED TO HOLD AT LEAST
THE INITIAL TALKS IN GENEVA (WITH SUBSEQUENT TALKS IN
CROATIA). MEANWHILE, THE UN WAS TRYING TO CONVINCE THE
SERBS NOT TO TACKLE THE ISSUES SEQUENTIALLY (I.E.,
INSISTING ON RESOLVING "SECTOR WEST" FIRST) BUT RATHER
OPEN UP DISCUSSION TO ALL ISSUES SIMULTANEOUSLY.
13. WHEN ASKED IF THE SERBS UNDERSTOOD THAT RESOLVING
"SECTOR WEST" DID NOT MEAN A RETURN OF "RSK" AUTHORITY IN
THE SECTOR, AKASHI SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE. MIKELIC,
ALTHOUGH HE MOUTHED MARTIC'S DEMANDS, SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND
THAT THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WAS THE MAY 3 AGREEMENT
(I.E., A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES, SURRENDER OF WEAPONS,
AND THE CHOICE OF REMAINING IN CROATIA OR LEAVING FOR
BOSNIA) AND NOT THE MAY 2 AGREEMENT WHICH CALLED FOR A
RETURN TO THE ST
ATUS QUO ANTE.
14. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE USG STRONGLY SUPPORTED
THE RETURN OF UN AUTHORITY IN THE SECTOR, ESPECIALLY IN
THE AREA OF MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS. AKASHI REPLIED THAT
THE UN WOULD SOON BE NEEDING GUIDANCE FROM THE SECURITY
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 ZAGREB 01822 03 OF 05 111610Z
COUNCIL IN DEFINING ITS MANDATE IN THE SECTOR AND IT WOULD
BE VERY HELPFUL IF THE USG WERE TO TAKE SUCH A POSITION.
--------------------------------------------- -------------
AKASHI CLAIMS SMITH WAFFLED, ARGUED AGAINST ON AIR STRIKES
--------------------------------------------- -------------
15. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE USG WAS VERY DISAPPOINTED AT
THE UN'S FAILURE TO RESPOND MORE FORCEFULLY TO THE RECENT
SERB ATTACKS AROUND SARAJEVO IN CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE
HEAVY WEAPONS EXCLUSION ZONE.
16. AKASHI CLAIMED THAT, IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY,
GENERAL RUPERT SMITH INITIALLY CAME DOWN AGAINST AIR
STRIKES. A FEW HOURS LATER, SMITH APPARENTLY CHANGED HIS
MIND AND CALLED FOR AIR STRIKES, WHICH WERE DENIED BASED
ON SMITH'S PREVIOUS ARGUMENTS. A FEW HOURS LATER, AKASHI
SAID, SMITH CAME AROUND TO HIS ORIGINAL POSITION. AKASHI
QUOTED FROM THE GENERAL'S INITIAL ANALYSIS, WHICH WE
PROVIDE BELOW.
17. BEGIN TEXT AS HEARD.
BEFORE REQUESTING NATO TO ATTACK IN WHAT SEEMS TO BE A
CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE EXCLUSION ZONE THERE ARE CERTAIN
FACTORS WHICH NEED TO BE BORNE IN MIND.
A. THE AIR STRIKES MIGHT NOT STOP THE SERB ATTACKS.
-
B. UNPROFOR IN BOSNIA IS UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE FROM THE
SERBS DUE TO EVENTS IN CROATIA AND GETTING CONVOY
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PAGE 04 ZAGREB 01822 03 OF 05 111610Z
CLEARANCE HAS BECOME HARDER.
C. IT CAN BE ANTICIPATED THAT SUCH A RESPONSE WILL HAVE
AN IMPACT ON THE CROATIAN SITUATION AND THE ONGOING
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE KRAJINA SERBS.
D. UNPROFOR IS NOT IN TOUCH WITH MLADIC OR OTHER BOSNIAN
SERB LEADERS.
E. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT IS TRYING TO
PROVOKE AN INTERNATIONAL REACTION AND THE BOSNIAN SERBS
MIGHT BE LOOKING FOR AN EXCUSE TO SEIZE HOSTAGES.
SO, MILITARY ACTION MAY NOT ACHIEVE THE DESIRED OBJECTIVES
AND MAY HAVE FAR-REACHING NEGATIVE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES.
END OF TEXT AS HEARD.
18. AKASHI SAID THAT HE AND FORCE COMMANDER JANVIER
SHARED SMITH'S ANALYSIS AND FELT THAT THE DISADVANTAGES
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNNPTQ3393
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3393
PAGE 01 ZAGREB 01822 04 OF 05 111611Z
ACTION EUR-01
INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-10 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
PM-00 P-01 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-01
PMB-00 /017W
------------------C49B48 111611Z /38
O 111710Z MAY 95
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5740
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USLO SKOPJE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BAKU
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822
SIPDIS
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ZAGREB 01822 04 OF 05 111611Z
BAKU FOR DCM FINN
FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE
E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00
TAGS: MOPS, UN, HR, BK
SUBJECT: AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS
DECISION ON AIR STRIKES
OUTWEIGHED THE ADVANTAGES. SINCE AT THAT TIME THE UN WAS
ENGAGED IN DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS IN KNIN AND SINCE AN AIR
STRIKE, UNLIKE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT WHERE LIVES ARE AT RISK,
DOES NOT HAVE TO BE CARRIED OUT IMMEDIATELY, (HE NOTED THE
DELAYED STRIKE ON UDBINA AIRFIELD), AKASHI AND JANVIER
FELT THEY HAD TIME TO REFLECT AND ANALYZE.
19. THEY CONSULTED WITH NEW YORK AND THE UNSYG IN MOSCOW
AND, CONSIDERING "THE TERRIBLE MOOD OF THE BOSNIAN SERBS,"
DECIDED THAT AIR STRIKES MIGHT HAVE MEANT THE END OF THE
UN MISSION IN BOSNIA. "AND MAY STILL," AKASHI ADDED.
----------------------------
BOSNIAN SERBS UNDER PRESSURE
----------------------------
20. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE
UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE. THEIR SITUATION WAS GROWING
WORSE AS THAT OF THE ROSNIAN GOVERNMENT GREW STRONGER,
WHICH EXPLAINED WHY THEY WERE DESPERATELY TRYING TO FOR A
DECISION NOW. HENCE, THE ATTACKS ON SAFE HAVENS, THE
CLOSING DOWN OF THE AIRPORT AND CONVOYS, AND THE ATTACKS
ON PEACEKEEPERS. THE UN NEEDED TO SHOW RESOLVE, INCLUDING
CONFIDENTIAL
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PAGE 03 ZAGREB 01822 04 OF 05 111611Z
AIR STRIKES, SO THAT THE SERBS WOULD UNDERSTAND THEY
CANNOT GET AWAY WITH THEIR STRATEGY.
21. AKASHI EXPRESSED HIS DOUBT THAT AIR POWER ALONE COULD
DO IT. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT NATO HAS
CONSIDERABLE AIR POWER. AKASHI ARGUED THAT UNDER THOSE
CIRCUMSTANCES UN PEACEKEEPERS WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHDRAWN.
THE AMBASSADOR AGREED THAT THEY SHOULD BE TAKEN OUT OF
HARM'S WAY, ESPECIALLY POTENTIAL HOSTAGES LIKE THE UN
MILITARY OBSERVERS. AKASHI SAID THE UN HAD NOT DONE THAT
YET AND NEEDED ADVANCE NOTICE. HE ALSO THOUGHT THAT AIR
STRIKES MIGHT SOLIDIFY THE POSITION OF THE EXTREMISTS.
THE AMBASSADOR COUNTERED THAT IT MIGHT HAVE THE OPPOSITE
EFFECT, NOTING THAT MARTIC APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN
CONSIDERABLY WEAKENED AFTER
THE CROATIAN ACTION IN SECTOR
WEST.
--------------------------------------------- -----------
"TRIED UN WAY FOR THREE YEARS, NOW ITS TIME TO TRY OURS"
--------------------------------------------- -----------
22. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE UN HAD TRIED AKASHI'S
APPROACH OF NEGOTIATION AND ACCOMMODATION FROM THE
BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT AND THE RESULT HAD REEN THAT THE
BOSNIAN SERBS HAD BEEN PERMITTED TO GET AWAY WITH
OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT. MEANWHILE, THE ONLY SUCCESSES WE HAD
SEEN TO DATE HAD BEEN AFTER A CREDIBLE THREAT OF USE OF
FORCE SUCH AS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EXCLUSION ZONE
FOLLOWING THE MARKET PLACE MASSACRE IN SARAJEVO. THE UN
AND NATO HAVE ALREADY AGREED ON HOW TO RESPOND TO THESE
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PAGE 04 ZAGREB 01822 04 OF 05 111611Z
SITUATIONS, HE ARGUED, "YOU'VE TRIED YOUR WAY FOR THREE
YEARS, NOW IT'S TIME TO TRY OURS."
23. AKASHI CAUTIONED THAT THE UN PEACEKEEPERS WERE
VULNERABLE. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THEY WERE BEING
TARGETED ANYHOW. THE SOLUTION WOULD BE TO HUNKER DOWN
UNTIL THE SERBS WERE FORCED TO BACK OFF. IF ENOUGH PAIN
WAS INFLICTED THE SERBS WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO HONOR
THE SAFE HAVENS AND REOPEN THE AIRPORT.
24. UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, AKASHI ARGUED, THE UN
WOULD BE UNABLE TO PROTECT THE ENCLAVES, KEEP THE AIRPORT
OPEN AND PROVIDE SAFE PASSAGE FOR CONVOYS. HOWEVER, IN
RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR'S QUESTIONING HE ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT TWO MONTHS HAD GONE BY WITH NO CONVOYS TO THE
ENCLAVES AND THE AIRPORT HAD BEEN CLOSED FOR A MONTH WITH
LITTLE PROSPECT FOR ANY CHANGE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION.
THE AMBASSADOR ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE UN WAS SUFFERING
TREMENDOUS DAMAGE TO ITS IMAGE BY ALLOWING ITSELF TO BE
HELD UP BY A BUNCH OF THUGS.
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNNPTQ3394
CONFIDENTIAL PTQ3394
PAGE 01 ZAGREB 01822 05 OF 05 111611Z
ACTION EUR-01
INFO LOG-00 AID-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 OASY-00 DODE-00 TEDE-00
INR-00 IO-10 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
PM-00 P-01 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-01
PMB-00 /017W
------------------C49B55 111611Z /38
O 111710Z MAY 95
FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5741
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
USLO SKOPJE
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY BAKU
AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 ZAGREB 001822
SIPDIS
VIENNA FOR BOSNIA
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 ZAGREB 01822 05 OF 05 111611Z
BAKU FOR DCM FINN
FRANKFURT PASS TO A/S HOLBROOKE
E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/11/00
TAGS: MOPS, UN, HR, BK
SUBJECT: AKASHI SAYS TENSION LOWER IN "RSK"; DEFENDS
DECISION ON AIR STRIKES
25. AKASHI NOTED THAT, SINCE THE 1956 SUEZ CRISIS, THE
UN'S PEACEKEEPING POLICY HAD BEEN THE IMPARTIAL
POSITIONING OF TROOPS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN A CONFLICT,
USING FORCE ONLY IN SELF-DEFENSE. SO FAR, THERE HAD BEEN
NO CLEAR DECISION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR THE TROOP
CONTRIBUTING NATIONS THAT A MORE ROBUST, "MUSCULAR USE OF
FORCE" WAS CALLED FOR. "IT MAY COME TO THAT," HE SAID,
"BUT FOR NOW THE SECURITY COUNCIL APPEARS TO HAVE OPTED
FOR THE MORE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF PEACEKEEPING."
26. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF
PEACEKEEPING IS APPLICABLE WHEN THERE ARE TWO SIDES THAT
WANT PEACE, WHICH WAS CLEARLY NOT THE CASE IN THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA WHERE THE SERBS HAD SHOWN THAT THEY ONLY
UNDERSTOOD THE USE OF FORCE.
27. AKASHI ASKED THE AMBASSADOR TO CONSIDER THE UN'S
CAPACITY IN THE REGION, ARGUING THAT ITS FORCES WERE
NEITHER EQUIPPED, NOR TRAINED, NOR CONFIGURED TO FIGHT A
WAR AGAINST A NON-COOPERATING PARTY. UN OBSERVATION POSTS
WERE LOCATED BETWEEN THE FRONT LINES ONLY BECAUSE THE
SIDES RESPECT THE UN'S IMPARTIALITY. THE AMBASSADOR
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PAGE 03 ZAGREB 01822 05 OF 05 111611Z
REPLIED THAT THE SERBS HAD ALREADY SHOWN THEY DID NOT
RESPECT THE UN'S NEUTRALITY AND THEREFORE CONSIDERATION
SHOULD BE GIVEN TO MOVE EXPOSED UN FORCES SUCH AS UNMOS
OUT OF HARM'S WAY AS A PRELUDE TO SERIOUS USE OF FORCE.
HE REITERATED THE POINT THAT THE UN'S EFFORTS FOR A
NEGOTIATED SOLUTION HAD NOT WORKED. THE BOSNIAN SERB
LEADERS WERE NOT REASONABLE PEOPLE. AKASHI READILY AGREED
TO THE LAST POINT.
GALBRAITH
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
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