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| Identifier: | 03ANKARA2315 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ANKARA2315 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2003-04-09 14:52:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | ECON EFIN PGOV TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002315 SIPDIS STATE FOR E, P, EUR/SE AND EB TREASURY FOR OASIA - MILLS AND LEICHTER NSC FOR QUANRUD AND BRYZA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2008 TAGS: ECON, EFIN, PGOV, TU SUBJECT: ECONOMIC MINISTERS BATTLE FOR INFLUENCE AS ERDOGAN APPOINTS LOYALISTS TO SENIOR POSITIONS IN BUREAUCRACY (U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch. Reason: 1.5(b,d) 1. (C) Summary: Infighting among economic ministers is hindering the Government's efforts to coordinate policy around an economic "super-minister." Deputy PM Sener, who was supposed to lead the economic team, appears to be losing influence to Finance Minister Unakitan, while State Minister Babacan's clout remains limited. Meanwhile, PM Erdogan is replacing a number of key technocrats with people loyal to him, in many cases from Istanbul municipality and/ or Islamic financial institutions. The lack of a clear policy coordination mechanism, combined with the latest personnel reshufflings, is adding to investor concerns about this government's willingness and ability to implement its economic program effectively. End Summary. 2. (C) The AK Party took the reins of government late last year intending to coordinate economic policy through an economic "super minister" who would oversee Treasury, Finance, and other key agencies. Initial power struggles resulted in half a loaf: Abdullatif Sener was named Deputy Prime Minister responsible for overall economic coordination, with direct responsibility for the Privatization Administration, Banking Regulatory and Supervision Agency (BRSA), and State Planning Organization, but without direct control over the Treasury or Finance Ministry. 3. (C) The months since then have witnessed constant infighting among the ministers that has hindered policy coordination and coherence. According to senior Treasury officials, Sener has been battling, unsuccessfully, to assert greater control over economic policy. He refused for two months to sign a cabinet circular naming State Minister for the Treasury Ali Babacan to chair the interagency committee on improving the foreign investment environment. He finally was instructed to sign the circular, but the delay meant that the committee did not even meet until February. Sener continues to wage the battle for management of foreign investment policy through the State Planning Organization, which is trying to wrest control of the issue from Treasury. 4. (C) Other senior officials have told us that both Babacan and Finance Minister Kemal Unakitan have largely ignored Sener, reporting directly to the Prime Minister. In recent weeks, according to government officials and some Istanbul analysts, Unakitan appears to have gained greater influence at Sener's expense, as evidenced by the government's recent decision to shift control of the Privatization Administration from Sener to the Finance Ministry; Sener also lost his role as government spokesman. There have been unsubstantiated press reports that Sener is frustrated and may be considering resigning. Analysts speculate that Unakitan's rise is due to (a) his closer personal relationship to PM Erdogan (since they worked together in Istanbul), and (b) his talent as a pragmatic problem solver. The consensus is that Babacan's clout remains limited. 5. (C) Erdogan's assumption of the Prime Ministry also has led to the long-expected replacement of a number of senior economic bureaucrats. In the past two weeks, the government has replaced the entire board of the two state banks, along with two senior Privatization Administration officials. It has also fired the head of the State Gas Pipeline Company (BOTAS) and the State Electricity Trading Company TETTAS, both of whom had reputations for competence. This week, markets are awash with rumors that Treasury U/S Faik Oztrak will be replaced in the very near future, perhaps by Istanbul Deputy Secretary General for Finance Mesut Pektas. (Note: Oztrak told us late April 8 that he had told Minister Babacan that he could not continue as a "lame duck"; the government needed either to replace him or back him fully.) 6. (C) European diplomats argued to us April 7 that Erdogan appears to be appointing new people to these key bureaucratic positions based more on their loyalty to him than on their competence or credibility with the markets. For example, the new Chairman of the State Bank Board, replacing respected banker Safa Ocak, is Zeki Sayin, who managed the Istanbul municipality-owned supermarket and then served on the board of Islamic bank Family Finans. Can Caglar, the new general manager of state-owned Zirat bank, also was an executive at Family Finans. Istanbul investment bankers and analysts with whom we met on April 3 were harshly critical of these appointments, saying the new board members lacked experience and credibility. They and others in the financial markets with whom we have spoken say they know little about Mesut Pektas, Faik Oztrak's rumored replacement, who worked for the Islamic finance house Al-Baraka Turk (as did Kemal Unakitan) before working with Erdogan in the Istanbul municipality. Faruk Demir, a leading national security analyst and Executive Director of the Advanced Strategy Center, argues that Pektas has a reputation for probity, credibility with the capital markets, and is one of the few men close to Erdogan who can give him the unvarnished truth. 7. (C) Comment: To regain market confidence, this government needs not only to implement its economic reform program, but to avoid mistakes and unhelpful signals. Unfortunately, the lack of policy coordination and discipline within the government means populists such as Energy Minister Hilmi Guler and Industry Minister Ali Coskun can continue to make unhelpful public statements that rattle the markets. It also means that the business community -- as well as the IFIs and foreign diplomats -- does not know where to turn for support of sound economic policy. (Note: When we made this complaint to Faik Oztrak April 8, he said "now you know my problem.") The government's replacement of competent technocrats with people who are either unknown or do not inspire confidence compounds the problem. PEARSON
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