US embassy cable - 03RANGOON446

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 000446 
 
SIPDIS 
 
OFFICIAL INFORMAL 
 
OFFICIAL INFORMAL FOR EAP/FO DAS MATT DALEY AND EAP/BCLTV 
DIRECTOR JUDITH STROTZ 
JAKARTA FOR AMBASSADOR RALPH BOYCE 
KUALA LUMPUR FOR POLOFF JAMES ENTWISTLE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, BM 
SUBJECT: RAZALI'S NEXT VISIT 
 
REF: A. TOKYO 1194 
     B. 02 RANGOON 1479 
     C. RANGOON 433 
     D. KUALA LUMPUR 1064 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN M. MARTINEZ; REASON 1.5(D). 
 
1.(C) Summary: Reliable sources indicate that Razali's next 
visit could be delayed until late summer and, as the Special 
Envoy's tenth trip to Rangoon slips, so does his ability to 
rescue the political dialogue. On his next visit, Razali must 
have substantial meetings with the Senior General; he should 
deliver a formal written message from SYG Annan expressing 
disappointment with the stalemate in the political dialogue, 
urging the immediate and unconditional release of all 
political prisoners, and urging the implementation of 
effective economic reform efforts; and he  must insist on 
meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi. There is no guarantee that any 
of these actions will push the SPDC down the path to 
meaningful political dialogue with the opposition.  But they 
can make it clear to the regime that the "comfort zone" they 
have established in the region does not extend to the larger 
international community.  The regime must understand that a 
visible commitment to political dialogue and economic reform 
is the only way to mitigate international condemnation and 
address the country's continuing decline.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) The latest word from reliable sources indicates that 
Razali's next visit will not take place before the very end 
of April or early May, and could be delayed until late 
summer.  As the Special Envoy's tenth trip to Rangoon slips, 
so does his ability to rescue the political dialogue from a 
quagmire of distrust and broken promises.  Although Razali 
received unanimous public statements of support at the 
February ICG meeting in Tokyo (Ref A, para 5) for continuing 
his mission, he had little to offer the group in the way of 
new strategies to move the regime (and particularly Burma's 
supreme ruler, Senior General Than Shwe) closer to a real 
political dialogue with the opposition.  In addition, since 
Razali's "face" with the generals is predicated on his 
relationship with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir, he will 
inevitably lose some of that face as the time draws near for 
Mahatir to step down from office in October.  Signs of 
Razali's waning prestige with the generals include the 
insulting few minutes he was given with Than Shwe on his 
November 2002 visit, and the regime's success in pressuring 
him to cancel a visit to Aung San Suu Kyi. 
 
3. (C) Razali has been described by those in recent contact 
with him as variously pessimistic, frustrated, or jaded.  He 
definitely appears to be out of fresh ideas.  In a side 
meeting with the COM and EAP/DAS Daley the morning after the 
Tokyo ICG, Razali floated the idea of having SYG Annan write 
a letter to Than Shwe regarding the need for political and 
economic reform but then asked somewhat helplessly "But then 
who could deliver it to Than Shwe?"  Given that the obvious 
person to deliver such a letter would be Razali himself, his 
question reinforced a sense of frustration (and perhaps his 
naivet), just as when he told the assembled diplomatic corps 
in November that he had just come to the realization that the 
agreements with anyone in the regime, including Secretary One 
Khin Nyunt, meant nothing without the final word by Than Shwe 
(see Ref B, para 2). 
 
4. (C) It was apparent at the Tokyo ICG that Razali hopes to 
use Rangoon UNDP's upcoming report on the results of its 
"Humanitarian Review Exercise" (scheduled for summer release 
to the GOB, civil society groups, the NLD and other political 
parties for the consultative process before being finalized) 
as a tool to break the political stalemate (Ref C, para 6). 
This confirms recent information received from Razali's 
assistant (see Ref D, para 5), but raises the concern that 
the humanitarian issues could be lost in acrimony between the 
NLD and the SPDC. Ralzali promoted the idea of strengthening 
the NLD by including them in development of new humanitarian 
aid programs and he should press the regime to allow 
participation by the NLD and civil society organizations in 
addressing the dire humanitarian needs of the Burmese people. 
What Razali should not do is insist on making dialogue 
between Aung San Suu Kyi and the Senior General/ Secretary 
One an absolute condition for implementing the 
recommendations that will arise from the UNDP assessment. 
 
5. (C) We have also heard that Razali has toyed with the idea 
that 2006 (when Burma takes over the chairmanship of ASEAN) 
could be used as a target date for possible moves toward some 
powersharing with the NLD.  This is unrealistic - the regime, 
and most of all, Than Shwe, has no intention of sharing their 
place in the ASEAN sun with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD. The 
regime's active regional diplomacy with its ASEAN partners, 
China, India, and Bangladesh plainly demonstrates its 
determination to show that the regime can maintain its power 
and gain regional acceptance, even legitimization, without 
any concessions to the democratic opposition. 
 
6. (C) Razali used the Tokyo ICG meeting to exhort the ASEAN 
members to use their good offices to push the regime to 
address economic and humanitarian issues, which would in turn 
impact positively on the political process.  We also 
understand that in contacts with our embassy in Jakarta he 
floated the idea of approaching the Indonesian government to 
use their influence on the regime.  It seems Razali thinks 
that perhaps the Indonesians can hold them out as an exemplar 
of a military government's transition to democracy and 
convince the SPDC that reforms are necessary.  However, we 
must agree with Jakarta's assessment of Razali's idea - it 
will have little resonance with the Indonesian military or 
foreign ministry - just as pressuring the junta for political 
or economic reform has no resonance with ASEAN as a whole. 
ASEAN's distaste for pressuring the regime was aptly 
illustrated at the Tokyo ICG where the Burmese FonMin 
successfully lobbied ASEAN countries to keep their 
Rangoon-based ambassadors at home (Ref  B). 
 
7. (C) Razali has also expressed interest in a so-called 
"invitation to dialogue with the U.S."  issued by the regime 
a few days after the Tokyo ICG. Again, this is a misplaced 
hope. This press statement, in which the regime called on the 
U.S. to "join us in open, constructive dialogue towards 
humanitarian, economic and political development," was never 
an official overture by the junta.  In fact, after we saw it 
in the foreign press, we contacted MOFA, which denied 
knowledge of the statement.  Two days later, the COM spoke 
personally with Secretary One (General Khin Nyunt), and the 
Deputy FonMin requesting a formal opportunity to explore the 
meaning of "invitation to dialogue", and the following week 
the COM posed the same question to Senior General Than Shwe. 
 The response from all the "decision makers"?  A weak smile, 
a nod, and an evasive "yes, we can discuss it."   The only 
"discussion" of this "invitation to dialogue" has come from 
SPDC spokesman Col. Hla Min who said what was meant was that 
the regime was open to more visits by US officials as long as 
they did not "come to lecture." 
 
8.  (C)Comment: What should Razali be aiming at on his tenth 
visit?  The Special Envoy is one of the few arrows that we 
have in the quiver and the visit could be our last shot, so 
he must be aimed directly at Senior General Than Shwe. Razali 
cannot accept a dismissive meeting on the fly as he did on 
his last visit - he must have substantial meetings with the 
Senior General.  Razali should also deliver a formal written 
message from SYG Annan expressing disappointment with the 
stalemate in the political dialogue, urging the immediate and 
unconditional release of all political prisoners, and urging 
the implementation of effective economic reform efforts. 
Razali must also insist on meeting with Aung San Suu Kyi (and 
not cave in to the Senior General as both he and PM Mahatir 
have done on their most recent trips).  There is no guarantee 
that any of these actions will push the SPDC down the path to 
dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi.  But they can signal to the 
regime that the "comfort zone" they have established in the 
region does not extend to the larger international community. 
 The regime must understand that a visible commitment to 
political dialogue and economic reform is the only way to 
mitigate international condemnation and address the country's 
continuing decline. End Comment. 
Martinez