US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI1700

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001700 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR EB - TONY WAYNE, NEA/FO - LAROCCO AND 
CROCKER, NEA/ARP - JONES AND HEFFERNAN, NEA/RA - 
PSUTPHIN, EB/ESC/ESP -GGLASS, S/CT - CBLACK AND 
FOX, AND IO/PHO -APEREZ 
 
TREASURY FOR OGC - DAUFHAUSER, DAS FOR TERRORISM 
AND VIOLENT CRIMES (JZARATE), AND TERRORIST 
FINANCING TASK FORCE 
TREASURY PASS OFAC FOR NEWCOMB 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/13 
TAGS: EFIN, PTER, ETTC, ECON, TC 
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCING:  CONCERNS REGARDING 
HUMAN APPEAL INTERNATIONAL 
 
REF:  A) SARAJEVO 1028, B) ABU DHABI 1490, 
 
      C) STATE 79970 
 
1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR MARCELLE M. WAHBA 
FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D). 
 
2.  (S/NF) Post read with interest ref A reporting 
concerning Human Appeal International (HAI).  We 
were unclear, however, as to the sourcing of the 
information.  Some factual inaccuracies, for 
example, the assertion  in para. three of ref A, 
that the Muslim Brotherhood has been designated by 
the USG as a Middle East terrorist organization, 
suggest  that some of this information,  may be of 
questionable provenance.  With reference to the HAI 
employee currently being detained, we would note 
that one bad employee does not make an entire 
organization male fide.  ORCA at post has not been 
able to confirm the substance of these allegations; 
we therefore would very much appreciate 
clarification with regard to the origin of this 
information.  We also request that the Department 
forward to us (via intel channels if necessary) the 
case summary regarding HAI. 
 
3.  (S/NF)  HAI is the third-largest charitable 
organization in the UAE.  It is federally 
registered and licensed (via the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Affairs) and is reportedly closely 
connected to the ruling family of Ajman emirate, 
where the organization is based.  As noted in ref 
B, we have seen no evidence to suggest that the 
leadership of HAI is male fide (i.e., actively and 
knowingly operating in support of terrorist 
groups).  If such information were available and 
compelling, we strongly believe that the UAE 
authorities would act promptly but quietly to 
replace the charity's management and stop any 
support for terrorist groups. 
 
4.  (S/NF)  Previous actions by HAI and the UAEG in 
response to our concerns regarding support for 
Chechen groups demonstrates the willingness of the 
charity itself, and the government of the UAE, to 
act to prevent abuse.  Our previous quiet 
representations led to the UAEG intervening quietly 
with HAI.  As a result of those approaches, HAI 
stopped funding those Chechen groups of concern to 
us -- although we would note that, from the Emirati 
perspective, our view with regard to which Chechen 
groups were or were not involved in "terrorist" 
activity has tended to fluctuate over time.  The 
UAE Central Bank Governor has frequently pointed to 
the HAI/Chechen issue, noting that the USG had 
initially not opposed support to these groups, but 
later changed position.  The Governor has suggested 
that post facto condemnation by the USG regarding 
alleged support for "terrorist groups" in Chechnya 
would have greater resonance if our own thinking 
regarding these groups had been consistent over 
time. 
 
5.  (S/NF)  Clearly, there are sensitivities here 
about charities, and about HAI in particular given 
the previous imbroglio over aid to Chechen groups. 
The key point to be emphasized is that the UAE has 
been an invaluable ally in the war against 
terrorism and terrorist financing.  The UAE has 
been instrumental in the capture of a number of 
senior Al-Qaida operatives and that cooperation is 
ongoing.  The UAE also continues to freeze more 
than two million USD belonging to the Al-Barakat 
organization, and has provided literally tens of 
thousands of pages of bank records and other 
documents -- including orginals when necessary -- 
that are crucial to the Moussaoui trial and to our 
ongoing investigation into the 9/11 case.  With the 
capture of a top Al-Qaida 9/11 financier during the 
raid on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, we anticipate that 
there will be more requests that we will need to 
make of the UAE as we trace AQ's financial flows -- 
the Central Bank Governor has indicated that he 
will welcome those inquiries.  To needlessly 
antagonize the UAEG by publicly embarrassing them 
via listing of HAI -- even if it is only listing of 
branch offices -- strikes us as potentially highly 
counter-productive.  That such a listing might be 
made on the basis of inaccurate information would 
undermine our ability to work constructively with 
the Central Bank and the UAEG more broadly. 
 
6.  (S/NF)  As noted above, the UAEG has given 
every sign of being prepared to act against groups 
quickly and decisively -- once credible information 
is provided.  In the post-9/11 environment, the UAE 
permitted, for example, the vetting of the Muhammad 
Bin Rashid Charitable Foundation in Dubai by a USG 
team (which found no evidence of wrong-doing; our 
intel proved inaccurate).  The MbR Foundation is 
directly associated with the de facto ruler of 
Dubai, so a willigness to open its books to us 
represented a real leap of faith on the part of the 
UAEG -- but also a strong commitment to making sure 
that UAE funds were not being misused.  Based upon 
our experience here, we believe that if we have a 
compelling case, we should go to the Emiratis at 
the political level and enlist their support for a 
thorough vetting of the organization.  But listing 
HAI as a terrorist organization based on 
unsupported assertions of links to a cast of 
terrorist organizations will not help us address 
any problems which may exist.  It is essential that 
we see the basis of every assertion and the case 
summary on which these listing recommendations are 
being made.  This is likely to achieve both a 
thorough investigation and effective measures to 
address any problem. 
 
Wahba