US embassy cable - 03RANGOON433

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NEW FUNDING INITIATIVE: WHY NOT KEEP AN OPEN MIND?

Identifier: 03RANGOON433
Wikileaks: View 03RANGOON433 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2003-04-08 02:46:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: EAID SOCI BM
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 000433 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AID/ANE 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, EAP DAS DALEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2013 
TAGS: EAID, SOCI, BM 
SUBJECT: NEW FUNDING INITIATIVE: WHY NOT KEEP AN OPEN MIND? 
 
REF: A. STATE 81067 
     B. TOKYO 1194 
 
Classified By: COM CARMEN MARTINEZ FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph seven. 
 
2. (C) Summary: The language of the recent FY 2003-04 omnibus 
spending measure's managers' report (asking us to work with 
the NLD on a "new initiative" to outline a comprehensive 
needs assessment) seems at odds with subsequent guidance (Ref 
A) limiting this assessment only to democracy-related 
programming.  We ask that the Department revisit this issue 
with the Hill to see if there is support for a slightly less 
restrictive approach that would still address the primary 
concern that USG assistance does not in any way benefit the 
SPDC regime.  End summary. 
 
3. (C) We appreciate Ref A's elaboration on the language in 
the FY 2003-04 omnibus spending measure's managers' report 
regarding working with the NLD to identify and address the 
"urgent needs" of the Burmese people.  We were surprised, 
though, by the expectation that traditional limitations on 
general ESF funding would apply to this "new initiative." 
The managers' report discusses other earmark-funded programs, 
namely for fighting HIV/AIDS, that are not limited to 
democracy promotion.  We welcomed what we thought was indeed 
a "new initiative" along these lines; to look -- as always in 
tandem with the NLD and its leadership -- with an unbiased, 
unjaded eye at what the most pressing priorities are. 
Consulting with the NLD on the best way for the USG to 
promote democracy in Burma does not constitute a "new 
initiative."  This has been the backbone of our work here for 
many years. 
 
4. (C) The managers' report asks us to use the "expertise of 
the leadership" of the NLD to determine and address the 
"urgent needs of the people of Burma."  Nowhere does it imply 
that the intent of the managers was to limit these findings 
to new democracy programming.  Indeed, from elsewhere in the 
managers' report (such as the section requesting a report 
from U.S. AID on the conditions of Burmese refugees and 
displaced persons) it is evident that Congress this year is 
interested in exploring the "root causes" of the crises 
facing the people of Burma.  This is a laudable objective. 
Though lack of freedom and deplorable human rights are a 
fundamental reason for the suffering of all Burmese people 
(displaced or not), the more immediate causes of the 
humanitarian crisis facing the Burmese people are horrendous 
health, sanitation, and educational deficiencies.  These are 
the issues that other bilateral donors are now addressing, in 
some cases quite independently of the SPDC. 
 
5. (C) Limiting before the fact any discussion to democracy 
promotion programs seems to go against the managers' intent. 
It also ignores the NLD leadership's previously expressed 
ideas that "urgent needs of the people of Burma" go well 
beyond such programs.  The NLD leadership has welcomed U.S. 
support for HIV/AIDS, childhood development programs, 
environmental conservation, and protection of workers rights 
inside the country.  While none of these fits directly within 
the limited definition of democracy and governance programs, 
there's no question that all would reside on the list sought 
by Congress of "urgent needs." 
 
6. (C) A third argument for allowing more slack in the reins 
is that by giving the NLD and its leadership more flexibility 
to guide USG assistance efforts, the party will gain status 
and credibility with the SPDC, hopefully convincing it of the 
NLD's important and indispensable role in the future of the 
country.  As reported in Ref B, at the most recent ICG 
meeting in Tokyo, U.N. Special Envoy Razali urged donors to 
work closely with the NLD while developing aid programs 
specifically as a way to build up ASSK and the NLD and 
perhaps get the dialogue jump started.  From the local angle, 
U.S. assistance to NLD-promoted humanitarian projects will 
help cement the role of the NLD as a party truly interested 
in and dedicated to the "needs of the people." 
 
7. (C)  Action request:  We urge the Department to return to 
the Hill to revisit this matter with all/all authors of the 
report language, to decide whether it's truly in USG 
interests to put the democracy promotion limitation on the 
consultative process before we've heard what the NLD has to 
say.  We propose instead to approach the NLD and its 
leadership with the broader aim of identifying programs that 
address the urgent needs of the people (as requested by the 
report language) and also scrupulously avoid "providing 
direct support to the SPDC" and its affiliated organizations. 
Martinez 

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