US embassy cable - 03GUATEMALA927

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AMBASSADOR PRESSES TORTURE CASE WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE MORAN

Identifier: 03GUATEMALA927
Wikileaks: View 03GUATEMALA927 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Guatemala
Created: 2003-04-07 22:06:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL PGOV MOPS SNAR GT
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
S E C R E T GUATEMALA 000927 
 
SIPDIS 
 
HARARE FOR DAVID WHARTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, SNAR, GT 
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES TORTURE CASE WITH MINISTER OF 
DEFENSE MORAN 
 
REF: A. GUATEMALA 770 
     B. GUATEMALA 884 
     C. GUATEMALA 801 
 
Classified By: Robert E. Copley for reasons 1.5 (b) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Ambassador called on Minister of Defense 
Robin Moran on April 3 to emphasize that resorting to illegal 
detention and torture as appears to have occurred in the 
March 6 drug seizure in Rio Hondo, Zacapa is totally 
unacceptable.  Moran clearly understood that these methods 
put Guatemala's recertification at risk.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C)  Following up on similar calls on President Portillo 
(ref A) and the Minister of Interior (ref B), the Ambassador 
made clear to Moran that attempting to fight drugs in this 
way is not only counter-productive, it is wrong on every 
count.  Such methods are unnecessary and hugely prejudicial 
to the GOG's efforts to be certified as a fully cooperating 
partner on drugs.  The Ambassador reminded Moran that similar 
(albeit, more serious) abuses last year by the former 
anti-narcotics police (DOAN) in the Chocon case were a major 
reason for decertification as well as the Embassy's decision 
to severely restrict its assistance to the DOAN. 
 
3. (S)  The Ambassador told Moran that there were strong 
allegations that the military (as opposed to police) were 
responsible for the abuses.  He added that the personnel 
involved appear to have planted drugs on the three people 
detained and that, too, is totally unacceptable. 
 
4. (C) Moran, who had clearly anticipated the purpose of the 
Ambassador's visit, started to make a lame defense, but 
decided better to drop it.  Moran said that he had already 
given strict orders limiting the military's role in the 
counter-narcotics effort to providing transportation to 
police and prosecutors and to providing perimeter security 
when an operation is mounted. 
 
5. (C) Comment: Moran seemed to clearly understand that the 
abusive methods evidenced in the Zacapa seizure put 
recertification at risk.  If not for the Zacapa incident, 
Moran might have hoped for congratulations from the 
Ambassador due to recent successes involving effective 
military support for counter-narcotics police operations (ref 
C) that demonstrate the type of results possible with proper 
cooperation.  Instead, the Ambassador treated Moran to a 
close inspection of the military's black-eye over this 
incident. 
HAMILTON 

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