US embassy cable - 03SANAA671

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000671 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2013 
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PTER, CASC, YM, EAC 
SUBJECT: TF1Z01:  SANAA EAC MEETING APRIL 6 
 
REF: SANAA 661 (NODIS) 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alan G. Misenheimer, for reasons 1.5 ( 
b) and (d). 
 
1.  (S/NF)  The Charge convened an Emergency Action Committee 
(EAC) meeting on April 6 to assess threat information and 
discuss Sheraton security in light of concerns expressed by 
President Saleh April 5 (reftel).  Key offices and personnel 
represented at the meeting included: ADMIN, Charge, CONS, 
DAO, FPD, OMC, ORCA, PD, POL/ECON, RMO and SOC YEMEN. 
 
2.  (S/NF)  ORCA reported no new specific threat information. 
 
3.  (S/NF)  EAC discussed Sheraton Hotel security (currently 
home to 24 Embassy TDY personnel, nearly all of whom are 
military).  President Saleh April 5 asked Charge if Embassy 
would consider removing its personnel from the Sheraton Hotel 
to the Embassy for the duration of the war in Iraq.  He cited 
no specific threat information, which was corroborated by PSO 
Chief Gamish.  Saleh brought subject up in a matter of fact 
manner, and Gamish asked Charge to "think about it." 
 
4.  (S)  On April 6, RSO raised Sheraton security with MOI 
second-in-command BG Ahmed Sunidar.  RSO asked if ROYG was 
aware of any threat to the hotel, and whether MOI saw cause 
to consider relocating to another location during the Iraq 
war.  Sunidar expressed surprise at the idea that the 
Americans saw a need to depart the Sheraton Hotel.  Sunidar 
had no threat related information regarding the Sheraton 
Hotel and, because of the line of questions, asked if the 
Embassy had any knowledge of a threat.  Sunidar went on to 
list reasons that the Sheraton Hotel was the best most secure 
choice, which included recent physical security upgrades, 
best utilization of MOI security assets, and close proximity 
to the American Embassy which reduced the time and distance 
Embassy employees were exposed as soft targets while driving 
to and from work.  (Note:  Sunidar was the ranking ROYG 
official at a recent working lunch, also attended by DCM and 
RSO, in which on-site security arrangements were discussed in 
great detail with the Sheraton management.  The ROYG has been 
cooperative and forward-leaning in upgrading hotel security 
over past months.  End Note.) 
 
------------------------ 
Saleh's Possible Reasons 
------------------------ 
 
5.  (S)  EAC discussed possible reasons for Saleh's 
suggestion, including: 
 
--  uneasiness on Saleh's part that security is not solely 
provided by the ROYG at the Sheraton; 
 
--  non-specific threat information that he is unwilling to 
divulge; 
 
--  commercial reasons possibly relating to the Sheraton; 
 
--  an unclear understanding on the part of Saleh of the 
comprehensive security measures in place at the Sheraton (in 
contrast to the perfunctory measures in place at Tourist 
City); 
 
-- desire on Saleh's part to appear to be "doing something" 
to ensure Amcit security. 
 
EAC members lacked sufficient information to draw any 
conclusions about Saleh's reasoning.  They agreed that a) it 
could not be ignored but b) was hard to understand and 
impossible to justify on strict security grounds -- 
particularly in the absence of specific threat information. 
 
-------------------- 
Comparative Security 
-------------------- 
 
6.  (S)  EAC members discussed the security provisions at the 
Sheraton Hotel, security at other possible locations and the 
ramifications of a change, noting the following: 
 
-- following numerous security upgrades in recent months, the 
Sheraton is the second-hardest target in Yemen after the 
Embassy; 
 
--  when specific threat information was known in late 2002 
about possible vehicle-borne attacks against hotels in Sanaa 
and Aden, the EAC assessed all available options and decided 
that the Sheraton remained preferable to any alternative 
housing site(s); 
 
--  comprehensive security measures at the Sheraton include 
1)  equipment such as drop barriers able to stop vehicles 
going up to 40MPH and metal detectors, 2)  personnel 
well-trained in using all equipment and 3)  procedures that 
are in place and working well; 
 
--  other possible locations such as Tourist City near the 
Embassy are much less secure, with the possibility of 
vehicle-borne threat at a much higher level; 
 
--  wide dispersal of personnel to other locations throughout 
Sanaa would stress the capability of the ROYG to protect them; 
 
--  removing personnel from the Sheraton could degrade their 
security posture and make it difficult to raise the level of 
Sheraton security again after the Iraq war ends. 
 
-------------------------- 
Suggested Embassy Response 
-------------------------- 
 
7.  (S/NF)  EAC members decided to respond to Saleh's 
concerns by doing the following: 
 
--  using existing ROYG channels via ORCA and RSO to pursue a 
dialogue on the issue; 
 
--  offering to brief appropriate ROYG officials, perhaps 
including the President, on details of Sheraton security with 
a comparison of the poorer security offered by other options; 
 
--  telling ROYG that the Embassy is considering the issue 
seriously, reassessing Sheraton security, actively seeking 
options that would provide comparable or superior security to 
that provided at the Sheraton, and minimizing official Amcit 
presence at the Sheraton and in Yemen as a whole; 
 
-- re-doubling Embassy's focus on Sheraton security to ensure 
that equipment, security personnel and equipment continue in 
top working order; 
 
--  putting the onus back on the ROYG to tell Embassy of any 
places that might be more secure than the Sheraton and of any 
possible threats immediately. 
MISENHEIMER