US embassy cable - 03AMMAN2068

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

TFIZ01: ZARQA BUSINESS COMMUNITY PONDERS IRAQ'S FUTURE

Identifier: 03AMMAN2068
Wikileaks: View 03AMMAN2068 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Amman
Created: 2003-04-06 13:35:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: ECON EAID PREL IZ JO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 002068 
 
SIPDIS 
 
USDOC FOR 4520/ITA/MAC/ONE/COBERG 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2013 
TAGS: ECON, EAID, PREL, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: ZARQA BUSINESS COMMUNITY PONDERS IRAQ'S 
FUTURE 
 
Classified By: DCM Greg Berry, reasons 1.5 (b,d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (c)  Business community leaders in Zarqa, Jordan's 
industrial center, are hopeful that a post-war Iraq will open 
numerous new business opportunities for Jordanian companies. 
They fear, though, that Iraq's diverse social structure makes 
the country vulnerable to collapse into internecine warfare 
as soon as coalition troops vacate.     While their political 
musings are typical of the overall Jordanian gloom about the 
politics of Iraq, their optimism about economic prospects 
puts them - along with much of Jordan's business community - 
at odds with the "street" regarding Iraq's potential future. 
End summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
IRAQ - BUSINESS PROSPECTS GOOD... 
--------------------------------- 
 
2.  (c)  A March 19 meeting with the board of the Zarqa 
Chamber of Industry, a relatively progressive collection of 
business leaders in Jordan's second city, quickly morphed 
into a spirited discussion about Iraq and internal politics 
in Jordan.  While not doubting that the coalition would 
ultimately be successful in ousting Saddam from Iraq, ZCI 
Chairman Mohammed al Tell and other board members were 
apprehensive at the possible shape of a post-Saddam Iraq. 
Tell spoke at length about the uncertainties that would 
continue to cloud the future of Iraq and Jordan's 
relationship with it. 
 
3.  (c)  On the economic side, Tell and board vice-chairman 
Thabet al Wir acknowledged that there would likely be 
opportunities in both the short and long term for Jordanian 
companies.  Initially, this would come through contracts with 
relief agencies in providing food and medicines to Iraq. 
They noted the transport sector would ultimately benefit as 
well, as Aqaba's historical position as a primary port for 
Iraq returned to normal after over a decade of sanctions. 
They admitted, though, that Jordanian companies had not made 
any plans to re-enter the market, and were waiting instead to 
see what opportunities came to them from the donor community. 
 
------------------------------------ 
...PROVIDED THE COUNTRY STAYS INTACT 
------------------------------------ 
 
4.  (c)  They conditioned this assessment, though, upon a 
quick end to the war and the immediate creation of a viable, 
sustainable government of, by, and for Iraqis.  Their 
greatest fear, they said, was a total breakdown in civil 
order in the absence of Saddam's apparatus of repression.  A 
gap of even a week, they said, between the fall of Saddam's 
regime and the establishment of a legitimate successor 
government that represented the fractious interests of all 
Iraqis, could easily lead to revenge killings and, if left 
unchecked, ultimately to a complete breakdown in civil order. 
 
5.  (c)  They saw Iraq as riven by a vast multitude of social 
divisions - ethnic divisions between Kurds, Arabs, Turks, 
Causasians, and others; religious divisions between Shia, 
Sunnis, Christians, and smaller groupings of faiths; 
political gradations among Saddam hardliners, Baathist 
apparatchiks, dissidents and liberals; and socio-economic 
divisions between urban rich and poor, between rural tribes 
and city-dwellers, and between middle/upper class diaspora 
and an economically depressed resident population.  Many of 
these fault lines are further reinforced by geographical 
divisions, and any or all could become flash points in the 
absence of strong authority following the economic damage 
brought by war. 
 
6.  (c)  The key to avoiding such a dissolution into chaos, 
the Chamber leaders contended, would be a short, successful 
war followed by a swift pull-out of foreign troops coupled 
with the installation of an internally legitimized central 
authority strong - or savvy - enough to keep these groups 
from tearing at one another.  A critical tool for such an 
authority would be immediate infusions of aid to feed and 
house Iraqis and to quickly pump money into the local economy 
through reconstruction projects. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7.  (c)  The Chamber's analysis of a post-Saddam Iraq 
predates the onset of hostilities, but nevertheless presents 
a sobering Jordanian assessment of likely post-war 
challenges.  In this typical discussion of Jordanian 
anxieties, it was easy to elicit opinions about what will 
tear Iraq apart.  It proved far more difficult to explore 
factors that might serve to hold Iraq together - 
urbanization, a historically strong middle class, an educated 
population, a supportive diaspora, and a relatively strong 
resource and industry base.  Yet, as dark an assessment as 
the Chamber had about political challenges, they - like a 
good percentage of Jordan's business community - continue to 
be more positive than the "street" about the prospects for 
quick economic benefits born of relief and reconstruction 
activities. 
GNEHM 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04