US embassy cable - 03ABUJA638

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000638 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR JENDAYI FRAZER 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
CAIRO FOR MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O.12958: DECL: 04/3/08 
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MASS, PGOV, IV, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: ECOWAS EXEC SEC CHAMBAS SAYS REGIONAL 
DEPLOYMENT NEEDS MONEY 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reason 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: During a hurried April 3 dinner at the 
Ambassador's residence, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Chambas 
said he was accompanying President Obasanjo to Cote d' 
Ivoire for the coalition government's Council of State 
meeting April 4. Obasanjo hopes that his attendance, along 
with Presidents Kufuor, Wade and Eyadema, would convince 
the rebel leaders to attend. Chambas said an ECOWAS 
Ministerial would be held next week in Abidjan to discuss 
ECOMICI financing which would run out this month.  He 
expected that the Ministerial would task a smaller group to 
visit donor countries to elicit financial support.  Chambas 
also stated that ECOWAS and Nigeria were seriously 
considering the use of Nigeria soldiers to provide security 
for the Ivoirien Government.  End Summary. 
 
 
2. (C) At an April 2 dinner with Ambassador Jeter, ECOWAS 
Executive Secretary Mohammed Chambas said he was leaving 
Abuja early the next morning to accompany President 
Obasanjo to Yamoussoukro. Chambas explained that President 
Obasanjo, Wade, Eyadema and Kufuor decided to go to Cote 
d'Ivoire to end rebel reluctance to participate in the 
National Reconciliation Government (NRG).  Rebel leaders 
had boycotted prior meetings; the Heads of State feared the 
rebel absence, if continued, could fatally undermine the 
NRG. The regional leaders thought their presence, by 
reducing the rebel's security concerns, would encourage the 
rebels to attend the session.  When apprised that the 
presidential quartet would be in Yamoussoukro, MPCI leader 
Soro promised to attend.  Chambas said that Soro and other 
rebels leaders had great reverence and respect for the 
elder statesmen in West Africa, and especially Obasanjo. 
He thought the quartet's effort would help. 
 
 
3. (C) Chambas stated he would remain in Cote d'Ivoire to 
attend an ECOWAS Ministerial next week.  He said Foreign 
Ministers would meet April 7 or 8 with the priority agenda 
item being ECOMICI funding. Without additional monies, 
funds to sustain the deployment would dry up by the end of 
April. The Ministers needed to discuss how to continue 
funding the deployment. He claimed that states 
participating in the force were very concerned about this 
issue.  Not only did they want the deployment to be 
financed for the Ivoiriens' sake but they were also worried 
about the effects in their capitals of soldiers returning 
home unpaid and disgruntled. 
 
 
4. (C) Chambas claimed that the costs for a six month 
deployment of the current ECOMICI force was 26 million USD. 
Compounding the financial woes, Chambas said the deployment 
would last at least until 2003 elections and for a time 
there after.  Ideally, ECOWAS would like to enlarge the 
force to approximately 3,400 soldiers, given the force's 
expanded mandate under the Marscoussis Accord, including 
border patrol, protection of NRG members, cease-fire 
monitoring and possibly disarmament and demobilization. 
All in all, ECOWAS has projected an overall budget of 160 
million USD for deployment of the enlarged force until 
2005. 
 
 
5. (C) Chambas thought the Ministers would agree to send a 
small team (Ghanaian, Nigerian, Senegalese and Ivorian 
Foreign Ministers) to visit G-8 and other potential donor 
capitals to seek financial support.  A donor's conference 
has also been mentioned. 
 
 
6. (C) In response to Ambassador Jeter's question about 
Nigerian participation in Cote d'Ivoire, Chambas replied 
that the possibility of using Nigerian troops to provide 
security to the Ivorien government was under serious 
consideration.  Everyone recognized that Nigeria could not 
participate formally in ECOMICI due to domestic political 
considerations.  However, having Nigerian troops serve 
independent of ECOMICI may be more palatable, he offered. 
If this deployment were accepted, it eventually could pave 
the way for a slow integration of Nigerian soldiers into 
the regional deployment "through the back door."  At the 
very least, such a Nigerian presence would free ECOMICI 
soldiers from this protective duty, allowing them to focus 
on other aspects of their mandate. 
 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT: Although fully cognizant of the challenges 
ahead, Chambas was somewhat sanguine about chances for slow 
progress on the political front in Cote d'Ivoire.  His 
greatest concern was the continued funding of the regional 
deployment. Everyone agrees that more troops are needed. 
However, unless ECOWAS can find more money relatively 
quickly, Chambas is worried that the contingents already 
there might begin to consider folding their tents, and that 
would be terrible blow to the pursuit of peace in Cote 
d'Ivoire. 
 
 
JETER