US embassy cable - 03ABUJA637

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000637 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SF, ZI, NI, SADC 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: DEMARCHE: DEMOCRATIC EXPRESSION CRUSHED 
IN ZIMBABWE 
 
 
REF: STATE 76465 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reasons: 1.5 (B & D). 
 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Ambassador Jeter delivered the demarche 
on Zimbabwe to President Obasanjo on March 26.  At that 
meeting he was joined by British High Commissioner Philip 
Thomas.  Allied with South Africa, the GON opposes 
continued suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth, and 
wants to disband the Troika.  Despite Mugabe's 
recklessness, publicly ostracizing Mugabe remains 
unacceptable to Obasanjo. For as long as he can, Obasanjo 
will stick to an approach of private dialogue and mild 
suasion in hopes of coaxing Mugabe to soften his violent 
opposition to political reform. END SUMMARY. 
 
 
2.  (C)  Meeting with President Obasanjo March 26 to 
discuss the crisis in the Niger Delta (septel), British 
High Commissioner Philip Thomas and Ambassador Jeter used 
the meeting as an opportunity to discuss Zimbabwe.  In an 
earlier meeting on the same day, Obasanjo's Foreign Affairs 
Advisor Ad'obe Obe had mentioned that Commonwealth 
Secretary General McKinnon had visited Abuja on March 25 to 
 
SIPDIS 
meet Obasanjo and plan next steps in light of the end of 
the one year suspension of Zimbabwe (in March) and current 
events in that country.  After canvassing some Commonwealth 
members, McKinnon had concluded there was a consensus for 
extending the suspension, Ad'obe said. 
 
 
3.  (C) In the meeting later that night with Obasanjo he 
confirmed that the GON disagreed with McKinnon's assertion. 
South Africa also viewed continued suspension as 
unacceptable and supported the reinstatement of Zimbabwe at 
the expiry of the suspension in March.  President Obasanjo 
told Thomas and Jeter that he concurred with Mbeki's 
position.  McKinnon was mistaken about consensus within the 
Commonwealth, Obasanjo contended.  South Africa, Nigeria 
and several other African states opposed extending Mugabe's 
suspension.  The Commonwealth was effectively at an impasse 
- with Obasanjo and Mbeki representing one stream of 
thought and McKinnon representing its antithesis. 
 
 
4.  (C)  Obasanjo continued that McKinnon had developed a 
list of "5-6" issues to raise with Mugabe (Obasanjo avoided 
mentioning the specific issues.)  Obasanjo revealed that 
his gameplan was to visit Zimbabwe after the Nigerian 
elections on April 19.  In Zimbabwe he would personally 
raise these issues with Mugabe and press him to deal with 
these matters.  It was clear that these issues were of 
great concern within the Commonwealth, and it was in 
Mugabe's interest to deal with them, Obasanjo declared, 
contending that he "would find a way to help Mugabe out of 
his current predicament." 
 
 
5.  (C)  Obasanjo further stated that after delivering his 
message to Mugabe, the Commonwealth should wait a 
"reasonable period" to give Mugabe a chance to act.  After 
that, the body should decide if the Zimbabwean President 
should be invited to the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meeting (CHOGM) if the suspension should be reactivated. 
If Mugabe made favorable progress, Obasanjo said he favored 
Mugabe's return to the fold in time to attend the CHOGM. 
 
 
6. (C) Obasanjo also said he supported Mbeki's position 
that the Troika (Australia, South Africa and Nigeria) 
should be disbanded.  His chain of logic was that sanctions 
should not be automatically extended since there was no 
consensus in the Commonwealth for sanctions.  If sanctions 
were no longer valid, then the Troika had lost its reason 
of existence. 
 
 
7.  (C) In response to Thomas' question about Mugabe 
stepping down, Obasanjo responded the British were not 
approaching this sensitive matter properly.  Obasanjo said 
he had no difficulty raising the issue of retirement with 
Mugabe; the key was how to put the issue to him.  Mugabe 
had to be convinced that it would be in his own interests 
to leave office, and that conclusion could not be reached 
through direct confrontation with him. 
 
 
8.  (C)  COMMENT:  The Troika is split, perhaps irrevocably 
so.  Unfortunately, Zimbabwe became an "us versus them" 
issue within the Troika with South Africa managing to pull 
Nigeria its way.  This probably did not take heavy exertion 
on Pretoria's part. Still, there ultimately may be some 
space between the Nigerian and South African positions. 
Nigeria sides with South Africa on ending the suspension 
and on the fate of the Troika; however, Nigeria also seems 
to realize that, at some point in the not too distant 
future, defending Zimbabwe will become untenable.  For now, 
however, Nigeria is seeking every out, not only for Mugabe, 
but for itself. 
 
 
9.  (C)  Comment Continued:  Nigeria does not want to 
condemn an old ally and a leader who once symbolized 
African liberation.  Thus, Nigeria will temporize and will 
be loathe to criticize Mugabe too harshly.  The Nigerian 
preference is: (1) to meet with Mugabe in late April, (2) 
in order to raise the "concerns" of the Commonwealth, (3) 
with a decision on reinstating Zimbabwe (4) delayed until 
Mugabe has a chance to address these concerns is 
characteristic of this mind-set. 
 
 
JETER