US embassy cable - 03ABUJA629

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000629 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
CAIRO FOR MAXSTADT 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2013 
TAGS: EPET, PREL, MOPS, PHUM, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: CONCERN FOR CRISIS IN THE DELTA 
 
 
REF: A) ABUJA 555 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reasons: 
1.5 (B & D). 
 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: During a March 26 evening meeting, 
President Obasanjo, Ambassador Jeter and British High 
Commissioner Philip Thomas discussed the ongoing 
crisis in the oil-producing Niger Delta. Jeter and 
Thomas expressed concern about the implications of a 
continuing crisis on stability and on Nigeria's 
economy. In the face of the violence that has already 
taken place there, Jeter urged restraint by Nigerian 
military units deployed to the area to contain the 
Ijaw militants. Obasanjo inveighed against these 
militants for killing several soldiers, commenting 
that he would "do what I have to do as President" to 
restore law and order.  Despite the air of toughness 
and emotion that permeated this meeting, GON action 
has been relatively measured thus far, consistent with 
the line expressed in the Ambassador's earlier 
discussion with the President (Reftel).  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
2. (C) During a late night March 26 discussion of the 
upheaval affecting the key oil producing areas in 
Delta State, Obasanjo explained that "troops with 
armor" had been ordered into the area, and that the 
Army and Navy would do everything necessary to ensure 
security on Nigeria's waterways.  Accusing Ijaw 
militants of killing four soldiers, Obasanjo condemned 
them as "criminals," and said they would have to 
answer for their misdeeds. As Head of State, it was 
his duty to restore order. Jeter and Thomas expressed 
concern that the conflict, if not properly handled, 
could spill over into the entire Delta. Given the loss 
of life and property destruction that has already 
occurred, Ambassador Jeter counseled that the Nigerian 
military show restraint and professionalism in 
handling the local militants. 
 
 
3. (C) Clearly agitated and angered, Obasanjo bristled 
that he would "do what I have to do as President." 
Obasanjo asked rhetorically, "What should I do?"  He 
then expressed his displeasure with the cutoff of 
security assistance, something he did not do when 
initially informed about the decision several weeks 
ago. 
 
 
4. (C) Obasanjo rebuffed the notion that the violence 
was politically motivated, asserting instead that 
illegal oil bunkering was at the heart of the matter. 
He claimed to have removed the top Naval commander in 
Warri, as well as his deputy for collusion in the 
illegal bunkering.  Obasanjo then stated that Delta 
State Governor James Ibori had promised to apprehend 
those responsible for killing the soldiers; if Ibori 
did not produce the suspects, Obasanjo declared, "then 
we will go in and find them." 
 
 
5.  (C) Meeting Minister of Defense Danjuma the 
following day, BHC Thomas was treated to an even more 
emotional encore.  According to Thomas, Danjuma "blew 
up."  "They killed four of our soldiers," Danjuma 
repeatedly said, "and we must do what we have to do." 
Danjuma chided Thomas by asking how he could offer 
advice on the Delta region, "given what you are doing 
in Iraq." 
 
 
6. (C) COMMENT: Obasanjo knows that he is in a 
delicate position at the worst of all conceivable 
times -- the eve of elections. On the one hand, he 
wants to end this crisis quickly to get downstream oil 
facilities back on line before the economy feels the 
pinch. Taking strong action to punish the soldiers' 
killers and restore the authority of the army is added 
incentive to talk tough and perhaps move quickly. 
However, Obasanjo also knows that an aggressively 
offensive strategy could produce another Odi or the 
Zaki-Biam, a development that could dim his electoral 
chances and further diminish Nigeria internationally. 
 
 
7. (C) COMMENT CONT. This will be a complex dilemma 
for Obasanjo. A key will be figuring out what exactly 
the Ijaw militants want. After taking control of this 
key oil producing area, it seems implausible that they 
will drop their weapons and simply hand themselves 
over to the authorities. More to the point, much 
depends on the leeway Obasanjo feels he has to resolve 
this issue. This has been a stiff challenge to GON 
authority; the militants have bested some of his 
soldiers and scared away international oil firms; by 
possession of key oil installations, have held the 
country's economy to ransom. Obasanjo cannot easily 
swallow a deal that allows the culprits to walk away. 
However, if the perpetrators know they will be 
severely punished, they have little incentive to give 
up. Resolution of crisis lies in Obasanjo's ability to 
identify an out for both sides. 
 
 
8.  (C) COMMENT CONT. Last, speculation is rife about 
who is actually behind this crisis. For many, this 
challenge looks too organized and strong to have been 
entirely the work of local authors. Some people point 
the finger at Delta Governor Ibori. Many others see 
even more distant and powerful hands, including former 
Head of State Babangida, in the mix. They believe 
Babangida and his ilk stoked this turmoil as part of a 
larger plan to create enough unrest that would scuttle 
the elections. (Septel will provide a more detailed 
analysis of these points.) 
 
 
JETER