US embassy cable - 03TEGUCIGALPA828

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 000828 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN, WHA/PPC, IO, AND EB 
STATE PASS AID FOR LAC/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: 04/02/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ETRD, AORC, IZ, HO 
SUBJECT: BUDGET CUTS HARM ALREADY STRUGGLING HONDURAN 
FOREIGN MINISTRY 
 
REF:  A.  TEGUCIGALPA 652 
 
B.  02 TEGUCIGALPA 3407 
 
Classified by Ambassador Larry Palmer; reasons 1.5(b) and 
(d). 
 
1. (U) SUMMARY: Severe budget cuts at the Honduran Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs threaten to incapacitate its ability to 
execute a coherent foreign policy strategy.  The cuts, 
amounting to 31 percent since President Ricardo Maduro came 
into office early last year, mean new layoffs and embassy 
closings, plus more work for the already overloaded staff 
who remain.  Several items on the Ministry's agenda affect 
the U.S., including support for the Coalition of the 
Willing, the current CAFTA negotiation and the country's 
request to extend Temporary Protected Status for Honduran 
immigrants.  The present understaffed and overworked status 
of MFA functionaries limits their ability to respond in a 
timely manner to U.S. initiatives and demarches.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (U) The Honduran Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
supports approximately 160 employees spread throughout 36 
embassies, 13 consulates and 31 consular sections. 
Honduras also has 45 honorary consulates whose consuls do 
not earn formal salaries.  However, the Ministry is in the 
midst of significant budget cuts.  Sources vary on the 
exact amount of the cuts (see ref B for previous reporting 
on MFA budget cuts).  Post received the following figures 
from Ambassador Mario Fortin and the Honduran press.  In 
2002, the MFA's allowance was cut 17 percent, leaving it at 
272 million lempiras, or approximately USD 16 million.  For 
calendar year 2003, the budget was cut yet again, this time 
by 14 percent. As a result, the MFA in 2003 has less than 
USD 14 million with which to support both its domestic and 
foreign operations--only 69 percent of the Ministry's 2001 
budget. 
 
3. (U) The MFA's diminishing finances are a growing 
impediment to the country's ability to effectively supply 
and manage its domestic and international posts and carry 
out a coherent foreign policy.  Primarily, these budget 
cuts mean a reduction in personnel and embassy closings 
and/or consolidations.  According to Honduran foreign 
service officers, however, conditions at overseas posts are 
already spartan.  Posts have minimal support staff, even in 
comparison to other Central American embassies.  Most 
Honduran ambassadors earn between USD 4,000 and 6,000 per 
month, plus an equivalent stipend for expenses.  Salaries 
and expense allowances for ambassadors to the U.S. and some 
other countries, including Japan, are higher due to cost of 
living allowances.  In December 2002 the salary for the 
ambassador to Japan was USD 10,000 monthly plus a USD 
20,000 monthly expense allowance  (Note:  These figures 
were reported in U.S. dollars in the Honduran press.  End 
Note.)  According to the Honduran paper "El Heraldo," the 
ambassadorship to Japan has often stayed vacant for 
extended periods of time because no one has been willing to 
accept the position, presumably due to lack of sufficient 
funding.  Foreign Minister Guillermo Perez-Cadalso Arias 
was recently quoted in the Honduran press acknowledging 
that ambassadorial salaries were too low and blaming the 
two recent budget cuts. 
 
4. (U) Despite these financial concerns, the MFA recently 
unveiled an ambitious agenda for 2003.  The agenda 
includes: 
--Restructuring of personnel in the Ministry, mainly due to 
budget cuts (i.e., dismissals and embassy 
closures/consolidations) 
--CAFTA signing, 
--Working with USG to extend Temporary Protected Status 
(TPS) for Honduran migrants to the U.S., 
--Presentation of observations on the Solicitation of 
Revision presented by El Salvador to the International 
Court of Justice (concerning the El Salvador/Honduras 
border dispute), 
--Making progress on maritime border demarcation with 
Nicaragua through the International Court of Justice, 
--Overcoming technical problems in the demarcation of the 
Honduras-El Salvador border, 
--Continuation of negotiations of maritime boundaries with 
Mexico, Cuba, and the OAS agreement on the Gulf of Honduras 
(on the Caribbean coast), 
--Suspension of the 35 percent tariff imposed by Nicaragua 
(this was already accomplished through the temporary 
suspension of the tariff on March 11 - see ref A), 
--Consolidation of the Customs Union for Central America, 
and 
--Continuation of the Plan Puebla Panama. 
 
5. (SBU) COMMENT:  Post is concerned that the 31 percent 
total cut in the MFA's budget over the last year and a half 
is significantly detrimental to the Ministry's ability to 
achieve its agenda goals.  For Example, Director General 
for Foreign Policy, Ambassador Mario Fortin, has been an 
excellent contact within the MFA for Post.  However, due to 
limited staffing, he is forced to cover a wide range of 
countries and issues. 
 
6. (SBU) COMMENT CONTINUED:  Proposed restructuring in the 
MFA has had a very negative impact on morale.  At times, it 
appears that Ambassador Fortin is a one-man shop.  He has 
no substantive staff to whom he can delegate.  Other 
diplomats have told us that they believe he is completely 
overburdened by the range of issues he covers.  Post is 
also concerned that cuts and or elimination of GOH posts 
abroad could be highly problematic in the case of a natural 
disaster, as Honduran embassies abroad were instrumental in 
gathering vital international aid after the 1998 tragedy of 
Hurricane Mitch. 
 
7. (C) Comment CONTINUTED:  There are a limited number of 
subject experts on technical issues in the MFA, leaving the 
GOH with little or no input on many complex international 
issues.  Post notes that the MFA's lack of technical 
experts allows the U.S. to play an influential advisory 
role in Honduran foreign affairs.  However, the MFA's bare- 
bones staff and lack of administrative support means that 
it cannot easily form or implement a coherent foreign 
policy strategy.  A good example:  last week in his visit 
to D.C. Foreign Minister Perez-Cadalso assured U.S. 
interlocutors that Honduras would be supportive of the U.S. 
at the U.N.  It appears that such forward-leaning 
instructions were never sent to New York, as the Honduran 
PermRep to the U.N. delivered a weaker statement at UNSC 
open session on Iraq March 27 than he had before the war. 
END COMMENT. 
 
PALMER