US embassy cable - 03ANKARA2155

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TURKEY: GOT CONCERN ABOUT CYPRUS EU ACCESSION DOCUMENTS

Identifier: 03ANKARA2155
Wikileaks: View 03ANKARA2155 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2003-04-02 14:27:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002155 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY: GOT CONCERN ABOUT CYPRUS EU ACCESSION 
DOCUMENTS 
 
 
 (U) Classified by DCM Robert S. Deutsch.  Reason: 1.5(b)(d) 
 
 
1. (C) In a March 28 meeting with DCM, MFA Cyprus DG Apakan 
raised GOT concerns about the draft EU protocol on Cyprus 
that will be attached to the accession partnership documents 
new members will sign on April 16. 
 
 
2. (C) According to Apakan, the draft copy of the protocol 
obtained by the GOT crosses Turkish red lines by: (1) 
referring to the "Republic of Cyprus," not to the "New 
Partnership;" (2) essentially ruling out long-standing 
principles of bizonality on the island; (3) ignoring the 
declaration at the EU's Helsinki summit in 1999 that "all 
relevant factors (i.e., lack of a solution on Cyprus) would 
be considered" in the context of whether to admit the island. 
 Apakan implied that admitting a divided Cyprus ran contrary 
to this sentiment; (4) and closing the door on the 
possibility that a solution will ever be reached. 
 
 
3. (C) If there is any hope for a settlement, room in the 
document must be preserved for the application of these 
principles, Apakan stated.  Therefore the UN, and the USG, 
should lobby EU members on Turkey's behalf to ensure that the 
final version of the protocol reflects these principles. 
 
 
----------- 
DCM Replies 
----------- 
 
 
4. (C) DCM noted that Embassy would be pleased to relay 
Apakan's views to Department.  He also noted that, however: 
(1) GOT concerns are now with an EU process over which the 
United States, not being a member, has no control; which was 
why (2) the USG had so strongly urged Turkey in the run up to 
the EU's Copenhagen summit in last December -- and indeed 
since the Helsinki summit, when the EU formally accepted 
Turkey's candidacy -- to come to terms on Cyprus. 
 
 
----------- 
TGS Drop-By 
----------- 
 
 
5. (C) TGS Greece-Cyprus department head RADM Kadir Sagdic 
subsequently dropped in on the meeting and made the following 
points: (1) the USG's "mistake" regarding Cyprus was to have 
"fallen under the spell" of UK Cyprus negotiator Hannay -- 
whom, Sagdic charged, was on the take, having received some 
USG 5 million in payoffs from the Greek Cypriots; and (2) it 
"would be better from the U.S. point of view" if two 
sovereign and independent states were to be established on 
Cyprus, which could, in theory, merge at some future date, 
when they would simultaneously join the EU.  DCM reiterated 
the points he had made earlier to Apakan.  (Comment: Sagdic 
was essentially calling on the USG to recognize the "TRNC." 
His views are among the most extreme at TGS.  End comment.) 
PEARSON 

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