US embassy cable - 03KUWAIT1207

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KUWAITI YUPPIES LOOK BEYOND THE LONG-AWAITED WAR

Identifier: 03KUWAIT1207
Wikileaks: View 03KUWAIT1207 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kuwait
Created: 2003-04-02 11:33:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: PREL PGOV ETRD MARR IZ KU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001207 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, ETRD, MARR, IZ, KU 
SUBJECT: KUWAITI YUPPIES LOOK BEYOND THE LONG-AWAITED WAR 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 1105 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. KUWAIT 1056 
 
1. SUMMARY: Where reftels analyzed how the US-led war against 
Iraq might affect Kuwait's  political and economic landscape 
in general, this cable examines perceptions of a specific 
sector of society -- young, upwardly-mobile, 
democratically-minded professionals.  At an informal dinner, 
EmbOffs met with a group of thirty-something Kuwaiti men to 
discuss the war's impact on their country, now and in the 
future.  Like others in their demographic, they have lived 
nearly half their lives under the shadow of a brutally 
hostile neighbor.  Most of them wanted this war, but now that 
it is here, what next?  As Saddam's regime nears its end, 
these potential leaders of tomorrow were eager to voice their 
opinions on a wide range of topics, from the war to the 
economy to Kuwait's relationship with the United States and 
its growing feeling of isolation in the Arab World.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
---------------- 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT 
---------------- 
 
2. ConOff, EconOff, and PolOff met March 27 for dinner with 
ten liberal, pro-Western Kuwaitis to discuss their views on 
how the war could affect Kuwait politically (ref A) and 
economically (ref B).  This gathering included lawyers, 
businessmen, investors, and media professionals, each 
financially well off by American standards (BMWs and Jaguars 
in the driveway), but none members of Kuwait's ruling family 
or upper elite class.  A few studied in the US and each 
graduated from Kuwait University, where they launched and 
remain active in a liberal student group called the 
"Democratic Circle."  All but two arrived in Western dress, 
the pair in dishdashas (traditional robes) quickly discarding 
their headgear to better fit in. 
 
3. Their views on the conflict ran the gamut from Rambo-esque 
to anti-war, but all agreed Saddam must go (one hawk asked 
"Why it had taken us so long," while even the lone dove was 
in favor of his removal).  Each participant appeared 
well-informed and well-engaged in television coverage of the 
war, viewing several hours of news a day.  Each said he 
watched a variety of television sources, from Al-Jazeera, Abu 
Dhabi TV, and other Arabic-language channels to CNN, Fox, 
BBC, and SkyNews.  Most were critical of Al-Jazeera, but at 
least one praised it for carrying information otherwise not 
available.  Most were also critical of CNN, stating that it 
was repetitive and had lost much of its edge since the Gulf 
War.  All expressed a vested interest in the outcome of this 
conflict. 
 
---------- 
WAR'S TOLL 
---------- 
 
4. While this group readily acknowledged the economic 
prospects for Kuwait following Iraq's liberation (ref B), 
their primary interest centered on the political 
ramifications -- namely, the impact this war was having on 
Kuwait's relations with other Arab states.  Each participant 
voiced concern over Kuwait's growing isolation in the Arab 
world.  Some noted with bitterness how no Arab nation had 
stood up for Kuwait while Iraq was launching missiles into 
its territory.  (Note: Local press reported March 30 that 
Saudi Arabia and Morocco finally deplored Iraq's actions, but 
only after a missile actually struck a Kuwaiti target the 
previous day.) 
 
5. Others complained even more acrimoniously how Kuwait 
routinely lent a money-laden hand to its Arab neighbors, yet 
none were standing behind Kuwait in its hour of need.  As one 
participant said, "We've given millions, for what?"  Others 
questioned the value of the Arab League, one calling it a 
"burden to Kuwait."  Some said they would not be surprised if 
the GOK refused to attend the next Arab League meeting. 
(Note: During the March 31 session of Kuwait's National 
Assembly, Members of Parliament railed against Arab League 
Secretary General Amr Mousa and the several Arab countries 
 
SIPDIS 
that refused to issue statements denouncing Iraq.  A proposal 
now before the National Assembly would require parliamentary 
approval of any further financial aid to Arab states. End 
note.) 
 
----------- 
ODD MAN OUT 
----------- 
 
6.  Most participants agreed that lack of Arab support went 
beyond envy over Kuwait's oil wealth to fears of a 
significant challenge to the status quo.  They singled out 
Syria, Egypt, and Libya as countries where autocratic leaders 
were especially fearful of a new order, one in which the USG 
established Iraq as a democracy to be followed by other 
states in the region.  They agreed Kuwait was hated for its 
support of the United States, but even more so for being a 
democracy.  (Note: An interesting dichotomy exists here, in 
which Kuwaitis pride themselves on the one hand for being 
democratic, while acknowledging on the other that women and 
most men still do not have the right to vote. End note.) 
 
7. Even within Kuwait, the status quo was coming under 
threat, they said.  One participant told how he and other 
members of the "Democratic Circle" were branded as communists 
and atheists by the Islamist student group as a way to 
discount their liberal ideas.  Even so, these ideas were 
permeating Kuwaiti society, especially among the younger, 
media savvy "Internet generation," another participant said. 
Nevertheless, the participants agreed that the Islamists on 
campus -- as well as in larger Kuwaiti society -- remain 
better organized and funded than their liberal counterparts, 
with a clear and singular message (religion) that is easier 
for many to grasp.  Recent gender segregation at Kuwait 
University demonstrates the potent Islamist influence. 
 
------------- 
LOOKING AHEAD 
------------- 
 
8. The participants expected economic opportunities to follow 
Iraq's liberation, especially in nearby Basra, where some of 
them have relatives.  Such a development, however, did not 
seem a central focus of this group, in comparison to their 
older, more established, and better connected compatriots, 
such as from the ruling al-Sabah or large merchant families. 
 Instead, they spoke of strong economic possibilities in 
Kuwait.  They said there was much money to be made in real 
estate, oil, and other investments.  They noted, however, 
that most Kuwaitis continue to think along short term lines, 
not willing to risk longer term investments.  They agreed 
with EmbOff that such thinking was hurting Kuwait's 
development, but did not expect to see this behavior change 
any time soon, even after Iraq opens up for business. 
 
9.  Whatever happens next, this group hoped that the US 
military would maintain a strong presence in the country. 
One participant said that at least for the foreseeable future 
Kuwait will need protection against historically 
expansion-minded countries like Iraq, Iran, and even Saudi 
Arabia.  Others stated America has proven it is the only 
country Kuwait can really trust.  They tended to agree the 
safety provided by the United States far outweighed the 
condemnation and isolation from their Arab brothers. 
 
10.  One area where this group fell in line with the majority 
of their countrymen was on Middle East peace.  Despite being 
educated, open-minded, and fully aware of how the 
Palestinians had twice sided with Saddam against Kuwait, 
members of the group were still critical over what one called 
"America's unquestioned support" for Israel.  They were not 
willing to admit that at least the USG was working to resolve 
this impasse, when most Arab nations are not, and trying to 
engage them in an objective discussion on this topic seemed a 
non-starter. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
11.  While these remarks admittedly reflect the opinions of a 
small group of Kuwaiti men, they can also be seen as 
incorporating a wider view held by a segment of society that 
figures to be among the economic, legal, and perhaps even 
political leaders of tomorrow.  Their ardent support for the 
United States -- not only its military might, but more 
importantly its democratic ideals -- in face of the wrath 
this relationship garners from Kuwait's Arab neighbors, is 
encouraging; we will endeavor to nurture it. 
JONES 

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