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| Identifier: | 03ANKARA2126 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ANKARA2126 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2003-04-01 07:34:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PARM KNNP ENRG TU IAEA |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002126 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2020 TAGS: PARM, KNNP, ENRG, TU, IAEA SUBJECT: IAEA & IRAN: TURKS TO PASS USG POINTS TO THEIR VIENNA MISSION; REQUEST CLARIFICATION REF: STATE 81552 1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 4. 2. (C) Polmiloff met MFA Disarmament Department Head Ibrahim Yagli on March 31 and delivered reftel points. Regarding the information outlined in reftel para 2, tick 2, Yagli asked whether the USG thought Iran had conducted experiments beyond the enrichment of uranium or if we were saying that Iran had failed to report to IAEA experiments related only to enrichment efforts. Polmiloff advised that we read reftel points to mean the former, but said that we would get back to MFA if that interpretation were incorrect. 3. (U) Yagli said he would pass our information to the Turkish Mission in Vienna, where personnel from the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority take the lead in examining Iran's compliance with its NPT commitments. Yagli added that he knew that Iran is a party to the "standard" safeguards protocol, but he wondered if the USG had any information that Iran may be considering signing the additional safeguard protocol. In any event, he advocated that the IAEA board of governors take a "step-by-step" approach to analyzing Iran's compliance and to pushing for greater Iranian transparency. From the Turkish perspective, Iran's becoming a party to the additional protocol ought not be enough to satisfy the IAEA. Noting that, as a neighbor of Iran, Turkey is keenly interested, Yagli concluded by asking that the USG continue to share with Turkey as much information about Iran's nuclear efforts as it can. He particularly signaled out USNATO's presentations to Allies in Brussels as "valuable." 4. (C) Action Request: Per para 2, if the correct reading of reftel points is that Iran has conducted experiments beyond uranium enrichment efforts, please advise so that we can reply to our Turkish interlocutors. End Action Request. PEARSON
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