US embassy cable - 03ANKARA2125

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 002125 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NOFORN 
 
 
STATE FOR NEA DAS RYAN CROCKER, NEA/NGA; 
NSC FOR HADLEY; 
OVP FOR JOHN HANNAH; 
OSD FOR BILL LUTI AND OSD/NESA; 
LONDON FOR GOLDRICH 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2013 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: KHALILZAD DISCUSSIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador W. Robert Pearson.  Reasons 1.5 
b and d. 
1. (S/NF) Summary: SPE Zalmay Khalilzad met with a range of 
Iraqi opposition leaders in northern Iraq on March 27-28. 
Discussions with PUK and KDP leadership centered on 
responding to Turkish concerns about northern Iraq, resolving 
the property claims of IDP's, and the formation of the Iraqi 
Interim Authority; discussions with the ITF's Sanan Aga 
revolved around how to resolve the issue of the ITF joining 
the opposition leadership council; and discussions with the 
INC's Ahmad Chalabi centered around his recommendation that 
there be uprisings in Iraq, and that the Iraqi opposition 
assist the U.S. militarily in the fight against Saddam. End 
Summary. 
2. (SBU) Special Presidential Envoy to Free Iraqis Zalmay 
Khalilzad headed a U.S. delegation to northern Iraq on March 
27-28. The delegation met in Suleymaniyah with PUK leader 
Jalal Talabani and other PUK officials, in Dukan with the 
INC's Ahmad Chalabi, Sanan Aga of the Iraqi Turkomen Front, 
as well as Talabani again, and in Salahudeen with KDP leader 
Masoud Barzani and other KDP officials. 
 
 
PUK Meetings 
------------ 
3. (S/NF) SPE Khalilzad met with Jalal Talabani, PUK "Prime 
Minister" Barham Salih, former PUK "Prime Minister" and 
peshmerga commander Kosrat Rasul Ali and other PUK officials 
on March 27 and 28. With regard to Turkish concerns about 
refugee flows into Turkey, Talabani stated that the threat is 
much different now than in 1991, that Iraqis do not want to 
leave Iraq, and that current refugee flows within northern 
Iraq are minimal. He stated that the PUK already has 
considerable capacity to provide for refugees, asserting that 
the PUK and KDP have coordinated planning efforts, that 
combined PUK and KDP camp capacity is currently 200,000 
refugees, and that the PUK alone has 10 camps, with 
generators, ready to go. Talabani said that the Kurds could 
increase capacity if provided with tents, medical supplies 
and food, and suggested that international NGOs, which have 
supplies prepositioned, could bring in supplies through Iran 
or Syria. He offered that the Turkish Red Crescent and UN 
were welcome to visit PUK camps to assess capacity, and that 
the PUK would provide maps and pictures of the camps to the 
USG for use with the Turks. 
4. (S/NF) On Turkish worries about increased PKK/KADEK 
terrorism, Talabani stated that the PUK is already sharing 
intelligence on a daily basis with the Turks on the 
PKK/KADEK, for which the Turks have been "grateful." He 
offered that Turkish Red Crescent officials could visit 
refugee camps to check for PKK/KADEK fighters, but asserted 
that "the PKK is afraid now because of the U.S. presence in 
Iraq - they will not move against Turkey, just as the 
Iranians won't get involved in Iraq." Talabani believes that 
the PKK wants amnesty, and that the majority of PKK adherents 
would lay down their arms if offered amnesty, but that the 
Turkish military and Turkish nationalist parties oppose 
amnesty. Talabani said that he told Turkey, "If the PKK moves 
against you, we're ready to help." He offered that if the 
Turks wanted to send an additional 15 officials to Chwar 
Qurna (just above Dukan Lake) to monitor PKK/KADEK 
activities, he would be amenable to their doing so. 
5. (S/NF) On the subject of potential mass movements of 
people to Kirkuk, and overall property reclamation issues, 
Talabani said that the PUK and KDP have formed a joint 
committee to discourage population movements - "everyone has 
a right to go back, but not unless it's in a legal, approved 
manner." He stated that both the PUK and KDP have made public 
statements discouraging Iraqis from taking the law into their 
own hands, and that he would continue to make such statements 
(Note: Talabani did make such a statement at a press 
conference following these meetings). Talabani was 
enthusiastic about SPE Khalilzad's description of the 
formation of a commission to deal with property claims, and 
asserted that his preferred structure for the commission 
would be for one senior international figure to be in charge 
(he suggested Bernard Kouchner, Silvio de Mello, George 
Mitchell, Ed Djerijian, Nancy Soderberg or another former 
senior U.S. official). He was very supportive of SPE 
Khalilzad's suggestion that, given that the formal property 
claims commission could take some time to set up, an 
additional subcommittee be formed and deployed to towns such 
as Kirkuk as soon as possible to build confidence between the 
various ethnic communities and reassure local populations 
that a formal claims mechanism will be set up. 
6. (S/NF) On the issue of forming the Iraqi Interim Authority 
(IIA), Salih asserted that the UN needed to be involved, "so 
that the US and UK don't take the inevitable blame alone." He 
stressed that who the UN representative will be is critical. 
Talabani and Salih were extremely concerned about SCIRI's 
role in the leadership council, and did not believe that the 
leadership council should be used as the vehicle to form the 
IIA, as the IIA would then end up with far too many 
Islamists. They both supported the idea of a "Baghdad 
Conference" to form the IIA, and suggested that the 
leadership council could assist in advising on who should be 
invited, although they then caveated that by asserting that 
after liberation, the U.S. should work with the core of the 
opposition that is supportive of the U.S. - KDP, PUK, INA and 
INC. They said that we must work with SCIRI now, "because 
they have the capacity to disrupt things," but following 
liberation advised that we not allow too much Iranian or 
Syrian influence.  They also advised that we engage further 
and encourage non-SCIRI external influential Shi'a leaders - 
such as Seyyid Mohammed Bahr Al Oluum, Abdulmajid Al Khoie, 
Ibrahim Jaafari, and Shaykh Sahlani (who resides in Los 
Angeles). Talabani asserted that after the war, opposition 
politics will shift dramatically, and there will "immediately 
be two fronts in Iraq - the secular democrats vs. the 
fundamentalists like SCIRI." On the issue of the Iraqi 
Turkmen Front joining the opposition leadership, Talabani 
said he was willing to resolve the issue according to 
whatever agreement SPE Khalilzad was able to negotiate 
between the KDP and ITF. 
7. (S/NF) Talabani disavowed the opposition leadership 
statement that had been issued earlier that day, asserting 
that it differed from what he had provided to the other 
oppositionists, and that SCIRI and Ahmad Chalabi had hijacked 
the statement to serve their desire for a provisional 
government to be formed. He said that he did not support a 
provisional government and instead backed the notion of a 
Baghdad Conference to form the IIA. He did, however, note 
that he would prefer the IIA be called a government, vice an 
authority, but stated that he knew such a change would have 
to be agreed to by the coalition. Talabani named some 
influential contacts that he has inside Iraq (ex-Baathists 
such as Fawzi Fayman, retired General Najib Taleb and Masid 
Shirazi), and offered to provide a list with a range of names 
for us to contact once inside central and southern Iraq.  He 
also recommended secular Shi'a and former Iraqi Minister of 
Justice Ahmad Haboubi (resides in Cairo) as still very 
influential inside Iraq. 
 
 
KDP Meeting 
----------- 
8. (S/NF) SPE Khalilzad met with Masoud Barzani, KDP "Prime 
Minister" Nechirvan Barzani, KDP "Foreign Minister" Hoshyar 
Zebari, KDP "Deputy Prime Minister" Sami Abdul Rahman, and 
other KDP officials on March 28. Barzani began the meeting by 
thanking SPE Khalilzad for his work with the Turks, stating 
that he was encouraged by the recent changes in Turkish 
statements about northern Iraq. With regard to Turkish 
concerns about refugee flows, Barzani asserted that there 
will not be large refugee flows from northern Iraq since the 
situation is different from 1991 - "there was no clear 
regime-change policy then, and many of the villages that were 
destroyed in Anfal have now been rebuilt, and refugees can 
seek refuge there." Barzani did note that if the Iraqis used 
chemical weapons, it would "be a catastrophe much bigger than 
Turkish or Kurdish concerns." Barzani asserted that the KDP 
has fought the PKK/KADEK for years, and lost thousands of 
peshmerga in doing so. He said that the KDP would never 
accept PKK/KADEK using KDP territory as a base for terrorist 
activities against Turkey, and asserted that he had 
designated three peshmerga divisions to use against the PKK 
if they began to undertake terrorist actions, including 
against Turkey. Barzani stated that "currently, we are 
focused on regime change, but after liberation the U.S., 
Turkey, and the Iraqi Kurds can work together to focus on 
dealing with the PKK." As evidence of his antipathy towards 
the PKK/KADEK, Barzani said that Farhad Ocalan (Abdullah 
Ocalan's brother) had recently sent him a telegram offering 
his assistance against Turkey; Barzani said he responded that 
the KDP did not need Ocalan's help, rather that he viewed the 
PKK as terrorists, and that the KDP was allied with Turkey 
against the PKK. Barzani also said that the security of 
Turkish troops currently in northern Iraq will be safeguarded 
even in the event of a conflict with Turkey - "they came as 
monitors, and we received them as guests - these particular 
troops should be treated as an exceptional case." 
9. (S/NF) Barzani stated that he has given KDP peshmerga 
clear instructions to not go into Mosul and Kirkuk, and that 
they need to cooperate fully with U.S. commands. He claimed 
that "the KDP has no intention to move into those cities," 
and that he wants to avoid intra-ethnic violence. Barzani 
said that he had made statements recently discouraging people 
from taking the law into their own hands, and would continue 
to do so. (Note: Barzani did make such a statement at a press 
conference following this meeting. End note.) He also said 
that he would meet soon with "influential people from the 
Arabized regions," and would inform them of the KDP's stance 
against violence. Barzani was supportive of the idea of a 
property claims commission being set up to address IDP 
property claims. He did not like the idea of the UN 
controlling a commission, and said he'd get back to us with 
his preferences for its organization shortly. 
10. (S/NF) On the issue of ITF representation on the 
opposition leadership council, Barzani insisted that Turkmen 
from different groups needed to get together, and then could 
jointly choose ITF official Juneyd Mengu as the Turkmen 
representative on the opposition leadership (rather than 
Mengu simply being appointed). He insisted that Mengu would 
have to make a statement upon joining the leadership council 
affirming the results of the London and Salahudeen 
conferences, accepting that Iraq's future will be governed by 
the approved Iraqi constitution, and stating that Mengu is 
representative of all Turkmen, not just the ITF. 
11. (S/NF) Like Talabani, Barzani was taken aback by the 
March 27 opposition leadership council statement, asserting 
that he had never seen it, and disagreed with the section 
about a provisional government. He said he supported the idea 
of a Baghdad Conference to form the IIA, and said the UN 
should play a supporting role. He offered to provide the U.S. 
with a list of respected Sunni and Shi'a figures inside Iraq. 
Barzani firmly stated that the Baghdad Conference cannot be 
based on the "Salahudeen percentages," which he said are not 
accurate or representative of the Iraqi people, and gave 
SCIRI far too big a share of seats. However, he said that we 
need to find some justifiable basis upon which to invite 
Iraqis to the Baghdad Conference. 
12. (S/NF) Nechirvan Barzani stated that because of the 
Turkish fight against the PKK, 10,000 Turks reside in 
northern Iraq, having fled Turkey due to the violence. 
Nechirvan said that Turkish MFA U/S Ugur Ziyal and TGS had 
approached him in Ankara about permitting those 10,000 
refugees to return to Turkey now.  Nechirvan said that the 
KDP would not let those refugees return in the immediate 
future, as they feared that the Turks would assert that they 
were part of a problematic refugee flow into Turkey from 
northern Iraq, thus justifying a Turkish military move into 
northern Iraq. 
 
 
ITF Meeting 
----------- 
13. (S/NF) ITF leader Sanan Aga reneged on his earlier pledge 
to SPE Khalilzad that in order to join the opposition 
leadership council, he would sign a letter stating that he 
accepted the principles of the London and Salahudeen 
conferences, as well as  acknowledge that he would recognize 
the official Iraqi names for various regions of Iraq, 
including "Iraqi Kurdistan." Aga stated that he did not 
accept the terminology "Iraqi Kurdistan." He initially stated 
that he did accept the principles of the London conference 
(except for federalism) but later walked back from that, 
explaining that he needed to check with the rest of the ITF 
as to whether that was acceptable. Following the meeting, he 
sent SPE Khalilzad a letter dated March 29, 2003, that reads 
as follows (informal translation from Arabic): 
Begin text of letter: 
The Iraqi Turkmen Front accepts the following points: 
a) Enabling the Iraqi people to build a fully representative 
and democratic government that meets international standards, 
including free and fair elections, respect for the rule of 
law and private property, equality before the law and respect 
for human rights, consistent with principles agreed by the 
opposition at the London Conference, and in light of the 
Iraqi opposition movement meeting held in Ankara on 19 March 
2003, with the participation of the US and Turkey. 
b) That the consitution and future political system of Iraq 
should be determined through the full participation and free 
consent of the totality of the Iraqi people. 
End text of letter. 
 
 
Chalabi Meetings 
---------------- 
14. (S/NF) Ahmad Chalabi met twice with SPE Khalilzad on 
March 27, bringing a variety of former Iraqi military 
officers (including General Mehdi Dulaymi, Colonel Ahmad 
Samarrai, General Talal Obaidi), Qayser Wutwut, and Mudhar 
Shawkat to the second lengthier meeting. Chalabi asserted 
that there needs to be an uprising of the Iraqi people, and 
that the USG should stop telling them not to rebel, and 
instead encourage uprisings. He urged the U.S. to destroy 
Saddam Hussein's TV and media capabilities. Chalabi was 
adamant that the Kurdish peshmerga not be used in any attack 
on Kirkuk, and said he was greatly concerned by reports that 
the peshmerga were now 15 kilometers outside Kirkuk. He 
recommended that the "joint command of the Iraqi opposition 
forces" be immediately activated. Chalabi and the military 
officers present were disparaging of U.S. military operations 
in Iraq, stating that the U.S. had made a major mistake by 
not including the opposition in their efforts (Note: None of 
the oppositionists present made any reference to the Free 
Iraqi Forces set up by the USG. End note). Chalabi asserted 
that INC forces, which he claimed were 4,000 strong, should 
be launched from northern Iraq to fight the Iraqi military, 
and said that he was preparing operational plans to submit to 
the Pentagon. 
15. (S/NF) Chalabi said he supported the ITF joining the 
opposition leadership council, as long as they stated that 
"we support the Salahudeen conference, and accept the process 
of selecting and completing the opposition leadership 
council." 
16. (S/NF) Comment: We need a senior diplomatic presence in 
northern Iraq as soon as possible, to be the eyes and ears of 
Washington in the area, and to liaise closely with the Iraqi 
oppositionists in the north to ensure that they do not 
undertake any actions unhelpful to U.S. goals. End Comment. 
17. (U) This cable has been cleared by SPE Khalilzad. 
PEARSON