US embassy cable - 03ROME1345

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR SA/PAB, EUR/WE, DRL/MLA, IO, IO/ESA 
GENEVA FOR CHRIS CAMPONOVO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2008 
TAGS: PHUM, IT, IT, AF, AFPHUM, AFGHANISTAN, HUMAN RIGHTS 
SUBJECT: GOI THINKS SOME KIND OF RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN 
IS INEVITABLE 
 
REF: A. STATE 80103 
 
     B. ROME 1168 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: POL MINCOUNS THOMAS COUNTRYMAN, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). 
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1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  WE DELIVERED REFTEL POINTS TO BOTH AFGHAN 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS COUNTERPARTS IN THE MFA, AND BOTH SAID THE 
GOI DID NOT SEE HOW A UNCHR DOCUMENT COULD BE AVOIDED. 
VARIOUS EU MEMBER STATES WERE ADAMANT THAT A RESOLUTION (EVEN 
STRONGER THAN THAT ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY ITALY) WAS 
NECESSARY; A DOCUMENT WAS NEEDED TO PROVIDE THE LEGAL BASIS 
FOR UN EXPENDITURES AND ASSISTANCE TO THE TISA; AND "PUBLIC 
OPINION" WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND THE LACK OF A RESOLUTION ON A 
COUNTRY WHERE MANY PROBLEMS REMAINED, DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL 
PROGRESS.  THAT SAID, THE GOI IS WILLING TO WORK WITH US ON 
VIRTUALLY ANY LANGUAGE, UNDERSTANDS THAT THE END RESULT MUST 
BE "MUCH SOFTER," AND WOULD ACCEPT EITHER A RESOLUTION UNDER 
ITEM 19 OR A CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT WITH EASE.  EMBOFFS 
IMPRESSED ON OUR INTERLOCUTORS THAT WASHINGTON DID NOT THINK 
ANY KIND OF RESOLUTION OR STATEMENT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE 
KARZAI GOVERNMENT OR GIVE CREDIT TO THE PROGRESS WE HAD 
JOINTLY MADE IN AFGHANISTAN THUS FAR.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  LABOR COUNSELOR AND POLOFF DELIVERED REFTEL POINTS 
TO CONS. GIUSEPPE CALVETTA, MFA HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE DIRECTOR, 
AND TO MIN. ENRICO DE MAIO, MFA SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR 
AFGHANISTAN, IN SEPARATE MEETINGS ON MARCH 28.  WE ALSO LEFT 
THE POINTS WITH MIN. ALESSANDRO DI FRANCO, CHIEF OF STAFF FOR 
UNDER SECRETARY FOR ASIA AND HUMAN RIGHTS MARGHERITA BONIVER. 
 (WE HAD HELD EXTENSIVE CONVERSATIONS WITH ALL THREE BETWEEN 
RECEIPT OF THE ORIGINAL GOI DRAFT UNCHR RESOLUTION ON 
AFGHANISTAN (REF B) AND RECEIPT OF REF A.)  DE MAIO EXPRESSED 
UNDERSTANDING FOR WASHINGTON'S REACTION TO THE DRAFT TEXT, 
WHICH HE INDIRECTLY ACKNOWLEDGED DID NOT REFLECT ADVANCES 
MADE BY THE KARZAI GOVERNMENT, BUT BOTH HE AND CALVETTA SAID 
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IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO WITHDRAW THE RESOLUTION 
AT THIS POINT.  EMBOFFS STRESSED THAT WASHINGTON WAS NOT 
PREPARED TO ACCEPT A RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN AND BELIEVED 
STRONGLY THAT ANY RESOLUTION WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND 
RISKED DAMAGING THE TRANSITIONAL ISLAMIC STATE OF AFGHANISTAN. 
 
3.  (C)  THE GOI HAD THREE REASONS IT BELIEVED WITHDRAWING 
THE RESOLUTION WAS NOT FEASIBLE.  FIRST, OUR COUNTERPARTS 
SUGGESTED, WITHOUT ANY KIND OF TEXT, THE UN WOULD NOT BE IN A 
POSITION TO OFFER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE OR EXPEND RESOURCES TO 
CONTINUE ASSISTING AFGHANISTAN IN IMPROVING ITS HUMAN RIGHTS 
SITUATION.  (NOTE:  WE WERE NOT ABLE TO ADDRESS THIS POINT 
EFFECTIVELY, BUT BOTH CALVETTA AND DE MAIO HAVE SERVED IN 
GENEVA AND WERE CONVINCED THIS WAS TRUE.)  SOME KIND OF 
RESOLUTION, CALVETTA EMPHASIZED, PROVIDED THE "LEGAL BASIS" 
FOR UN INTERVENTION AND ASSISTANCE. 
 
4.  (C)  SECOND, MANY IN THE EU (BOTH MEN SUGGESTED IN 
PARTICULAR THE NORDIC COUNTRIES) INSISTED ON A RESOLUTION, 
AND INDEED WANTED ONE MORE STRONGLY-WORDED THAN THE ORIGINAL 
GOI DRAFT AND UNDER ITEM 9 IN THE CHR.  CALVETTA SUGGESTED 
THE GOI HAD TAKEN THE PEN IN PART TO ENSURE THE LANGUAGE 
WOULD NOT BE MADE WORSE.  GIVEN INTERNAL EU DYNAMICS, THE GOI 
WAS CONVINCED THE IDEA OF "MAKING THE RESOLUTION DISAPPEAR" 
WAS A NON-STARTER.  TO BOLSTER THE POINT, CALVETTA SHARED THE 
TEXT OF AN ITALIAN PAPER INTENDED FOR EU PARTNERS, ARGUING ON 
BEHALF A SOFTER RESOLUTION.  (TEXT OF PAPER AT PARA 9.) 
 
5.  (C)  THE THIRD (COMMENT:  AND WEAKEST) ITALIAN POINT WAS 
THAT "PUBLIC OPINION" DEMANDED SOME KIND OF RESOLUTION, IN 
LIGHT OF ONGOING PROBLEMS IN AFGHANISTAN.  FULLY RECOGNIZING 
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THAT THE TISA WAS NOT THE PERPETRATOR OF THE ABUSES, CALVETTA 
SAID NONETHELESS EUROPEAN PUBLICS, AT LEAST, "WOULD NOT 
UNDERSTAND" HAVING NO RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN.  (NOTE:  HE 
MAY HAVE BEEN REFERRING AS WELL TO EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
NGOS.) 
 
6.  (C)  BOTH CALVETTA AND DE MAIO URGED THE U.S. TO WORK 
WITH THE GOI IN GENEVA TO IMPROVE THE LANGUAGE.  (CALVETTA 
WILL ARRIVE IN GENEVA ON MARCH 29 FOR AT LEAST SEVERAL DAYS.) 
 CALVETTA SAID THE GOI WAS VERY FLEXIBLE ON WORDING AND 
FORMAT.  HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE DOCUMENT SHOULD BE MUCH SHORTER 
AND "SOFTER."  THE GOI WANTED A DOCUMENT THAT COULD BE 
ADOPTED AT CONSENSUS, INCLUDING BY THE AFGHAN DELEGATION, 
WHICH, HE SAID, RECEIVED A DRAFT THE MORNING OF MARCH 28. 
THE GOI COULD ACCEPT EITHER AN ITEM 19 RESOLUTION OR A 
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT.  THE THREE DELEGATIONS COULD WORK 
TOGETHER TO ENSURE NOTHING IN THE RESOLUTION WAS OFFENSIVE. 
THE GOI WAS FLEXIBLE AS WELL ON THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL 
COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE PAST HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND WOULD 
ASSIST US WITHIN THE EU IN KEEPING THIS PROVISION OUT, IF THE 
U.S. SAW IT AS A PROBLEM.  CALVETTA REITERATED THAT THE GOI 
COULD WORK OUT ESSENTIALLY ANY LANGUAGE -- BUT A RESOLUTION 
OF SOME SORT WAS VIRTUALLY INEVITABLE, IN HIS OPINION. 
CALVETTA STRONGLY URGED THE U.S. NOT TO DEMAND A VOTE ON THE 
 
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                           CONFIDENTIAL     PTQ2985 
 
PAGE 01        ROME  01345  02 OF 02  281650Z 
ACTION SA-00 
 
INFO  LOG-00   AID-00   AMAD-00  CIAE-00  INL-00   DODE-00  SRPP-00 
      EB-00    EUR-00   TEDE-00  INR-00   IO-00    LAB-01   L-00 
      NEA-00   NSAE-00  NSCE-00  OIC-02   OPIC-01  PA-00    PRS-00 
      P-00     SP-00    SSO-00   SS-00    STR-00   TRSE-00  USIE-00 
      PRM-00   DRL-01   G-00     SAS-00   SWCI-00    /005W 
                  ------------------4C7F3C  281651Z /38 
O 281651Z MAR 03 
FM AMEMBASSY ROME 
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9018 
INFO USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 
AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 001345 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR SA/PAB, EUR/WE, DRL/MLA, IO, IO/ESA 
GENEVA FOR CHRIS CAMPONOVO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2008 
TAGS: PHUM, IT, AF 
SUBJECT: GOI THINKS SOME KIND OF RESOLUTION ON AFGHANISTAN 
IS INEVITABLE 
 
RESOLUTION, BUT TO WORK WITH ITALY IN KEEPING THE DOCUMENT A 
CONSENSUAL ONE, EVEN IF THE U.S. HAD TO ISSUE A STATEMENT TO 
CLARIFY ITS RESERVATIONS. 
 
7.  (C)  DURING THESE AND PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS, OUR MFA 
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INTERLOCUTORS (INCLUDING DI FRANCO OF U/S BONIVER'S OFFICE) 
REPEATEDLY UNDERSCORED THAT BY MOVING THE RESOLUTION TO ITEM 
19, WE WERE ENSURING THAT AFGHANISTAN, UNLIKE BURMA, CUBA OR 
OTHER "BAD" COUNTRIES, WAS NO LONGER ON THAT LIST.  IT HAD 
"GRADUATED."  THEY ALSO SAID THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD 
A GOOD STORY TO CONVEY ABOUT AFGHANISTAN'S SUCCESS AND COULD 
USE THE REVISED TEXT OF A RESOLUTION AS THE BASIS FOR PUTTING 
THAT MESSAGE BEFORE THE WORLD. 
 
8.  (C)  COMMENT:  USMISSION GENEVA WILL BE BETTER ABLE TO 
EVALUATE THE POINTS RAISED BY THE ITALIANS, BUT OUR 
INTERLOCUTORS WERE CONVINCED OF BOTH THE "LEGAL" NEED FOR A 
RESOLUTION TO ENABLE UN EXPENDITURES AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF 
WITHDRAWING THE RESOLUTION AT THIS POINT, DUE TO PRESSURE 
FROM OTHER DELEGATIONS.  WE JUDGE THAT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE 
TO CONVINCE ITALY AT THE WORKING LEVEL TO WITHDRAW A 
RESOLUTION COMPLETELY.  IF WASHINGTON REMAINS CONVINCED 
WITHDRAWAL IS THE ONLY OPTION, HIGHER-LEVEL INTERVENTION WILL 
BE REQUIRED. 
 
9.  (C)  BEGIN TEXT OF INTERNAL MFA PAPER (AS PROVIDED IN 
ENGLISH BY THE MFA).  PLEASE PROTECT. 
 
THE NEW TEXT INCORPORATES MOQ OF THE SUGGESTIONS AND 
COMMENTS MADE BY PARTNERS.  IN PARTICULAR IT MAKES REFERENCE 
TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
(OP. 40 PARA 1).  THE WORDING IS THE ONE SUGGESTED BY UK AND 
TAKEN FROM THE RECOMMENDATION MADE BY THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR 
ON EXTRA JUDICIAL KILLINGS.  ITALY IS NOT AGAINST IN 
PRINCIPLE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION AND SHARES 
THE VIEW THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD ENCOURAGE 
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THE AFGHAN AUTHORITIES TO HANDLE THE PAST ATROCITIES.  BUT 
HAVING CONSIDERED THAT THE CONSTITUTION OF THE INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY IS STILL UNDER EVALUATION BY THE UNCHR 
THAT THE DRAFT CHAIRPERSON'S STATEMENT ALREADY CONTAINS A 
NUMBER OF SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO THE NEED FOR INVESTIGATING 
CRIMES OF THE PAST AND COMBATING IMPUNITY, AND THAT BOTH 
BRAHIMI AND KARZAI HAVE SHOWN A CAUTIOUS APPROACH ON THE 
ISSUE IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT DELICATE POLITICAL CONTEXT, 
ITALY SUGGESTS TO KEEP A FLEXIBLE APPROACH AND CONSIDERS THE 
POSSIBILITY OF DROPPING SUCH A REFERENCE IN THE COURSE OF 
FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS OF THE TEXT WITH THIRD COUNTRIES. 
 
THE NOMINATION OF AN INDEPENDENT EXPERT (OP. 40 PARA C) TO 
REPLACE THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR IS A TECHNICAL RESULT OF THE 
DECISION TO PRESENT THE CHAIRPERSON'S STATEMENT UNDER ITEM 19 
OF THE CHR AGENDA.  AS IN THE CASE OF SOMALIA HE IS ENTRUSTED 
WITH PERIODICALLY REPORTING TO THE COMMISSION ON THE 
SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN. 
 
ITALY BELIEVES THAT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN THE INTERNAL 
SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN FULLY JUSTIFY THE DECISION TO TABLE 
THIS TEXT UNDER ITEM 19 OF THE AGENDA.  THE TRANSITIONAL 
AUTHORITY HAS GIVEN CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF ITS COMMITMENT TO 
CO-OPERATE IN AN EFFECTIVE WAY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND WE NEED TO FOCUS 
ON HOW TO STRENGTHEN ITS CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH THESE TOPICS 
AND SUPPORT ITS EFFORTS IN THE FIELD.  A COMMUNICATION TO THE 
PLENARY IN THIS RESPECT WILL BE ISSUED BY THE ITALIAN 
DELEGATION JUST AFTER THE PRESENTATION OF THE REPORT BY THE 
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR. 
SEMBLER 
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 2003ROME01345 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL