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| Identifier: | 03ANKARA2051 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ANKARA2051 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Ankara |
| Created: | 2003-03-28 16:11:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | ECON PREL TU |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 281611Z Mar 03
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002051 SIPDIS STATE FOR E, P, EUR/SE AND EB TREASURY FOR U/S TAYLOR AND OASIA - MILLS NSC FOR QUANRUD AND BRYZA E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2006 TAGS: ECON, PREL, TU SUBJECT: SENIOR BANKING OFFICIALS CONCERNED OVER GOT ECON POLICY DRIFT REF: ANKARA 2010 Classified by Econ Counselor Scot Marciel for reasons 1.5 (b,d). 1. (C) Summary: In frank discussions March 26 and 27, BRSA Chairman Engin Akcakoca and the outgoing Chairman of the State Bank Board Safa Ocak told us of concerns with the lack of market confidence in the government. They described a situation of policy drift on the economy, with Deputy PM Sener's influence on the wane, MinFinance Unakitan's rising and, per Akcakoca, a PM who is impervious to the logic of financial markets. The AK Party continues to make populist signals to its constituencies even while implementing reforms, they noted. Neither Akcakoca nor Ocak had solutions to what they see as a growing risk of debt default, though the outgoing Ocak said he hoped the U.S. would help keep Turkey firmly anchored in the West. End Summary. 2. (C) "Trust in the government is minimal," according to Banking Regulatory and Supervision Board Chairman Engin Akcakoca, summing up recent contacts with the banking community. He noted the Babacan and others are trying to blame everything on Iraq, when in fact it's more a crisis of confidence in the government. Asked about the market impact of the GOT's recently announced fiscal measures, Akcakoca said no one trusts AK to implement what they promise. "If Dervis had made these statements, the markets would have reacted. But not to these guys." 3. (C) Akcakoca described a March 21 meeting between PM Erdogan and the GOT economic team (including Deputy PM Sener, MinState Babacan, MinFin Unakitan, CenBank Governor Serdengecti, Treasury U/S Oztrak, State Planning U/S Tiktik). The team counseled Erdogan not to use the word "surprise," that the markets like stability not surprises. Erdogan rejected the advice, saying President Bush surprises his audiences all the time. "Erdogan is maybe a good politician but has no understanding for economic policy. Gul was better." 3. (C) Asked who was likely to take charge of economic policy under Erdogan, Akcakoca pointed to Finance Minister Unakitan. Unakitan is a problem-solver, he said. Deputy PM Sener doesn't want to take responsibility for anything, is a real bureaucrat, and opposes the IMF. MinState Babacan has underperformed, lost his credibility and may well get fired. Akcakoca noted PM Erdogan has stripped privatization away from Sener and gave it to Unakitan. 4. (C) Akcakoca stressed the populist impulse that still motivates AK Party. Sener, in his March 26 statement on privatization (reftel), had again assured the Turkish public that privatization won't lead to public sector lay-offs. Meanwhile, Akcakoca continued, he had had to lay-off nearly 30,000 in the banking sector in the process of intervening and resolving 20 banks over the past two years. He is facing several ongoing law suits for doing it. The state bank board had laid off another 35,000 in the state banks. "Sener and AK don't trust the IMF. His solution is to print money." 5. (C) Asked how this mood of pessimism will affect upcoming debt roll-overs, Akcakoca said the banks will roll-over their T-bill portfolios on April 8, but won't want to increase their T-bill exposure. He sees default risks increasing, given the short maturities of T-bill issuances (likely three months) and high interest rates. implying the default. 6. (C) Outgoing Chairman of the State Bank Board Safa Ocak told us on March 28 he was confident that after two years of independent operations (under first Vural Akisik and then him), the state banks were in good shape. It would be difficult, he ventured, for the GOT to shift them back to providing subsidized loans at GOT instruction. Ocak said it would be difficult to privatize Halk Bank this year, though he had initially hoped to do so, given worsening market sentiment. 7. (C) Ocak, like Akcakoca, is concerned with market sentiment. He noted, "this government continues to widen its existing credibility gap with the markets." Asked about the state banks' ability to help the Treasury meet additional debt roll-over demands, Ocak said the state banks will continue to participate in debt auctions, and they had helped the GOT at the March 17 auction when demand had been low, but their ability to absorb additional T-bill exposure was quite limited. 8. (C) Ocak closed by underscoring a widely felt concern in the financial community here with maintaining strong U.S. - Turkish relations. "Since childhood, we have been lullabyed by the notion that 'Turkey is geo-strategically important.' It may be true, but it was used to blur our realities and give us a false sense of grandeur. Now we're beginning to face realities, and we need the U.S. to be patient. Turks tend to listen to the West more than some others do. I believe the U.S. has the ability to keep us firmly anchored in the West." PEARSON
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