US embassy cable - 03ANKARA2048

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002048 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, IZ, CY, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S "WHERE ARE THEY NOW" FILE: CHP'S KEMAL 
DERVIS 
 
 
REF: 02 ANKARA 7606 
 
 
(U) Classified by Acting Political Counselor Nicholas S. 
Kass.  Reason: 1.5(b)(d). 
 
 
1. (C) In a March 28 meeting with poloff, opposition CHP 
deputy and former State Minster Kemal Dervis offered his 
views of USG-GOT relations, Iraq, Cyprus, and his own 
political ambitions.  Dervis made the following points: 
 
 
-- He sees himself as leading an effort to modernize CHP, in 
part by trying to bring more women into the party fold; 
 
 
-- CHP, he stated, has always maintained a close political 
and ideological relationship with the Turkish military.  An 
analysis of Nov. 2002 election voting patterns reveals, he 
claimed, that CHP won 80% of vote in areas heavily populated 
by the military and their dependents; 
 
 
-- CHP's core is dominated by traditional Kemalism -- 
"statism, suspicion of foreigners, and nationalism," Dervis 
explained.  Ataturk had voiced some important truths -- among 
these the idea that his own principles were subject to 
change.  Unfortunately, the hard-core Kemalists in CHP (and 
elsewhere) "refuse to modernize."  To them, modernization is 
simply a Trojan horse for foreign interests that conflict 
with Kemalism -- and thus threaten Turkey; 
 
 
-- On Iraq, Dervis tried to walk both sides of the fence.  He 
said he supported USG overall goals, but as an 
"internationalist" he cannot support "the way you are doing 
it."  According to Dervis, CHP's opposition to the US-led war 
effort is due to a variety of reasons, including: 1) a 
primitive oppositionist impulse in CHP; and 2) traditional 
leftist anti-war sentiments.  He offered the self-serving and 
somewhat mystifying rationalization that, had CHP supported 
the government on Iraq, anti-American sentiment in Turkey 
"would be even more intense than it is now." 
 
 
-- Regarding Cyprus, Dervis asserted that Turkey is not to 
blame for the failure of the UNSYG sponsored settlement 
talks.  The problem, he noted, "has deep historical roots." 
Turkish psychology on this issue is complex; it is important 
to avoid feeding the perception among Turks that "something 
is being imposed on them." 
 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
 
2. (C) Once seen as CHP's shining political star, Dervis' 
luster has faded considerably since the Nov. 2002 elections. 
CHP leader Deniz Baykal -- perhaps seeing Dervis as a 
potential rival -- excluded him from important committees and 
CHP executive organs.  Instead, Dervis became head of CHP's 
politically impotent science research arm.  According to CHP 
M.P. and Human Rights Committee member Engin Altay, Dervis is 
relegated to "producing reports that no one reads."  Many of 
our CHP contacts say Dervis rarely even makes an appearance 
at Parliament. 
 
 
3. (C) Dervis' many years in the United States and 
familiarity with the wider world insulates him from many of 
the xenophobic pathologies of his colleagues in the 
Establishment intelligentsia and other circles.  His private 
criticism of Kemalism -- at odds with his politically 
problematic public comments in the days before the elections 
(reftel) -- have considerable merit.  Nevertheless, he 
displays at a minimum a high degree of comfort with the party 
line of CHP boss Deniz Baykal.  Before the election, 
erstwhile Dervis allies began to criticize him for "selling 
out" to Baykalism and its principal-free approach to 
politics.  Dervis' performance to date as a politician has 
done nothing to dispel such sentiments. 
PEARSON