US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI1471

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001471 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR IRAQ TASK FORCE, ALSO NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, 
CA, CA/OCS/NEASA, DS, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/IP/NEA, 
DSERCC, S/CT, INR AND M 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL 03/28/13 
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, KHLS, PTER, PREL, EAID, PGOV, TC 
SUBJECT:  TFIZ01 (EAC): ABU DHABI SITREP NO. 8, MARCH 28 
 
REF: A) ABU DHABI 1461 AND PREVIOUS     B) STATE 79964 
 
1.  (U) Classified by DCM Richard A. Albright, for reasons 
1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
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General Overview 
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2.  (S/NF) COM convened Abu Dhabi's Iraq Task Force/core 
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) at 1000 local time, 3/28 to 
review recent threat reporting that potential Iraqi sleeper 
cells are operating in and could take action in the UAE 
during the period of 27-29 March (ref B).  The Task 
Force/EAC agreed that Embassy Abu Dhabi, FCS (located 
outside of the Embassy compound), and the USGS office in Al 
Ain will open as usual 3/29 with full staffing. 
 
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Security 
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3.  (S/NF) ORCA provided background to ref B threat 
reporting and emphasized that more information regarding 
the specific threat to U.S. interests in the UAE would be 
forthcoming during the next few days. 
 
4.  (S/NF) Concerned that a similar attack (in terms of 
timing, targets, choice of weapons, etc.) may be planned 
for the UAE, the Ambassador on 3/27 requested UAE Armed 
Forces Chief of Staff Shaykh Mohammed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan 
to increase security at the Embassy compound and Embassy 
residences.  RSO echoed this request with his contacts at 
the Abu Dhabi Police Department: stationary armed guards 
are now posted at the DCM, PAO, P/M, DATT residences, and 
additional undercover CID and roving police patrols are 
monitoring Embassy staff residences. 
 
5.  (S/NF) Based on the new threat reporting, USLO has 
implemented a Force Protection Condition upgrade to Delta 
for all U.S. military non-combatants in the UAE.  Al- 
Dhahfra airbase has remained on FPCon Delta since the onset 
of hostilities in Iraq. 
 
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UAEG Actions/Statements 
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6.  (S/NF) Shaykh Mohammed Bin Zayid assured the Ambassador 
3/27 that he takes this threat reporting very seriously, 
and UAE security services are keeping a close watch on all 
Iraqi diplomats, known Mukhabarat, and personnel from Iraqi 
front-companies in the UAE.  Following the discovery of a 
cache of weapons and explosives in the Iraqi Embassy here 
during the 1991 Gulf War, the UAEG has been X-raying all 
Iraqi diplomatic pouches coming into the country for at 
least the last several years. 
 
7.  (S/NF) Director of State Security Shaykh Hazza Bin 
Zayid Al-Nayhan confirmed to ORCA that one of the men named 
in the investigation in Sanaa as a possible Iraqi agent 
operating in the UAE is known to State Security and has not 
been allowed to enter the country for many years.  State 
Security continues to search for the other suspects named 
in the investigation. 
 
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Consular/ American Citizen Issues 
--------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) The Ambassador noted that, unlike in Yemen, there 
are many more high-profile American companies, hotels, and 
schools in the UAE.  In order to minimize the threat to 
soft targets, RSO continues to work with the police for 
increased armed guard coverage at the American Community 
School in Abu Dhabi, the FCS satellite office, and the 
construction site for the New Embassy Compound.  (Note: 
USGS in Al-Ain already has a dedicated security guard as 
per its contract with the UAEG.  End note.) 
 
9.  (U) The Task Force/EAC agreed that the general "safety 
and security" warden message disseminated by CONS on 3/27 
is sufficient for now. 
 
10.  (U) Abu Dhabi Iraq Task Force/EAC will reconvene at 
1000 local time, 3/29. 
11.  (U) Iraq Task Force/EAC members in attendance included 
AMB, DCM, RSO, DAO, P/M, POL, ECON, CONS, PAO, USLO. 
Wahba