US embassy cable - 03KUWAIT1221

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TERRORIST FINANCE: POST VETTING OF PROPOSED TERRORIST FINANCE TARGETS

Identifier: 03KUWAIT1221
Wikileaks: View 03KUWAIT1221 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Kuwait
Created: 2003-03-27 23:09:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: EFIN ETTC PTER PREL PGOV KU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001221 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
STATE FOR EB/ESC/ESP (GLASS) 
STATE FOR S/CT (FOX) 
STATE FOR IO/PHO (PEREZ) 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP AND NEA/RA 
TREASURY FOR GENERAL COUNSEL AUFHAUSER 
TREASURY FOR OFAC DIRECTOR NEWCOMB 
TREASURY FOR DAS FOR TERRORISM AND VIOLENT CRIMES (ZARATE) 
TREASURY FOR TASK FORCE ON TERRORIST FINANCING 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/24/2012 
TAGS: EFIN, ETTC, PTER, PREL, PGOV, KU 
SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: POST VETTING OF PROPOSED 
TERRORIST FINANCE TARGETS 
 
REF: STATE 79970 
 
Classified By: Per Reference Telegram DTG 272309Z MAR 03 
 
1.(S) Two of the proposed terrorist finance designation 
targets described in reftel have significance for Kuwait.  As 
requested, post provides the following comments on these two 
entities. 
 
2. (S) Abdullah Al-Nafisi:  Post foresees no significant 
negative reaction to the designation of Al-Nafisi, and 
believes the GOK has the legal authority, administrative 
capability, and political will to enforce such a designation 
if it is confirmed by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee. 
 
3. (S/NF)  Social Reform Society (SRS) and subsidiaries: 
Post notes that it is difficult to judge the credibility of 
these allegations without seeing the reports upon which they 
are based, and requests that such reports be provided to post 
through ORCA channels for review as soon as possible. 
 
4. (S) The SRS designation was originally proposed in late 
2001, but the USG ultimately decided not to propose 
designation at that time, for reasons unknown to post.  To 
our recollection, we were never actually instructed to engage 
the GOK to express our concerns about SRS.  The allegations 
now presented appear significantly broader and more detailed 
than earlier reports.  Post would welcome instructions to 
share our concerns with the appropriate GOK officials, but 
will need detailed and credible evidence that we can share to 
do so. 
 
5. (S) Clarifications:  Please note that reftel summary 
includes the Islamic Missionary Commission, which is another 
name for the SRS branch committee Lajnat al-Daawa 
al-Islamiyya (LDI, or Islamic Call Committee.  LDI was 
designated on January 9, 2003 and by the UN in February. 
Post reported that the GOK has frozen at least KD 1.4 million 
in LDI assets.  Additionally, post is not aware of the 
affiliation of the African Relief Agency with SRS, and 
believe this may refer to the Africa Relief Committee, 
another SRS subcommittee. 
 
6. (S) Domestic Political Fallout:  Public designation of 
SRS, with National Assembly elections only a few months away, 
would be a political bombshell.  An untimely designation 
could cause some to accuse the U.S. of trying to influence 
the election and Kuwaiti internal politics.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood -affiliated SRS is closely tied with a small but 
powerful political Islamist bloc in the National Assembly, 
the Islamic Constitutional Movement.  Conceivably, a 
designation could garner the group sympathy, and cause their 
representation and influence to grow; or it could discredit 
the group causing them to lose seats and power.   We would 
recommend discussing such issues fully with senior GOK 
officials before proceeding. 
 
7. (S) Bilateral Political Fallout:  An SRS designation would 
be big news in Kuwait.  If not handled properly, it could 
become an unwelcome irritant in the bilateral relationship. 
There is also a risk that it could distract GOK officials 
from their unwavering support for our current war effort and 
undercut broad local public support at a time when we need it 
most. 
 
8. (S) Recommendation:  On balance, we would suggest that a 
public designation of SRS and/or its branches be delayed 
until after hostilities cease in Iraq.  In the meantime, we 
note that reftel admits there is no evidence SRS's key 
management wittingly supports terrorism.  We would suggest a 
direct approach to senior SRS officials to share our 
allegations and allow them to clean house quietly.  (Such an 
approach would have to be previously discussed and 
coordinated with the GOK.  Indeed, the GOKs new office of 
Charity Oversight and Supervision, housed in the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Labor, could be a valuable partner in this 
effort, which could serve as a springboard for a combined 
technical assistance mission and joint investigation.) 
Should SRS officials refuse to cooperate, an immediate 
designation of the branches would be politically more 
palatable.  However, given the apparent lack of evidence on 
SRS Kuwait complicity in terrorist finance, and the 
precedents of the designation of branches (but not the main 
office) of the SRS and the Revival of Islamic Heritage 
Society based on a similar pattern of evidence, we would not 
recommend the designation of the parent SRS operation in 
Kuwait at this stage. 
JONES 

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