US embassy cable - 03SANAA605

S E C R E T SANAA 000605 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
TERREP 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, S/CT, 
S/ES-O, RSOS FOR ABU DHABI, AMMAN, ANKARA, BEIRUT, 
DAMASCUS, ISLAMABAD, LONDON, MANAMA, BANGKOK, NEW DELHI, 
CAIRO, RIYADH, 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2013 
TAGS: ASEC, PTER, CASC, PREL, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM, EAC 
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP REGARDING HOST GOVERNMENT ACTION AGAINST 
POSSIBLE EMBASSY ATTACK 
 
REF: A. TD-314/17398-03 
     B. SANAA 00602 
     C. SANAA 00603 
 
Classified By: RSO TIMOTHY E. LAAS, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 
 
1.  (S/NF)  Summary:  On March 27 at 0145 local, Yemen's 
Political Security Organization (PSO) officers arrested three 
members of a terrorist cell and confiscated explosives per 
REFTELS.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (S/NF) On the afternoon of 27 March 2003, the Ambassador 
called on PSO Chief Gamish to discuss follow-up to possible 
Iraqi attack plot described in REFTELS.  The PSO Director 
informed Ambassador three suspected IIS operatives were 
arrested by PSO at 0145 on 3/27.  Explosives were also found 
in the house, apparently confirming threat information from 
REFTEL source. 
 
3. (SBU)  RSO considers the post's current security 
configuration as appropriate to adequately protect USG 
personnel and facilities while in the "Stand Fast" mode. 
Under Stand Fast operations the potential for an attack 
against a "soft target" is minimized because movements of 
Embassy officers are restricted to essential movements only 
in a armored vehicle monitored by the RSO with random ROYG 
marked police car escorts. 
 
4. (S/NF) Post has been in a Stand Fast posture since 
receiving the preliminary threat information.  As noted in 
REFTEL A, source indicated that residences of the DAT and 
Public Affairs Officer were to be targeted along with the 
Egyptian Embassy and a local travel agency that works for 
British Airways.  The American Embassy was identified by 
REFTEL source as a surveilled potential target, but was 
dropped from the target list as "two difficult".  Source 
indicated that the attack cell intended to throw a small IED 
timed or remote control device over the wall of the selected 
Embassy residences.  RSO notes that such an act would run a 
substantial risk of detection and armed confrontation due to 
perimeter security coverage which includes one armed ROYG 
officer at the front gate, "as directed" Surveillance 
Detection activities, PSO spot coverage on the residential 
perimeters, one mobile patrol unit visiting each post three 
times per one eight hour shift, and hourly radio checks with 
one unarmed LGF post on the inside of the each compound. 
 
5. (SBU) U.S. Embassy-related facilities in Sanaa including 
residences have aggressive perimeter and access control 
policies.  Embassy security was recently made more 
restrictive with a new prohibition against Foreign Service 
National's parking on the Embassy compound.  Post will be 
reassessing all there arrangements in light of this 
experience, and seek to learn as much as possible from source 
about how U.S.-related sites were surveilled and targets 
chosen. 
 
HULL