US embassy cable - 03ANKARA2018

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002018 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: REPORT OF GROWING WAR ANXIETY IN TURKEY'S KURDISH 
SOUTHEAST 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1631 
     B. ANKARA 1740 
 
 
(U) Classified by Polcouns John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.5 
(b)(d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Kurdish M.P. from Diyarbakir who is also a 
member of opposition CHP's Central Administrative Board has 
elaborated on concerns expressed to us recently by other 
Kurdish politicians (ref A) regarding fallout in southeastern 
Turkey from the war in Iraq.  Moreover, he asserted that (1) 
there is a growing sense among Kurds that the war in Iraq is 
going poorly and (2) a growing number of Kurds in Diyarbakir 
view the conflict in increasingly stark, "Islamic" terms. 
End summary. 
 
 
2. (C) A Kurdish M.P. from "secular" CHP -- one of the few 
straight shooters we know in that party -- asserted to us 
March 27 that the initial positive sentiment about the war in 
Iraq has faded among many Kurds in Turkey's Southeast.  He 
claimed the mood in Diyarbakir, the region's largest city and 
our contact's hometown, is one of "controlled panic." 
Diyarbakir Kurds, he averred, "are genuinely concerned that 
the U.S. will bomb them.  Even if Iraq shoots a missile 
against Diyarbakir, people will blame the U.S."  Our contact 
recognizes the absurdity of such a fear but believes it comes 
from a growing sense -- fanned by local religious leaders -- 
that the U.S. is conducting a war against Islam.  "You must 
take care not to bomb religious sites in Iraq," he warned, 
"or you will risk greater opposition in the Southeast." 
 
 
3. (C) Moreover, the M.P. noted that many in the Southeast 
may not support the war because of familial and tribal ties 
to the terrorist PKK/KADEK.  He noted that his own brother 
had joined the PKK in 1988 at the age of 15, though he has 
not been seen since.  Kurds, he said, fear that whatever 
post-Saddam regime emerges in Iraq, it will at a minimum 
exclude PKK/KADEK from a place at the table and may even 
attempt to destroy it.  Consequently, the pro-PKK/KADEK 
Kurdish Medya TV, he said, is broadcasting this concern. 
(Comment: In one of the ironies of the current political 
situation, we note that numerous senior figures in the 
pro-Kurdish DEHAP and defunct HADEP parties, both with a 
relationship to PKK/KADEK akin to that of Sinn Fein with the 
IRA, have eagerly expressed to us privately their support for 
USG actions in Iraq.  End comment.) 
 
 
---------------------------- 
Comment: The Kurdish Dilemma 
---------------------------- 
 
 
4. (C) Our senior CHP contact's comments emphasize different 
aspects of the situation than the views espoused by some of 
our other leading (pro-Barzani) Kurdish contacts, including 
those in CHP.  On the one hand, they reflect diffuse 
tolerance of PKK/KADEK, not because it is a terrorist 
organization but because "these are our sons."  Second, in 
previous, more official settings, this particular contact has 
been careful to enunciate the CHP line -- even as he 
simultaneously expressed hope that the USG war effort will 
succeed in improving conditions for Kurds in Iraq.  As a 
secularist, however, he is also more prone to warn against 
rising Islamic sentiment than his more traditional brethren. 
 
 
5. (C) As a whole, Kurds are more openly religious than 
ethnic Turkish citizens.  While this helps foster a sense of 
the Kurds as distinct from, and victims of, the "Kemalist" 
Turks, it also makes many susceptible to pan-Islamic 
arguments that the USG is leading a "Crusade" against Muslim 
Iraq (ref B).  In this contact's view, at least, there is a 
growing convergence of interests between some militant 
Islamist elements and far-left nationalists in the Kurdish 
Southeast. 
PEARSON