US embassy cable - 03AMMAN1843

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001843 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2013 
TAGS: PREL, IZ, TH, JO 
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: THAI AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ PROVIDES MORE 
INFORMATION ON SITUATION IN BAGHDAD 
 
REF: AMMAN 1581 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (S) On March 26, Thai Ambassador to Iraq (also accredited 
to Jordan) Tawatchai Piyarat (please protect) invited A/DCM 
and A/Pol to his temporary Amman residence to discuss ongoing 
events in Iraq.  Piyarat said that he was speaking in a 
personal capacity and not on instructions from Bangkok, and 
was motivated to provide any help he could "to end the war 
quickly and end the suffering of the Iraqi people." (Note: 
Piyarat had earlier provided us the information contained 
reftel.) 
 
2. (S) Piyarat began by noting that the Iraqis are "tough, 
smart, and will fight you with all they've got."  He noted 
that before he departed Baghdad on 3/11, he saw Baath party 
officials distributing weapons to party members and other 
Saddam loyalists.  Such tenacity notwithstanding, he offered 
the following observations to help coalition military 
personnel define targets: 
 
-- Every Mukhabarat building has a pole with red and white 
stripes.  He noted that care must be taken as many of these 
buildings are co-located in residential areas (the 
Mukhabarat's HQ -- long since relocated to a building near 
the UNDP HQ -- is only 30 meters from the official Thai 
residence.) 
 
-- Iraqi Generals and senior officials drive white Mercedes 
320S sedans.  Government vehicles have blue license plates, 
however GOI officials drive in regular white plated vehicles 
as well making identification difficult. 
 
-- Many senior Iraqi officials have homes near the park by 
the Parade Grounds (where the large crossed swords monument 
is located).  Most of these officials have moved out of their 
residences and have commandeered buildings along the river 
 
-- There are many underground roadways in Baghdad.  He says 
that Thai workers have told him of being blindfolded, put on 
a bus, and then arriving at an underground construction site 
where they would labor in six month rotations.  He noted 
specifically that under the garden and "pool" of the palace 
beside Saddam tower is an underground roadway.  Piyarat did 
not specify where the road went or what its use is but 
offered that "perhaps another 'bunker buster' can finish it 
off." (DAO Comment: This reporting is similar to reports of 
Chinese laborers working on underground facilities in the 
1990s.) 
 
-- In attacking Baghdad, the U.S. should consider attacking 
or gaining access to the city by using the river: "they 
expect you to come by land or by air, but not by water." 
 
3. (S) Piyarat offered the following additional thoughts on a 
range of topics. 
 
-- Iraq's strategy: Piyarat assessed that "they will lure you 
into Baghdad and then take down a lot of people with them." 
 
-- WMD labs: He has no doubt they exist, but the Iraqis have 
been very smart in breaking down individual factories into 
very small units, each of which produces only a small part of 
the overall item. 
 
-- The average Iraqi's psychological state:  Among the 
younger people "they've created a generation of hatred, they 
hate America" but among older Iraqis a reservoir of good 
feelings about America still exists.  "Its about 50/50." (DAO 
Comment: Past DAO reporting has indicated a similar 
generational divide in Iraq regarding attitudes toward the 
U.S.) 
 
-- Radio/TV: Iraqis listen to Iranian radio and watch Iranian 
TV, both of which they can receive well in Baghdad.  He 
suggested that the coalition should take out Iraqi TV as soon 
as possible.  Saddam uses that to "create instant casualties" 
whenever he wants.  Piyarat suggested that an area in the 
desert west of Baghdad would be a good place to locate radio 
or TV transmitters that could reach Baghdadis. 
 
-- The Power of Giving:  As a final observation, Piyarat 
commented on how much of Saddam's power derives from favors 
which he can provide or deny:  "When Saddam gives, he's good. 
 When he doesn't give, he's bad.  That's the way it is." 
 
 
GNEHM