US embassy cable - 03KUWAIT1105

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 001105 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2013 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, PGOV, SOCI, KISL, KU 
SUBJECT: (C) HOW THE WAR COULD AFFECT KUWAIT POLITICALLY 
 
REF: KUWAIT 974 EXDIS 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; REASON 1.5 (D) 
 
1.  (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY:  Reftel examined how a 
US-led war against Saddam's regime could affect US relations 
with Kuwait.  This message looks at the closely-related topic 
of the political effects the war could have on Kuwait itself. 
 In both cases, the answer is highly scenario-dependent.  If 
we win quickly and relatively cleanly, and the new Iraq 
rapidly emerges as a friendly, responsible state, Kuwait will 
probably come under relatively little pressure to change 
course, and liberal, pro-American elements may be 
strengthened.  On the other hand, if stiff Iraqi resistance 
drags out the conflict and produces massive civilian 
casualties, Kuwait will face widespread condemnation as a 
traitor to the Arab/Muslim world for having served as our 
main launching pad.  The regime could feel compelled to 
bolster its Arab and Muslim credentials by promoting more of 
the Islamist agenda.  We assess that the Kuwaitis will not 
break with us no matter how the war goes, unless they were to 
conclude that we were about to leave them at Saddam's mercy. 
Even if the war goes well, though, the Kuwaitis will feel 
more vindicated than beholden to us.  END INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) PERCEPTIONS RULE:  The outcome of the war to remove 
Saddam's regime and eliminate its WMD programs will 
eventually make itself clear, but in the meantime, we can 
expect perceptions to range all over the map, mostly in 
negative directions.  No matter how inaccurate or unfair, 
perceptions determine reactions.  Kuwaitis' perceptions may 
be vulnerable to change because of unrealistically high 
initial expectations:  they have been telling themselves that 
the Iraqis hate the dictator so much they would not fight, 
and that our military might is so overwhelming that we would 
sweep into Baghdad in no time, with negligible casualties. 
This Embassy is tracking not only the Kuwaitis' own 
perceptions about the war, but the effect on them of 
prevailing perceptions in the wider Arab world.  There, if 
not here, we expect to see an inverse relationship between 
the degree to which the Iraqis put up a fight and the 
credibility of our claim to be liberators (never mind that 
this equation is a fallacy as long as only the regime 
resists, not the population).  We also expect to see (in the 
larger Arab world, but not here) a direct relationship 
between the amount of perceived harm the Iraqis do to us and 
Saddam's standing as a warrior hero. 
 
3.  (C)  OPTIMIST'S SCENARIO:  If the war ends well, Kuwait 
will be adequately insulated against criticism in the 
Arab/Muslim world.  In the best case, US influence in Kuwait 
will grow, liberals in this country will be strengthened, and 
they may increase their representation in the National 
Assembly (elections are due by mid-July).  This optimistic 
scenario offers the best chance for progress on women's 
rights (Kuwaiti women can neither vote nor run in National 
Assembly elections; in 2000, the Assembly narrowly rejected 
an Amiri decree enfranchising them).  However, even 
spectacular success in the war will not guarantee liberal 
ascendancy.  Liberals are disunited, and they are -- almost 
by definition -- vulnerable to being stigmatized as 
anti-Islamic. 
 
4.  (C) How Iraq evolves after the war will also affect 
Kuwait.  If the new Iraqi government is seen as democratic, 
successful, and friendly, the advocates of democracy and 
women's rights in this country will be heartened.  At the 
moment, with everybody in crisis mode, we detect no 
groundswell of demand for greater democracy in this small 
oil-rich emirate.  Indeed, by Gulf standards, Kuwait is 
exceptionally open, with a lively private press and 
rambunctious National Assembly.  Even so, it is not only 
women who are disenfranchised:  most male citizens also lack 
the right to vote.  While Iraq does not have much of a 
democratic tradition, its women do already have the right to 
vote, and that could serve as a positive example for Kuwait. 
In fact, more than one young Kuwaiti including members of the 
al-Sabah, have told us that they are hoping to be able to use 
a newly democratic Iraq as an example to spur reform in 
Kuwait. 
 
5.  (C) THANKS, AND YOU'RE WELCOME:  We assess that after the 
war, the Kuwaitis will feel vindicated more than beholden to 
us.  After all, they contributed greatly to our preparations 
for Operation Iraqi Freedom and have put their collective 
neck on the line by allowing us to use their country as the 
launching pad for this major, internationally controversial 
war against an Arab state.  The relative lack of cooperation 
from Saudi Arabia and Turkey underscores both the value and 
the courage of Kuwait's role.  In addition, the GOK is 
providing a very great deal of Assistance-In-Kind to our 
military.  The Government/ruling family will expect us to 
recognize these contributions which are already approaching 
USD one billion; and they will expect us to treat them as a 
full partner.  Unlike after the Gulf War, they will not feel 
a need to make promises on internal political reform.  We 
also see no prospect of Kuwait becoming more active in the 
Arab-Israeli peace process.  Here as in other Arab states 
friendly to us, the population is less supportive of the 
peace process than the regime is.  The GOK will look to us to 
achieve real progress towards a solution satisfactory to the 
Palestinian people (independent state with some part of 
Jerusalem as its capital, knowing that that would help its 
standing in the Arab world).  We can expect it to play a 
quietly supportive role within Arab councils if the situation 
seems promising, but we anticipate that it will remain 
reluctant to get ahead of Saudi Arabia with regard to 
normalization with Israel.  Financial support for any 
Palestinian government involving Yasir Arafat would also be a 
very tough sell here. 
 
6.  (C)   PESSIMIST'S SCENARIO:  If the war were to go badly, 
Kuwait would find itself in a very awkward position:  it 
would feel great pressure to assert its Arab and Muslim 
credentials, but it would also want to ensure our continued 
protection.  We expect Kuwait to stay as close as possible to 
Saudi Arabia, its next-door neighbor to the south, the de 
facto leader of the GCC and a state that has longstanding 
strategic relations with us even though it does not share 
some of our values.  (Notwithstanding historical animosity, 
since the Gulf War Kuwait has become closer to the Saudis 
than any other GCC state.)  The Islamists, particularly the 
Salafis (first cousins of Saudi Arabia's Wahabis), would be 
emboldened. Liberals would be on the defensive.  The general 
trend is already in that direction, even without the war.  A 
law requiring classes at Kuwait University to be segregated 
by gender on the books for several years is being enforced as 
of this academic year.  Plans are afoot to move female 
students off the main campus, even though they constitute 70 
percent of the student body. 
 
7.  (C) U.S. RESOLVE:  We assess that the Kuwaitis would not 
break with us no matter how badly the war went, because the 
more their partnership with us brought heat on them, the more 
they would need protection, and no other nation but the US 
will be there to provide it.  The one thing that could split 
them from us would be a perception that we were about to 
leave them at Saddam's mercy.  That would be their worst 
nightmare (and Saddam's propaganda machine is working 
overtime to keep it vividly before them).  At this stage, we 
do not sense much live questioning of our resolve, but 
psychologists manning Kuwaiti hotlines reportedly already 
have some callers expressing worries about it.  Embassy works 
overtime to counter such notions. 
 
8.  (C) TCNs:  Under the "Optimist's Scenario," we did not 
even mention the TCNs who constitute the majority of Kuwait's 
population.  They are normally quiescent; any involvement in 
protests would jeopardize their job security.  The TCNs 
include hundreds of thousands of Arabs, with Egyptians 
constituting by far the largest group.  We certainly cannot 
exclude the possibility of subversive agitation surfacing 
within this community, which could further complicate 
Kuwait's delicate relationship with the Arab world.  Also, if 
certain Arab governments become excessively hostile, the GOK 
could retaliate by expelling large numbers of their 
nationals.  (Syria has already made some inflammatory 
statements; it has tens of thousands of nationals here.) 
 
9.  (C) PARTING THOUGHT:  The Kuwaitis are the one people in 
the Arab world whose first-hand experience of Iraqi brutality 
makes them impervious to the Saddam mystique.  The more 
Saddam becomes a hero to other Arabs, the deeper the rift 
will be.  The more successful we are, the less Kuwait will 
have to do to mend fences, but the harder certain other Arab 
states will find it to mend fences with Kuwait. 
JONES