US embassy cable - 03AMMAN1835

S E C R E T AMMAN 001835 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2023 
TAGS: PREL, PTER, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: JORDAN'S EXPULSION OF IRAQI DIPLOMATS: GOJ 
DEFENSIVE AFTER SABRI LETTER AND RAMADAN TV ATTACK 
 
REF: A. (A) FBIS GMP20030325000335 
 
     B. (B) FBIS GMP20030325000176 
     C. (C) FBIS GMP20030325000243 
     D. (D) FBIS GMP20030325000316 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm.  Reasons 1.5 (b,d). 
 
1. (C) Naji Sabri's publicly released March 25 letter 
denouncing the GOJ's decision to expel five Iraqi diplomats 
(ref A), and Taha Yasin Ramadan's subsequent outburst against 
Jordan during a March 25 press conference (ref b), have left 
GOJ officials in a state of acute public discomfort as they 
seek to defend Jordan's actions.  In his letter to FonMin 
Muasher, Sabri vented that GOJ intelligence officials 
escorted one of the diplomats in question "in an uncivilized 
manner from his house in Amman and beat him up, as if he is a 
war criminal.  They did so while all the faithful and the 
righteous Arabs view the Iraqis with pride.  This makes me 
wonder: O Brothers, what have you left for the 
U.S-British-Zionist enemy?"  Ramadan's subsequent TV 
appearance also singled out Jordan for criticism for 
"fulfilling" a U.S. demand to expel Iraqi diplomats when 
other Arab states had not, and for claiming that Iraq had cut 
off supplies of oil when, according to Ramadan, it had not. 
 
2. (C) These twin Iraqi broadsides forced the GOJ into a 
defensive crouch while it engaged in damage control with the 
Jordanian public.  FonMin Muasher held a press conference 
broadcast live on Jordan TV (refs c and d) on the evening of 
3/25 in which he reiterated the GOJ's explanation that the 
five Iraqis in question were expelled for security reasons 
and that the Iraqi government is "fully aware" of those 
reasons.  He went on to say "If there is Iraqi insistence to 
consider the expulsion of the diplomats a U.S. dictate or to 
make any other accusations, we will not mind disclosing these 
security considerations that will not please any Jordanian or 
Iraqi citizen." 
 
3. (C) Muasher's statements make clear GOJ's extreme 
sensitivity to the accusation that it is acting at the behest 
of the U.S..  It has sought to make the case that its actions 
were solely for the protection of Jordan and in no way were 
in the service of the U.S.  In this formulation, the GOJ took 
the action it did not as part of the global U.S. effort to 
close down Iraqi diplomatic missions, but rather in response 
to the Jordan-specific actions (or planned actions) of the 
individuals in question.  To underline the point, Muasher 
stated that King Abdullah is ready to receive new Iraqi 
diplomats and the Iraqi embassy will not be closed. 
 
4. (C) Following his press conference, Muasher called the 
Ambassador to ask if the Ambassador could publicly 
acknowledge that the U.S. had not requested the expulsion and 
reinforce Muasher's public statement that the GOJ's actions 
were based on its own criteria.  The Ambassador declined, but 
said that, if asked, he would make reference to our global 
concerns and simply refer to the GOJ any questions about 
their actions. 
 
5. (S/NF)  According to ORCA, the GID identified seven Iraqi 
intelligence agents for expulsion, five with diplomatic 
status and two who worked for an Iraqi trade office in Aqaba. 
 GID confirms that three of the five accredited as diplomats 
have been removed.  With regard to the two Aqaba trade 
officials, they were asked to leave Jordan.  However, as of 
3/26, we do not know whether they have left.  Additionally, 
GID detained two Iraqi Airways personnel suspected of being 
IIS officers.  Their situation as of 3/26 is not clear.  ORCA 
is working with GID on these issues. 
 
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Comment 
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6. (C) This small tempest in a much bigger storm highlights 
the dangers the GOJ sees lurking as it awaits the "tipping 
point" when a U.S. military victory and clear signs of Iraqi 
public happiness with the fall of Saddam transform public 
opinion here.  Until that point, and as long as most 
Jordanians root for Iraqi resistance, the GOJ will bob and 
weave as much as it can to avoid connection with U.S. 
military actions in Iraq. 
GNEHM