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| Identifier: | 03ABUDHABI1467 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03ABUDHABI1467 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Abu Dhabi |
| Created: | 2003-03-26 12:33:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| Tags: | KPAO PREL PGOV TC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
null
Diana T Fritz 05/24/2007 04:44:37 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results
Cable
Text:
UNCLASSIFIED
SIPDIS
TELEGRAM March 26, 2003
To: No Action Addressee
Action: Unknown
From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 1467 - UNKNOWN)
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KPAO
Captions: None
Subject: TFIZ01: PUBLIC OPINION WRAP-UP: RESIGNATION
TURNING
TO ANGER
Ref: None
_________________________________________________________________
UNCLAS ABU DHABI 01467
SIPDIS
CXABU:
ACTION: POL
INFO: RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON
DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:MMMENARD
CLEARED: DCM:RAA; CGD:RGO; POL:STW; ECON:TEW; PAO:KVV
VZCZCADI674
OO RUEHC RUCNRAQ RUEKJCS RUCAACC
DE RUEHAD #1467/01 0851233
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261233Z MAR 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9102
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCAACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001467 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPARTMENT FOR IRAQ PD TASK FORCE, NEA/ARP AND NEA/P E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KPAO, PREL, PGOV, TC SUBJECT: TFIZ01: PUBLIC OPINION WRAP-UP: RESIGNATION TURNING TO ANGER SUMMARY AND COMMENT ------------------- 1. (U) Six days into Operation Iraqi Freedom, even our closest and most westernized Emirati contacts are disturbed by the coverage they are seeing of the Iraq war. The emotional impact of the images of civilian casualties and the negative spin being imparted by the vast bulk of the Arab media are having a real effect. As one pro- western, Boston University-educated Emirati technocrat put it: "We are reacting emotionally as Arabs to the death of Arab civilians and the humiliation of a once- proud Arab state." 2. (U) Emiratis would like the war to end as soon as possible and with a minimum loss of life. Several close contacts have urged us to keep Iraqi TV off the air. Our contacts don't understand why the U.S. has allowed the Iraqi regime to get its message out in what has been a devastatingly effective propaganda campaign. While there is little doubt here that the coalition will ultimately prevail, there is a growing sense that we are losing the information war. 3. (SBU) While we may not be able to turn the tide on the strong anti-American sentiment -- which predated this conflict -- we are taking steps to get our story on the air and in the papers. Our Public Affairs Office, like other in the region, is in daily contact with the Iraq PD Task Force and CENTCOM with recommendations on how we can better shape our message. We are also disseminating information, via IIP products, to the media and the public on coalition efforts. To help counter the slew of misinformation, we intend to deploy our Arabic-speaking officers to engage informally with local journalists. At the appropriate time, the Ambassador, a fluent Arabic speaker, will meet with select members of the press to get the humanitarian story out. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT SLEEPLESS IN ABU DHABI: WAR WATCHING TILL DAWN ------------------------ 4. (U) In the UAE, as elsewhere in the Arab world, people are closely monitoring the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In a country where even newspaper deliverymen carry cell phones, many receive regular news updates on their mobiles while others exchange text messages with the latest dark- humor jokes on the conflict. Families gather late into the night in front of the television set surfing the major Arabic news satellite channels, namely, Al-Jazeera, Abu Dhabi TV and Al-Arabiya. As one of our contacts put it, "No one is working because everyone is up late watching TV." 5. (SBU) Television is clearly having an impact on public opinion in the UAE. Senior Emiratis have expressed consternation at the disturbing and often gruesome visuals of dead, burned and maimed Iraqi civilians being aired on Al-Jazeera. While there is a belief that the coalition forces will win the conflict on the ground in Iraq, there is growing concern that we are losing the information war across the entire Arab world. As a well-connected Sharjah notable put it to Dubai Consul General on March 25: "Get the cameras out [of Iraq]." AGREEMENT THAT SADDAM MUST GO BUT RESIGNATION TURNING TO ANGER AS CASUALTIES INCREASE ------------------------------ 6. (U) Among elites, there is a widespread recognition that Saddam Hussein must go, and in this regard, key opinion makers are still with us (in a way that they are most definitely not on the Palestinian/Israeli conflict). However, they are nervous because they fear that the daily bombardment of negative images will make it impossible to support a goal they believe in -- getting rid of Saddam. 7. (U) As the days go by and the number of Iraqi civilian casualties increase, our contacts' focus is shifting from the suffering of the Iraqi people at the hands of Saddam Hussein and 12 years of sanctions to the perceived suffering of the Iraqi people as a result of coalition bombing. There is a general disbelief that bombs dropped in Baghdad are hitting only strategic targets. Rather, most comment that "what the U.S. is doing is brutal -- bombing the people." 8. (U) The specter of an Arab country under attack has brought to the fore an emotional identification with fellow Arabs and Muslims. An Emirati banker stated: "Baghdad is the historical capital of Arab culture and civilization. It is being attacked and occupied. It is disgraceful and shameful, and the images [of the civilian casualties in Basra] are horrifying." These sentiments are not shared by the large Iraqi expatriate community. An Iraqi physician downplayed the anti-American hype in the Arab media as a throwback to the cold war when the press was state-controlled. FEAR OF A LONG, DRAWN-OUT CONFLICT ---------------------------------- 9. (U) Our interlocutors' general impression before the war was that the operation to remove Saddam Hussein would be quick and painless. Instead, based on what they see on television, their general impression is that coalition forces are not much closer now to removing Saddam Hussein than they were on Day 1. Many are comparing this conflict unfavorably to the 1991 Gulf War, in which the ground campaign lasted only 100 hours. 10. (U) Prominent interlocutors believe that a long, drawn-out conflict will bring untold negative consequences to regional economic and political stability. Their unified message: "Hurry up and get it over with." (Comment: In this regard, messages from the White House and CENTCOM preparing Americans for a long conflict, while necessary for managing the expectations of the American public, go down very badly here for the coalition but in the long term will serve to lower expectations. End comment.) 11. (U) This cable was coordinated with ConGen Dubai. WAHBA
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