US embassy cable - 03ABUDHABI1467

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TFIZ01: PUBLIC OPINION WRAP-UP: RESIGNATION TURNING TO ANGER

Identifier: 03ABUDHABI1467
Wikileaks: View 03ABUDHABI1467 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abu Dhabi
Created: 2003-03-26 12:33:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Tags: KPAO PREL PGOV TC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
null
Diana T Fritz  05/24/2007 04:44:37 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
UNCLASSIFIED

SIPDIS
TELEGRAM                                           March 26, 2003


To:       No Action Addressee                                    

Action:   Unknown                                                

From:     AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 1467 - UNKNOWN)         

TAGS:     PREL, PGOV, KPAO                                       

Captions: None                                                   

Subject:  TFIZ01: PUBLIC OPINION WRAP-UP: 		RESIGNATION 
TURNING  
          TO ANGER                                               

Ref:      None                                                   
_________________________________________________________________
UNCLAS        ABU DHABI 01467

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL 
    INFO:   RSO AMB DCM P/M ECON 

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:MMWAHBA
DRAFTED: POL:MMMENARD
CLEARED: DCM:RAA; CGD:RGO; POL:STW; ECON:TEW; PAO:KVV

VZCZCADI674
OO RUEHC RUCNRAQ RUEKJCS RUCAACC
DE RUEHAD #1467/01 0851233
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261233Z MAR 03
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9102
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUCAACC/USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001467 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR IRAQ PD TASK FORCE, NEA/ARP 
AND NEA/P 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KPAO, PREL, PGOV, TC 
SUBJECT:  TFIZ01: PUBLIC OPINION WRAP-UP: 
  RESIGNATION TURNING TO ANGER 
 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
1.  (U) Six days into Operation Iraqi 
Freedom, even our closest and most 
westernized Emirati contacts are disturbed 
by the coverage they are seeing of the Iraq 
war.  The emotional impact of the images of 
civilian casualties and the negative spin 
being imparted by the vast bulk of the Arab 
media are having a real effect.  As one pro- 
western, Boston University-educated Emirati 
technocrat put it:  "We are reacting 
emotionally as Arabs to the death of Arab 
civilians and the humiliation of a once- 
proud Arab state." 
 
2. (U) Emiratis would like the war to end as 
soon as possible and with a minimum loss of 
life.  Several close contacts have urged us 
to keep Iraqi TV off the air.  Our contacts 
don't understand why the U.S. has allowed 
the Iraqi regime to get its message out in 
what has been a devastatingly effective 
propaganda campaign.  While there is little 
doubt here that the coalition will 
ultimately prevail, there is a growing sense 
that we are losing the information war. 
 
3. (SBU) While we may not be able to turn 
the tide on the strong anti-American 
sentiment -- which predated this conflict -- 
we are taking steps to get our story on the 
air and in the papers.  Our Public Affairs 
Office, like other in the region, is in 
daily contact with the Iraq PD Task Force 
and CENTCOM with recommendations on how we 
can better shape our message.  We are also 
disseminating information, via IIP products, 
to the media and the public on coalition 
efforts.  To help counter the slew of 
misinformation, we intend to deploy our 
Arabic-speaking officers to engage 
informally with local journalists.  At the 
appropriate time, the Ambassador, a fluent 
Arabic speaker, will meet with select 
members of the press to get the humanitarian 
story out.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
 
SLEEPLESS IN ABU DHABI: 
WAR WATCHING TILL DAWN 
------------------------ 
 
4.  (U) In the UAE, as elsewhere in the Arab 
world, people are closely monitoring the 
course of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  In a 
country where even newspaper deliverymen 
carry cell phones, many receive regular news 
updates on their mobiles while others 
exchange text messages with the latest dark- 
humor jokes on the conflict.  Families 
gather late into the night in front of the 
television set surfing the major Arabic news 
satellite channels, namely, Al-Jazeera, Abu 
Dhabi TV and Al-Arabiya.  As one of our 
contacts put it, "No one is working because 
everyone is up late watching TV." 
 
5. (SBU) Television is clearly having an 
impact on public opinion in the UAE.  Senior 
Emiratis have expressed consternation at the 
disturbing and often gruesome visuals of 
dead, burned and maimed Iraqi civilians 
being aired on Al-Jazeera.  While there is a 
belief that the coalition forces will win 
the conflict on the ground in Iraq, there is 
growing concern that we are losing the 
information war across the entire Arab 
world.  As a well-connected Sharjah notable 
put it to Dubai Consul General on March 25: 
"Get the cameras out [of Iraq]." 
 
 
AGREEMENT THAT SADDAM MUST GO 
BUT RESIGNATION TURNING TO 
ANGER AS CASUALTIES INCREASE 
------------------------------ 
 
6. (U) Among elites, there is a widespread 
recognition that Saddam Hussein must go, and 
in this regard, key opinion makers are still 
with us (in a way that they are most 
definitely not on the Palestinian/Israeli 
conflict).  However, they are nervous 
because they fear that the daily bombardment 
of negative images will make it impossible 
to support a goal they believe in -- getting 
rid of Saddam. 
 
7.  (U) As the days go by and the number of 
Iraqi civilian casualties increase, our 
contacts' focus is shifting from the 
suffering of the Iraqi people at the hands 
of Saddam Hussein and 12 years of sanctions 
to the perceived suffering of the Iraqi 
people as a result of coalition bombing. 
There is a general disbelief that bombs 
dropped in Baghdad are hitting only 
strategic targets.  Rather, most comment 
that "what the U.S. is doing is brutal -- 
bombing the people." 
 
8.  (U) The specter of an Arab country under 
attack has brought to the fore an emotional 
identification with fellow Arabs and 
Muslims.  An Emirati banker stated: 
"Baghdad is the historical capital of Arab 
culture and civilization.  It is being 
attacked and occupied.  It is disgraceful 
and shameful, and the images [of the 
civilian casualties in Basra] are 
horrifying."  These sentiments are not 
shared by the large Iraqi expatriate 
community.  An Iraqi physician downplayed 
the anti-American hype in the Arab media as 
a throwback to the cold war when the press 
was state-controlled. 
 
FEAR OF A LONG, DRAWN-OUT CONFLICT 
---------------------------------- 
 
9.  (U) Our interlocutors' general 
impression before the war was that the 
operation to remove Saddam Hussein would be 
quick and painless.  Instead, based on what 
they see on television, their general 
impression is that coalition forces are not 
much closer now to removing Saddam Hussein 
than they were on Day 1.  Many are comparing 
this conflict unfavorably to the 1991 Gulf 
War, in which the ground campaign lasted 
only 100 hours. 
 
10.  (U) Prominent interlocutors believe 
that a long, drawn-out conflict will bring 
untold negative consequences to regional 
economic and political stability.  Their 
unified message:  "Hurry up and get it over 
with."  (Comment: In this regard, messages 
from the White House and CENTCOM preparing 
Americans for a long conflict, while 
necessary for managing the expectations of 
the American public, go down very badly here 
for the coalition but in the long term will 
serve to lower expectations. End comment.) 
 
11.  (U) This cable was coordinated with 
ConGen Dubai. 
 
WAHBA 

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