US embassy cable - 03ZAGREB681

UNCLAS ZAGREB 000681 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON, ENRG, TRGY, SI, HR 
SUBJECT: KRSKO NUCLEAR PLANT AGREEMENT ENTERS INTO FORCE AT 
LAST 
 
REF: LJUBLJANA 216 
 
1. THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON THE KRSKO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, 
LOCATED IN SLOVENIA BUT CO-OWNED BY SLOVENIA AND CROATIA, 
CAME INTO FORCE ON MARCH 11, THE DATE THE GOC RECEIVED THE 
SLOVENIAN DIPLOMATIC NOTE REGARDING SLOVENIAN RATIFICATION. 
ON MARCH 14, THE CROATIAN PARLIAMENT REJECTED TWO MOTIONS 
FROM OPPOSITION PARTIES TO WITHDRAW CROATIAN RATIFICATION -- 
SOMETHING THE PARLIAMENT HAD LEFT OPEN AS A POSSIBILITY WHEN 
IT RATIFIED THE AGREEMENT IN JULY 2002 IN THE CASE THAT 
SLOVENIA DID NOT RATIFY BY THE END OF 2002. 
 
2.  WHILE THE AGREEMENT SETTLED OUTSTANDING CLAIMS AND 
ARREARS THROUGH JUNE 30, 2002, THE DELAY IN ENTRY INTO FORCE 
MEANS THAT ANOTHER EIGHT MONTHS HAVE LAPSED DURING WHICH 
CROATIA RECEIVED NEITHER ELECTRICITY FROM THE PLANT NOR MONEY 
FROM THE SALE OF THE ELECTRICITY.  ACCORDING TO THE GOC, 
SLOVENIA IS ON THE HOOK TO PAY CROATIA FOR ITS SHARE OF 
ELECTRICITY PROCEEDS DURING THAT PERIOD .  HOWEVER, THE GOC 
HAS ANNOUNCED IT WILL SEEK TO SETTLE THE ISSUE OF 
NON-DELIVERY OF ELECTRICITY DURING THE EIGHT MONTH PERIOD 
SEPARATELY, AND WELCOMES THE AGREEMENT AS CLEARING THE WAY 
FOR CROATIA TO RESUME ITS ROLE AS FIFTY-PERCENT OWNER OF THE 
PLANT. 
 
    3.  OBJECTIONS TO THE KRSKO AGREEMENT IN THE PARLIAMENT 
CENTERED AROUND WHETHER THE FINANCIAL PROVISIONS WERE GOOD 
FOR CROATIA.  ONE OBJECTION CAME FROM THE HSLS (CROATIAN 
SOCIAL LIBERAL PARTY), WHICH LEFT THE RULING COALITION LAST 
SUMMER, OSTENSIBLY OVER THIS ISSUE, AND THE EXTREME 
RIGHT-WING HSP (CROATIAN PARTY OF RIGHTS), WHICH REPORTEDLY 
ALLEGED THAT SUPPORTERS OF THE AGREEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT 
WERE "COLLABORATORS" OF THE SLOVENES. 
 
4. THERE WAS ALSO SOME CONSTERNATION IN THE PARLIAMENT AND IN 
THE PRESS OVER A PROVISION OF THE SLOVENIAN LAW OF 
RATIFICATION, WHICH CAME AS AN ATTACHMENT TO THE DIPLOMATIC 
NOTE.  THE PROVISION APPARENTLY CITES EU REGULATIONS AS 
REQUIRING A SHORTER TIMELINE FOR DETERMINING FINAL 
DISPOSITION FOR THE NUCLEAR WASTE FROM THE PLANT.  WHILE THE 
PRESS CHOSE TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF THIS PROVISION, AND EVEN 
CLAIMED THAT IT INCREASED THE POSSIBILITY THAT CROATIA MIGHT 
ONE DAY HAVE TO STORE THE WASTE, THE GOVERNMENT EXPLAINED 
THERE WAS NOTHING ABOUT IT THAT CHANGED CROATIA'S 
OBLIGATIONS, WHICH ARE CONTAINED WITHIN THE TEXT OF THE 
AGREEMENT ITSELF.  IF SLOVENIA WANTED TO TAKE ON ADDITIONAL 
BURDENS, THAT WAS ITS PREROGATIVE. 
 
5. FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, IT IS 
CLEAR THAT CROATIA HAS NO INTENTION OF EVER STORING THE WASTE 
ON ITS TERRITORY.  ACCORDING TO THE AGREEMENT, CROATIA AND 
SLOVENIA SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FINDING A PERMANENT 
SOLUTION TO THE DISPOSAL PROBLEM (CURRENTLY, WASTE IS STORED 
ON-SITE AT KRSKO), AND A PROGRAM FOR THE DECOMMISSIONING OF 
THE PLANT SHOULD BE DRAFTED WITHIN 12 MONTHS FROM THE ENTRY 
INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT.  IF THE PARTIES FAIL TO REACH 
    AGREEMENT ON DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE BY THE END OF THE 
PLANT'S LIFE (NOW SET FOR 2023, BUT WITH AN EXTENSION 
POSSIBLE), THEN WITHIN TWO YEARS OF THE PLANT'S 
DECOMMISSIONING, BOTH PARTIES ARE OBLIGED TO STORE THE WASTE 
IN A 50-50 DIVISION.  CROATIA HAS NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING 
THAT TO COME TO PASS, AND OUR CONTACT IN THE MINISTRY OF 
ECONOMY PREDICTED THAT ULTIMATELY THE WASTE WILL END UP IN A 
THIRD COUNTRY. 
ROSSIN 
 
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