US embassy cable - 03GUATEMALA781

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 GUATEMALA 000781 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/25/2013 
TAGS: SNAR, PGOV, GT 
SUBJECT: RE-CERTIFICATION BENCHMARKS DEMARCHE DELIVERED 
 
REF: A. SECSTATE 66351 
 
     B. GUATEMALA 770 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Hamilton.  Reason 1.5 (B&D). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  As requested in Ref A, the Ambassador 
discussed counter-narcotics re-certification benchmarks in 
detail with President Portillo on March 22.  The Ambassador 
gave Portillo a copy of the diplomatic note on benchmarks 
(full text para 10), rebuffed a request for material 
assistance to the Guatemalan military, and warned that the 
use of torture against narco-traffickers is unacceptable to 
the USG and would be extremely prejudicial to Guatemala's 
chances for re-certification.  Portillo raised no objections 
to the benchmarks and promised to investigate MINUGUA's 
allegations of the use of torture and to stop any further use 
of torture in the war against narcotics trafficking.  DCM met 
separately with Vice Foreign Minister Jorge Perez and 
Secretary for Strategic Analysis Arturo Montenegro to discuss 
 
SIPDIS 
the benchmarks.  Perez proposed a follow-up meeting on 
benchmarks between GOG vice ministers and the DCM and NAS on 
March 26.  We anticipate that the GOG will formally agree to 
the benchmarks.  End Summary. 
 
2.  (C) The Ambassador's meeting with Portillo was reported 
in Ref B.  MINUGUA chief Koenigs had told the Ambassador on 
March 21 that there was strong evidence of the use of torture 
and illegal detention (for at least eight hours) against 
three narco-trafficking suspects on March 6, in Zacapa 
province.  MINUGUA's conclusions in this case were based on a 
joint investigation by its regional office in Zacapa in 
conjunction with the Human Rights Ombudsman's representative. 
 To compile its report, MINUGUA interviewed the 
suspects/victims, police and anti-narcotics (SAIA) police 
sources.  We have been unable to corroborate MINUGUA's report 
with official sources in the SAIA or the military, who deny 
any involvement with torture in this case.  Nevertheless, 
based on discussions with unofficial sources, MINUGUA's 
allegations appear credible. 
 
3.  (U) DCM met with Perez and Montenegro on March 19, 
accompanied by Acting NAS Chief and PolOff.  He provided 
Spanish and English versions of the benchmarks received from 
the Department, commenting that these benchmarks are not 
substantially different from what had previously been under 
discussion. 
 
4.  (SBU) The two GOG officials made the following comments 
in response to specific benchmarks: 
 
-- SAIA Institution Building:  Montenegro provided a copy of 
a general order from the National Civil Police establishing 
the Guatemalan Narcotics Police (SAIA) which outlined basic 
selection requirements for entry into the unit.  Montenegro 
asked if this order satisfied the benchmark requirements. 
Acting NAS chief noted that the order was a partial document 
of a larger regulation and that the requirement for periodic 
urinalysis and polygraph testing would be contained in 
another part of the regulation which was not presented. 
Perez distinguished between "formal versus real" compliance, 
noting that issuing an order may satisfy the formal 
requirement, but real compliance would involve verification 
of implementation.  Montenegro acknowledged this point, and 
added that the order indicated the GOG's intention to comply. 
 
-- Extradition:  Perez asked what time frame is implied in 
the phase "over the coming year."  DCM replied that it was 
the next 12 months. 
 
-- Precursor Chemicals:  Montenegro confirmed that the 
regulations have already been passed. 
 
5.  (SBU) Perez noted that the benchmarks now total nine vs. 
the ten previously discussed, since the issues of seizures 
and prosecutions have been combined in the current document. 
Montenegro said the order of the benchmarks has apparently 
changed.  Previously, the first benchmarks under discussion 
were those under the direct responsibility of the Executive. 
Now they are mixed.  Perez said that is not a problem;  the 
benchmarks are a GOG, not solely Executive responsibility. 
He said he has not discussed this yet with the Foreign 
Minister, but he will propose that the GOG assign primary 
responsibility for completion of each benchmark to the 
responsible ministry, and name an individual responsible, 
thereby creating a matrix of goals and accountable 
institutions and individuals. 
 
6.  (SBU) Perez said the Portillo Administration has "a 
mountain" of demands on it in its last year, but wants to 
make substantial progress meeting the benchmarks by 
September, 2003.  Re-certification is important to the GOG's 
bilateral relationship with the U.S., the GOG's financial 
interests (Comment:  this is a reference to stalled efforts 
to float Eurobonds.  End Comment.), and also a national 
interest in combating narco-trafficking and related 
corruption. 
7.  (SBU) Perez acknowledged that the recertification effort 
will require coordinated action by the Executive, the Public 
Ministry and the judiciary.  Given shortage of prosecutors 
and resources, progress will be difficult, and will require 
shifting prosecutorial assets to this task in the next 
semester.  DCM asked if the Public Ministry and judiciary are 
willing to do so.  Perez said yes.  He said FM Gutierrez has 
two priority areas for transition to the next government: 
the Peace Accord Agenda and the Counter-narcotics Matrix.  He 
asked if the USG would object to the GOG sharing the matrix 
with other countries who might be able to provide support (he 
mentioned Japan in the context of better port management, and 
Spain to train police).  The DCM said we would have no 
objection to the GOG doing this once we have a formal 
agreement on benchmarks.  Perez proposed, and the DCM 
accepted, a meeting between GOG vice ministers, the DCM and 
NAS on March 26 to discuss the benchmarks further. 
 
8.  (SBU) Secretary Montenegro concluded by saying the new 
benchmarks offered "no surprises" and indicated general 
agreement on the substantive issues.  Montenegro said that he 
hopes to develop a national counter-narcotics strategy for 
Cabinet approval, to coordinate GOG policy and create a 
policy framework useful to this and the next government.  He 
is aware of the Government of Mexico's strategy document, and 
was told of the USG strategies.  He asked for NAS 
collaboration in this effort, which we to. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
9.  (SBU) We anticipate no major roadblocks to formal 
Guatemalan agreement to these benchmarks.  End Comment. 
 
10.  (U) Text of Diplomatic Note on Benchmarks provided to 
GOG: 
 
The Embassy of the United States of America presents its 
compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Guatemala 
and has the honor to refer to conversations between our two 
governments on the matter of counter-narcotics cooperation. 
 
To comply with current United States law establishing the 
certification mechanism and to respond to calls for a more 
transparent process, the Embassy of the United States takes 
advantage of this opportunity to advise the Government of 
Guatemala of U.S. law governing the certification process and 
both generic and specific certification standards. 
 
The Embassy wishes to establish at the outset that the 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) and 
other U.S. policy documents on drug control underscore U.S. 
efforts to curb its own drug consumption problems.   Illegal 
drugs exact an enormous toll on U.S. society: 52,000 lives 
annually and some $160 billion dollars a year in economic 
costs.  Sixteen million Americans use drugs on a current 
basis, and 5.6 million meet the criteria for needing drug 
treatment.  United States National Drug Control Policy 
commits unprecedented resources to the treatment of drug 
abuse and the reduction of demand: some $5.2 billion in 
Fiscal Year 2002.  President Bush has announced the United 
States goal of reducing drug use by 10 percent in two years 
and 25 percent in five years.  Recent data from the 
University of Michigan's "Monitoring the Future" survey show 
the first significant downturn in youth drug use in nearly a 
decade, with reduced drug use noted among 8th, 10th, and 12th 
graders. 
 
No domestic policy of demand reductions can succeed, however, 
while the supply of drugs into the United States continues 
unrestrained.  For that reason, we also place enormous 
importance on cooperation with other countries.  The United 
States Government's aim in approaching the Government of 
Guatemala now is to establish a dialogue regarding the United 
States and Guatemala counter-narcotics objectives for the 
near term and to present clear objectives that, if met, will 
be given due consideration by the U.S. in evaluating 
compliance with the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN 
convention and the United States and Guatemala bilateral 
counter-narcotics program.  The Embassy of the United States 
is pleased with the exchanges held to date and will continue 
to dialogue with the Government of Guatemala on this subject 
throughout the year.  The United States Government is 
prepared to review the original decision regarding 
Guatemala's counter-narcotics cooperation in response to 
significant progress in all areas of the shared 
counter-narcotics agenda.  The benchmarks outlined in this 
diplomatic note are not "all or nothing" mandates but, 
rather, represent a series of concrete steps toward a 
definite target.  Significant progress on taking these steps 
would demonstrate the will of the Government of Guatemala to 
meet its international counter-narcotics obligations. 
 
The United States Government's assessment of a country's 
counter-narcotics performance is independent of levels of 
U.S. bilateral counter-narcotics assistance to that country. 
However, within budgetary limitations, the United States 
Government will seek to be as responsive as possible to the 
Government of Guatemala's requests for drug control 
assistance. 
 
Under U.S. law, each country identified by the President as a 
major illicit drug producing or drug- transit country is 
subject to the annual certification process.  Under this 
process, the President determines, based upon overall 
counter-narcotics performance, whether the country has 
"failed demonstrably" during the previous 12 months to make 
substantial efforts to adhere to their obligations under 
international counter-narcotics agreements and take the 
counter-narcotics measures specified in U.S. law.  The 
certification decisions are made by the President upon the 
recommendations of the Secretary of State, with input from 
other concerned United States Government agencies. 
 
In order not to be found as having "failed demonstrably," a 
country must take meaningful and committed actions against 
narcotics trafficking and related criminal activity.  Key 
criteria considered in the certification process include: 
 
(1) Performance in areas identified in the 1988 UN drug 
convention: namely, cultivation/manufacturing; 
consumption/demand reduction; trafficking; illicit crop 
eradication/substitution; interdiction and law enforcement 
cooperation; asset seizure; extradition and mutual legal 
assistance; drug treatment; control of precursor/essential 
chemicals; and money laundering. 
 
(2) Performance in accomplishing goals described in any 
applicable bilateral narcotics agreement with the United 
States, or a multilateral narcotics agreement; 
 
(3) Performance in preventing and punishing public 
corruption, especially by senior government officials that 
facilitates the production, processing, or shipment of drugs 
and other controlled substances, or that discourages the 
investigation or prosecution of such acts; and 
 
(4) The United States Government is very interested in 
efforts to improve regional cooperation and regional 
activities to support the goals of the 1988 UN drug 
convention. The Government of the United States will consider 
such activities and initiatives as we evaluate performance. 
 
While the President makes his certification determinations 
based on a country's compliance with all aspects of the 1988 
UN drug convention, bilateral agreements, other multilateral 
agreements, and the elimination of corruption, there are 
specific areas of interest that we will highlight during the 
certification process.  The United States believes the 
following actions could be taken: 
 
1.   SAIA Institutional Building: Adopt formal regulations to 
govern SAIA activities and operations based on the 
regulations and policies used by the National Civilian 
Police. Policies should include regular polygraphs and 
urinalysis, as well as mechanisms to promote greater 
cooperation between the SAIA and the Anti-Narcotics 
Prosecutors. 
 
2.   Significant Increase in Seizures, Arrests and 
Prosecutions: Increased development and prosecution of cases 
against those involved in narco-trafficking and other types 
of organized crime.  Guatemala should increase security 
measures to protect judges and prosecutors.  Cocaine seizures 
should return to CY2000 levels, which averaged 800 kilos or 
more per month, with a significant seizure at ports of entry 
at least every two months. 
 
3.   Inventory and Destroy All Drugs Seized before 1999 and 
Increase Warehouse Security: Destroy all seized drugs not 
needed for evidence by April 30th, and develop and implement 
security measures for drug warehouses. Establish clear 
procedures for chain of custody, evidence handling, and drug 
destruction. 
 
4.   Sign the Counter-narcotics Bilateral Maritime Agreement 
with the U.S.: Guatemala should negotiate and sign a 
counter-narcotics bilateral maritime agreement with the USG. 
 
5.   Search Warrants: Guatemala should develop a mechanism 
that ensures that narcotics search warrants are issued in a 
timely and secure fashion. 
 
6.   Successful Completion of Extradition Requests: Guatemala 
should fully process all pending U.S. extradition requests. 
Over the coming year, the Government of Guatemala  should 
cooperate in identifying procedures to expedite extradition 
requests. 
 
7.   Successful Promulgation and Implementation of 
Regulations on Precursor Chemicals: Guatemala should 
promulgate the implementing regulations that are required by 
the precursor chemical law of 1999. 
 
8.   Seized Assets and Forfeited/Undeclared Cash: Guatemala 
should adopt and implement legislative and/or procedural 
reforms for seizing and utilizing in an efficient manner all 
assets of criminals acquired through criminal activity, and 
assign these assets to strengthen the Judiciary, the Public 
Ministry, and the Police, who are battling narco-trafficking 
and organized crime. Special emphasis should be placed on 
transferring seized cash into law-enforcement programs. 
 
9.   Money Laundering Efforts: Guatemala's money laundering 
legislation is the best weapon in the fight against 
corruption and organized crime. Guatemala should assign 
sufficient personnel who are qualified to the Money 
Laundering Prosecutor's Office and will make every effort to 
take cases to trial. The Financial Investigations Unit 
(IVE), that is part of the Superintendent of Banks (SIB), 
should share information with the Prosecutor's office in 
conformance with the Guatemalan money laundering law. These 
efforts will contribute to Guatemala coming off the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) list of non-cooperating countries in 
anti-money laundering efforts.  Guatemala should take all 
necessary steps to improve inter-institutional cooperation 
that will allow for more effective compliance with the money 
laundering law. 
 
The efforts of U.S. and Guatemalan governments can do much to 
reduce the threat of drug addiction to the youth of the two 
countries.  The Government of the United States looks forward 
to continued discussions with the Government of Guatemala on 
strengthening counter-narcotics cooperation. 
 
The Embassy of the United States of America takes the 
opportunity to renew to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Government of Guatemala the assurances of its highest 
consideration. 
 
Embassy of the United States of America, Guatemala City, 
March 21, 2003. 
HAMILTON