US embassy cable - 03ANKARA1931

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001931 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKEY'S RULING AK PARTY: DISCONTENT ON HIGH AND 
AT GRASSROOTS 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1350 
     B. ANKARA 1740 
 
 
(U) Classified by Polcouns John Kunstadter.  Reasons: 1.5 
(b)(d). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: Senior AK party reps express concern to us at 
AK's mishandling of the Iraq question and relations with the 
U.S.  Local AK party bosses in Ankara districts complain 
bitterly to us about AK's failure to pass the U.S. deployment 
resolution (ref A) and what they see as AK's subsequent 
unseemly bargaining with the USG.  They are also increasingly 
frustrated with: (1) national AK leadership for not sharing 
enough information on policy of direct concern to them and 
their constituents; and (2) AK's inability to counter the 
tactics of Establishmentarian opposition CHP and State 
entities, which, they say, have left AK wearing the jacket on 
Iraq.  End summary. 
 
 
2. (C) Three AK deputy chairmen, an AK M.P. who was 
previously P.M. Erdogan's private secretary, and two AK 
parliamentary group deputy chairmen, all representing varying 
currents in the party, have separately expressed concern to 
us at potential negative trends in U.S.-Turkish relations. 
All acknowledge the negative effect of AK's failure to pass 
the U.S. troop deployment resolution and to secure a workable 
political understanding on N. Iraq and a broad economic 
support package.  The deputy chairmen (Kurdish patrician and 
director of policy and legal affairs Firat; director for 
foreign policy Disli; and usually truculent director of press 
and public relations Mercan) and former private secretary 
Comez, all of whom we talked to after the overflight 
permission was held up, also understand the deleterious 
effect of the overflight delay.  They all expressed interest 
in rebuilding U.S.-Turkish relations. 
 
 
3. (C) To varying degrees, the latter four have also been 
unusually forthcoming in admitting weaknesses in AK's 
approach.  Among other points cited by one or more of them: 
lack of good communications between the party leadership and 
the parliamentary group; pernicious influence of Islamist 
journalist Fehmi Koru and Islamist academic Ahmet Davutoglu 
in misleading Erdogan and former P.M. Gul to think they could 
prevent the U.S. operation by preventing a northern option; 
an inability to avoid the political trap set by the 
Presidency and General Staff, whom they are beginning to 
admit openly are hostile to AK; and the political sabotage 
being carried out against his own party leadership by 
parliamentary Speaker Arinc. 
 
 
4. (C) As laid out below, the AK leadership's failures to 
manage the Iraq question, relations with the U.S., and 
internal party dynamics has had a negative effect on AK's 
grassroots structures. 
 
 
--------------------- 
Information Underload 
--------------------- 
 
 
5. (C) Two of AK's Ankara district chairmen -- middle-class 
Yenimahalle's Hamdi Balaban and lower-middle-class Altindag's 
Orhan Kaya -- pointed out to us that there has been little 
guidance from AK party headquarters with respect to GOT Iraq 
policy.  As a result, they have been unable to explain the 
government's policies to local constituents, who are 
uncomfortable with the lack of clear decision making from 
P.M. Erdogan and former P.M. (now Fonmin) Gul.  Balaban 
lamented then-P.M. Gul's lack of strong leadership in the 
run-up to the failed deployment vote on March 1: "he should 
have worked harder." 
 
 
-- Balaban, a former administrator in center-right DYP, also 
explained to us recently that although there are anti-war 
elements among Turks, his constituents are most concerned 
with the prevailing GOT uncertainty about what will come 
next.  AK leaders' dithering has compounded public doubt, he 
said.  Balaban is further worried that continued poor 
economic conditions exacerbated by the government's waffling 
will harm AK's chances for success in nationwide local 
elections scheduled for April 2004. 
 
 
-- According to Kaya, parliamentary Deputy Speaker and Ankara 
AK deputy Ismail Alptekin attended Altindag's most recent, 
and raucous, party meeting -- but refused numerous entreaties 
to comment on GOT Iraq policy.  "We are registering our 
concerns with AK headquarters, but no one responds," Kaya 
charged. 
 
 
------------------- 
AK Wears the Jacket 
------------------- 
 
 
6. (C) Both Balaban and Kaya are concerned that AK has 
allowed itself to be painted into a corner by opposition CHP 
and its allies in the Kemalist State apparatus -- which they 
see as "unfairly" exploiting AK's own confusion on Iraq. 
With considerable exasperation, Kaya noted that "Iraq is a 
State policy -- not just the responsibility of the elected 
government."  He stated that his constituents have taken note 
of the "unhelpful" role played by President Sezer, CHP, and 
the TGS in foisting all of the responsibility on AK's 
shoulders.  "Everyone sees this," he said hopefully.  "How 
can a party like CHP -- with all of those retired ambassadors 
-- not recognize the importance of the current situation?" he 
lamented. 
 
 
----------------------------------- 
Comment: Crushed Shoes and Top Hats 
----------------------------------- 
 
 
7. (C) AK officials assert, with some justification, that the 
party has been set up as the fall guy on Iraq (ref A).  Yet 
the frustration of Kaya, Balaban, and others over AK's 
wearing the jacket of blame stems primarily from what they 
see as the leadership's inexplicable willingness to stand 
meekly while the tailors did the fitting.  This frustration 
reflects how much AK is divided against itself in its 
relations with the Kemalist Establishment, seeing Kemalism as 
an obstacle yet craving the legitimacy and acceptance of the 
very State with which AK and its predecessor parties have 
long been at odds.  On the streets, where the Establishment's 
image is threadbare, AK's confused quest for mainstream 
respectability, and its perceived submissiveness, is 
distressing. 
 
 
8. (C) Well aware of this grassroots discontent, AK's 
Islamist rival Saadet is also courting discontent M.P.s (ref 
B).  At a March 21 ceremony marking his formal accession to 
Saadet, Islamist godfather Erbakan appealed to his erstwhile 
followers in AK and elsewhere to "return to the true faith." 
Judging from our contacts' concerns, the crafty Hoca will 
have some success. 
PEARSON