US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO481

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D'S MEETING WITH G L PERIIS

Identifier: 03COLOMBO481
Wikileaks: View 03COLOMBO481 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Colombo
Created: 2003-03-24 05:40:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PINR PGOV CE LTTE
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L COLOMBO 000481 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY AND SA A/S ROCCA FROM ASHLEY WILLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PINR, PGOV, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: D'S MEETING WITH G L PERIIS 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador E. Ashley Wills.  Reasons 1.5 b, d. 
 
1.  (C) You have met with GL before and will thus recall that 
he is a man of spectral gauntness, extraordinary intellect 
and unfailing optimism.  It is this latter quality that I 
want to draw your attention to prior to your meeting.  By all 
accounts, and despite having been wounded himself in an LTTE 
bomb attack, GL is soft and inordinately forgiving in the 
talks with the Tigers.  He avoids confrontation with 
Balasingham and tends to engage in discourses on political 
science rather than focusing on the issues at hand.  We have 
the impression, in other words, that the Tigers consider 
Milinda as the more formidable negotiating opponent and GL as 
a pleasant but not pivotal figure. 
 
2.  (C) This view of GL may by a little ungenerous but it 
squares with my experience with him since the talks began. 
He tends to see this process as leading ineluctably toward a 
happy outcome and takes the sunniest possible view of Tiger 
intentions and behavior.  I bring this to your attention 
because, while we all like bracing splashes of optimism from 
time to time, you may nevertheless wish to discount somewhat 
GL's version of the negotiations. 
 
3.  (C)   One final note about him.  He loathes President 
Kumaratunga, his contempt for her exceeding ours for Saddam 
Hussein.  He will thus not share our view that she needs to 
be involved somehow for this negotiation to end happily.  You 
may wish to draw him out a bit on why he thinks she can and 
should be ignored.  You may also wish to ask him what effect 
a PA-JVP alliance (which is looking liklier) will have on the 
UNF government. 
WILLS 

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