US embassy cable - 03ABUJA555

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000555 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR JENDAYI FRAZER 
LONDON FOR GURNEY 
PARIS FOR NEARY 
 
 
E.O.12958: DECL: 03/22/13 
TAGS: EPET, ASEC, CASC, PGOV, PINS, NI 
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: PRESIDENT OBASANJO'S STRATEGY FOR 
HANDLING VIOLENT UPSURGE IN THE DELTA 
 
 
REF: A) LAGOS 575 
-    B) LAGOS 568 
 
 
Classified by Ambassador Howard F. Jeter.  Reason 1.5 
(B) and (D). 
 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Ijaw militants in the Delta who 
instigated this latest round of communal violence are 
surprisingly well armed, according to President 
Obasanjo. In order to avoid a potentially bloody 
confrontation, Obasanjo has opted for a strategy of 
attrition and containment instead of directly 
attacking the armed militants. Obasanjo hopes this 
approach will protect oil production while ending the 
current ethnic eruption with minimal loss of life. 
End Summary. 
 
 
2. (C) During a midnight March 21 meeting at the 
Villa, Ambassador Jeter asked President Obasanjo how 
the GON planned to handle the upsurge of violence in 
the Delta. The Ambassador said that violence had 
already caused a significant reduction in oil 
production for Shell and ChevronTexaco; if the 
situation were to exacerbate, it might cause a serious 
dent in Nigeria's daily production and affect global 
oil prices at a very sensitive time.  Even more 
tragically, people already have been killed and 
several villages razed, causing hundreds of Itsekiris 
to seek refuge at the Escravos Tank Farm. 
 
 
3. (C) Obasanjo said he was cognizant of the 
seriousness of the situation and was tracking it 
closely. He had sent the Chief of Army Staff (COAS), 
who is indigenous to the area, and the Chief of Navy 
Staff (CNS) to assess the situation. Their report was 
eye opening. The COAS stated the Ijaw militants who 
initiated the fighting were surprisingly well armed. 
In fact, they were better equipped than the soldiers 
the GON initially deployed in response to the 
violence. The Ijaws had "machine guns, rocket 
launchers and bazookas," the President said. In 
response, the COAS had augmented the Army's initial 
deployment with additional men and weaponry (he did 
not specify weapon types). 
 
 
4. (C) Obasanjo said that he had conferred with the 
COAS who said he was prepared to attack the Ijaw 
militants' positions; however, that battle would be 
very bloody and significant damage would be done. In 
an apparent but indirect allusion to impending 
elections and the overall tense security environment, 
Obasanjo stated that now was not the time for more 
violent confrontation. He explained that the upheaval 
was basically due to political competition between the 
Ijaws and Itsekiris over the demarcation of local 
governments in the area. The two groups were long-time 
rivals who feud frequently. Frustration over oil 
revenue allocations, which the President said he 
thought he had resolved, was another factor in the 
Ijaw's militant dissatisfaction. 
 
 
5. (C) Instead of a frontal attack that might make 
matters worse, Obasanjo said he had chosen the path of 
attrition. The army would not engage the Ijaws but 
would instead encircle them, hoping to hold them in 
check. He hoped that within a short time, this would 
starve the youth of both their ardor and ammunition. 
Once they were sufficiently weakened, the army and 
police would probe and begin to exploit their 
weaknesses. The President did not give a timetable for 
this strategy to work and, for the time being, seemed 
content to wait things out. Obasanjo added that Delta 
State Governor Ibori had held talks with Ijaw and 
Itsekiri leaders months ago; coming out of those talks 
Ibori had assured the President that all was calm. 
Obasanjo intimated that further talks would be needed 
but did not think Ibori would be the one to do it. The 
President did not say that he would intervene 
personally. 
 
 
6. (C) During a luncheon today with the Ambassador, 
the National Security Advisor's Political Advisor Ben 
Obi (fully protect) expressed reservations about the 
President's plan to resolve the Escravos impasse. 
First, although from the Delta, the Chief of Army 
Staff is Urhobo not Ijaw. (Obasanjo thought the COAS 
was Ijaw when he had the appointment, Obi claimed.) 
Because Urhobos are often at odds with the Ijaw, COAS 
Ogumudia's influence on the Ijaws will be limited, if 
not counterproductive. Second, Ijaws are deeply 
involved in oil bunkering; therefore, the ability to 
resupply and rearm their militants may be much greater 
than the GON estimates. 
 
 
7.  (U) Meanwhile, evacuation operations in and around 
Escravos continue.  According to reports received by 
RSO/Lagos, there were still approximately 800 people 
within the tank farm by late morning, but most 
American citizens had been evacuated.  There were 
still approximately 39 people at offshore sites 
associated with Escravos.  At one point during the 
morning, Ijaw militia fired three mortar rounds, one 
of which landed near the Escravos Tank Farm.  The Ijaw 
have repeatedly made it clear that their quarrel is 
neither with GON Armed Forces nor with ChevronTexaco 
but with their Itsekiri neighbors. 
 
 
8.  (C) COMMENT: Obasanjo's approach may be the only 
reasonable course of action for the GON. A shootout 
now would give provide ammunition to Obasanjo's 
political opponents, who already claim that his 
Administration has allowed festering ethnic tensions 
to flare into open conflict, that it has failed 
broadly to maintain law and order, and that when he 
finally acts, it is heavy-handed and too lethal.  An 
attack now could also turn the populous Ijaw community 
(the largest ethnic group in the South-South and the 
fourth largest in Nigeria)) against him just weeks 
before the presidential election.  Moreover, Obasanjo 
is caught between the "rock" of security for oil 
installations and the "hard place" of human rights 
concerns.  He and his advisers want to avoid a third 
incident (after Odi and Zaki Biam) of military abuse 
of force. 
 
 
9. (C) However, the siege approach is not ideal in 
terms of sustaining oil production levels and, 
ultimately, might not be successful in averting a 
possibly very bloody encounter between the Army and 
the Ijaws. The longer the two sides are in close 
proximity, however, the more likely a confrontation 
becomes. Indeed, the territory the Ijaws claim they 
control extends beyond the immediate area of Escravos. 
Additionally, there will have to be some dialogue with 
the Ijaws. While Obasanjo seems content to wait things 
out, he also is aware that a protracted siege could 
provoke similar flare-ups elsewhere in this important 
oil-producing area.  END COMMENT. 
 
 
JETER