US embassy cable - 03AMMAN1720

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001720 
 
SIPDIS 
 
CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2013 
TAGS: PREL, KPAL, PGOV, IS, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: PALESTINIANS AND PALESTINIAN-JORDANIANS PRAISE 
APPOINTMENT OF ABU MAZEN, SAY IRAQ STRIKE HURTS U.S. 
CREDIBILITY ON THE MEPP 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM Doug Silliman for reasons 1.5 (B)(D) 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C)  During a series of discussions in the days before 
the start of war in Iraq, prominent Palestinian-Jordanians 
and Palestinians resident in Jordan told A/DCM that the 
appointment of Abu Mazen as Palestinian Prime Minister should 
provide a big boost to good government in the PNA.  However, 
they said Abu Mazen needed to secure immediately from Israel 
concrete concessions -- an end to targeted killings, house 
demolitions and a lifting of restrictions on movement within 
the West Bank and Gaza -- to prove that he can have a 
positive impact, and to strengthen him vis-a-vis Yassir 
Arafat.  While applauding the words of President Bush's March 
14 White House statement on the Roadmap, all roundly 
criticized (or angrily denounced) the President personally 
for announcing U.S. support for the Quartet Roadmap only on 
the eve of war with Iraq.  All said that, because of the 
(then) impending war against Iraq, U.S. credibility on the 
MEPP has sunk to a new low.  Only public U.S. pressure on 
Israel and concrete and visible progress toward Israeli 
withdrawal and creation of a Palestinian state can turn the 
tide.  We are struck that the President's March 14 Roadmap 
remarks did not produce the usual local spike in optimism on 
the MEPP.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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ABU MAZEN GOOD FOR PALESTINIANS AT HOME... 
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2.  (C)  A/DCM met March 17-20 with several prominent 
Palestinian-Jordanians and Palestinians resident in Jordan. 
All praised the appointment of Abu Mazen as Palestinian Prime 
Minister.  Hamadi Fara'neh, a Palestinian-Jordanian former 
Member of Parliament, said that Abu Mazen is personally 
well-respected, has the support of Fatah and excellent 
contacts in Israel.  Abu Mazen's most important task, 
according to Fara'neh, will be to speak to Israelis and 
provide a positive Palestinian focus for the peace movement 
inside Israel.  Labor's decision to stay out of the 
government should help Abu Mazen in this task, especially if 
the new Palestinian PM and Labor leaders maintain public 
contacts to put pressure on Sharon.  PNC Chairman Salim 
Zanoun hoped that Abu Mazen's appointment would help unite 
different factions of Fatah and "show to Israel and the world 
a positive, sympathetic Palestinian face." 
 
3.  (C)  Fara'neh and George Musleh, a Palestinian 
businessman from Beit Sahour but resident in Amman, said that 
the appointment of a PM should help improve the quality of 
Palestinian governance.  It will be possible under a PM, 
Musleh said, for an average Palestinian and the Palestinian 
media to criticize the quality of work of a Palestinian 
ministry without it being taken as an implicit criticism of 
Yassir Arafat and, by extension, "the Palestinian struggle." 
"Palestinians have never before been able to criticize the 
job the PNA does without being seen as attacking Abu Ammar 
(Arafat)." 
 
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... BUT FACES AN UPHILL BATTLE WITH ISRAEL ON SECURITY 
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4.  (C)  Fara'neh and Adnan Abu Odeh, a former advisor to 
King Hussein and King Abdullah, said that the U.S. war 
against Iraq will make it more difficult for Abu Mazen to 
take the concrete security steps Israel is demanding.  HAMAS 
and Islamic Jihad (PIJ), they said, see Fatah as their enemy 
and will oppose any real consolidation of PNA control in Gaza 
or the West Bank.  He expects HAMAS and PIJ to try to stir up 
the Palestinian street to prevent Abu Mazen from taking 
security actions against them.  They argued strongly that 
many Palestinians will not support strong security steps 
without concrete Israeli "concessions" that Palestinians 
could "see and feel."  The most important things Israel could 
do would be to end targeted killings ("assassinations") and 
house demolitions, lift roadblocks between Palestinian towns 
on the West Bank and Gaza, and withdraw from West Bank cities 
reoccupied in the past year.  In the fairly near term, Israel 
would have to withdraw its forces to the September 28, 2000 
lines, and engage in real negotiations.  Both felt that 
Israeli pledges to end settlement activity would be less 
valuable since they would not be immediately visible to 
average Palestinians. 
 
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IRAQ WAR DESTROYS BUSH'S CREDIBILITY ON THE MEPP 
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5.  (C)  The harshest words in these conversation were aimed 
not at PM Sharon and his new, conservative government, but at 
President Bush.  All of these interlocutors asked pointedly 
why the President had waited until the eve of war before he 
endorsed the Roadmap.  Fara'neh and Musleh angrily dismissed 
the President's March 14 White House remarks as an "insulting 
attempt to win Arab and European support for his war in 
Iraq."  When asked how the U.S. could win back the goodwill 
it might lose during an Iraq campaign, all responded that a 
quick, clean, and honorable campaign in Iraq coupled with 
"real American pressure on Israel" that produced "real 
movement toward a Palestinian state" would win back many 
suspicious Palestinians. 
 
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COMMENT 
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6.  (C)  Originally conceived as a way to promote the 
President's March 14 Roadmap remarks with Palestinians here, 
these meetings turned instead into acrimonious discussions of 
the lack of credibility of the U.S. (in general) and 
President Bush (specifically) in the region.  Most previous 
U.S. statements on the MEPP (such as the President's June 24, 
2002 speech) produced in Jordan at least a temporary spike in 
optimism.  We were struck -- but given the intense focus here 
on Iraq, not surprised -- that the President's very positive 
March 14 statement produced criticism of American credibility. 
 
 
GNEHM