US embassy cable - 03AMMAN1718

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001718 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ARN, NEA/PPD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, JO 
SUBJECT: KING'S SPEECH TO NATION UPSTAGED BY "SHOCK AND 
AWE"; EMOTIONAL JORDANIANS CYNICAL ABOUT USG INTENTIONS. 
 
REF: AMMAN 6692 (2002) 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDWARD W. GNEHM  REASONS: 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  King Abdullah's March 21 speech was largely 
upstaged by the televised coverage of the beginning of 
extensive coalition bombing.  Many people we spoke with 
missed the beginning of the speech to watch the bombing, but 
most read a transcript the following day.  Already very 
emotional and pre-occupied with coverage of military activity 
in Iraq, many Jordanians didn't focus too much on the King's 
message.  Some, particularly in the younger generation, were 
critical of the King's stance "against" Iraq and dismissive 
of his attempt to "empathize" with the Jordanian people. 
Contacts in the middle class felt the King didn't really say 
anything surprising or new, and their focus remained almost 
exclusively on events in Iraq.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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KING: I FEEL YOUR PAIN, BUT JORDAN MUST COME FIRST 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
2. (SBU)  At 2000 local time March 21, the King delivered a 
five minute speech to the nation on Jordan TV.  He asked 
Jordanians for "a sense of responsibility" in placing "our 
national interest above all interests and considerations." 
He was clear that the GOJ's current primary objective is "to 
preserve the security and stability of our homeland and 
protect its top interests."  As for the people of Iraq, the 
King noted Jordan's "humane brotherly obligation," and said 
he would work as hard as possible to end the war and "ease 
the suffering of our brethren in Iraq."  On demonstrations, 
the King said Jordanians should express themselves with 
civility. 
 
3. (SBU)  The King empathized with his people, saying "I know 
the pain and true anger you are feeling because of the 
suffering and ordeal that the Iraqi people are facing.  I am 
one of you, and I share the feelings of every one of you." 
 
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DISTRACTED JORDANIANS TUNED TO THE WAR; 
SOME YOUNG PEOPLE DISMISSIVE OF SPEECH 
-------------------------------------- 
 
4. (C)  Most Jordanians were (and have been for the past two 
days) almost exclusively focused on the military conflict in 
Iraq.  Many contacts report that they missed the King's 
remarks because they were watching the beginning of the 
coalition "shock and awe" bombing campaign against the Iraqi 
regime.  Contacts report most Jordanians -- who read the 
speech the morning after -- regard it as "nothing new." 
However, there appears to be some anxiety among moderates 
that the King will be unable to deliver a "dividend" for 
Jordan's "allegiance" to Washington.  A senior Foreign 
Ministry official expressed the belief that the King struck 
the proper tone in the speech, and that his message of the 
need to focus on Jordan would inevitably win over public 
opinion when fighting in Iraq ends. 
 
5. (C)  Many younger contacts were more derisive of the King, 
with some scoffing openly at his attempt to "relate" to the 
Jordanian people.  This cynicism is apparently also more 
concentrated within the Palestinian-Jordanian community, 
which appears to be reacting more emotionally, in general, to 
the Iraq situation. 
 
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COMMENT 
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6. (C)  Faced with vivid images of US bombs exploding in 
downtown Baghdad, the populace is extremely angry and 
emotional.  They are glued to the television and internet and 
in this context, considered the King's message less important 
than the immediate war.  It is worth mentioning that the 
meaning of the King's "Jordan First" campaign, introduced in 
October 2002 (reftels), was well understood by Jordanians 
prior to the onset of hostilities, and probably made it 
easier for him to effectively articulate the need to focus 
now on Jordan's interests. 
 
7. (C) Many embassy contacts are optimistic that if the 
operation in Iraq proceeds well, much of the street's emotion 
will subside.  That said, as our reporting has indicated, in 
moderate, traditionally pro-western circles here there is a 
growing presumption of bad intentions toward the USG that 
even a best-case outcome in Iraq may be unable be to quash 
completely.  Jordanians will need to see more progress on the 
Roadmap, and gain confidence that Iraq will truly prosper and 
stabilize, before their trust in US intentions will return. 
GNEHM