US embassy cable - 03ABUJA552

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 000552 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:03/20/2013 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NI 
SUBJECT:  NIGERIA OPEN TO DISCUSSION OF ARTICLE 98 
 
 
REFS: (A) 02 STATE 192375 
  (B) STATE 22119 
  (C) 02 ABUJA 2872 
  (D) 02 ABUJA 2978 
  (E) ABUJA 328 
  (F) ABUJA 342 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR HOWARD F. JETER. REASON 1.5(b). 
 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Embassy efforts to obtain GON signature to 
an Article 98 Agreement continue despite initial resistance 
and skepticism in several GON quarters.  The Ambassador most 
recently raised the subject on March 20, this time with MFA 
PermSec Hart.  Hart voiced strong "personal" reservations but 
said the GON was open to discussion.  We doubt the threat of 
ASPA-based sanctions will move the GON, but its own interests 
might.  We continue to pursue this key objective 
energetically.  End Summary. 
 
 
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STRATEGY 
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2.  (C) The GON was deeply involved in the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), and Nigeria offered a 
candidate (who lost) for one of the seats.   Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) resistance to an Article 98 Agreement 
was anticipated.  Thus, Mission strategy in pursuit of an 
agreement foresaw approaching others in the GON before 
engaging with MFA.  Indeed, an early mention of Article 98 had 
produced very strong opposition from Foreign Minister Sule 
Lamido (Ref C). 
 
 
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DEMARCHES 
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3.  (C) In October and November of last year, the Ambassador 
raised Article 98 with National Security Advisor LTG Aliyu 
Mohammed (ret) and Minister of Defense LTG Theophilus Yakubu 
Danjuma (ret), providing each with a draft agreement for 
consideration.  Mohammed (Ref C) was interested in exploring 
possibilities and encouraged us to engage with Danjuma and 
Minister of Justice Kanu Godwin Agabi.  The Ambassador 
stressed that, as a major contributor to PKOs in Africa and 
beyond, Nigeria's national interest might be well-served by 
signing Article 98 agreements with other countries as well, 
particularly countries in ECOWAS. Danjuma (ref D) expressed 
some doubt and said he would discuss the matter with FM 
Lamido. 
 
 
4.  (C) In a meeting at the end of January, Agabi (Ref E) took 
on board the Ambassador's points, including those about the 
ASPA, and promised to acquaint President Obasanjo with the 
issue.  We left a draft Article 98 Agreement with Agabi also. 
The Ambassador and AF DAS Bridgewater raised Article 98 with 
Obasanjo on February 14 (Ref F).  Initially criticizing the 
USG for not being a member of the ICC, Obasanjo became more 
receptive to Article 98 as the discussion proceeded.  At the 
end, he instructed his International Affairs Advisor (Ad'Obe 
Obe) to ask FM Sule Lamido to convene an Inter-Ministerial 
Committee to examine whether Nigeria should enter into an 
Article 98 Agreement. 
 
 
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CONTINUED RESISTANCE 
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5.  (C) The Ambassador, accompanied by DCM, March 20 made a 
strong pitch for Article 98 to MFA Permanent Secretary Dan 
Hart.  Hart explained that Nigeria had played an important 
role in the establishment of the ICC and strongly backed its 
principles.  The Ambassador responded that the USG had no 
objection to the principles behind the ICC and that Article 98 
Agreements were bilateral accords for which the Rome Statute 
specifically provides.  The Ambassador related to Hart the 
substance of his meeting with Obasanjo (Ref F) and wondered 
whether the Inter-Ministerial Committee had been formed.  Hart 
said it had not.  He welcomed the Ambassador's offer of a 
draft Article 98 Agreement and other materials, adding that he 
was certain the matter would be discussed within the GON 
"before long." 
 
 
6.  (C) In response to the Ambassador's point that Nigeria 
might have its own strong interest in concluding Article 98 
Agreements with countries in the region, Hart commented that 
he "personally" was not concerned about the possibility of 
Nigerian troops being convicted of war crimes if they had 
committed them.  War must be conducted to "correct and humane 
standards," he added.  The Ambassador replied that the U.S. 
agreed completely but took a different approach; accusations 
of war crimes should be addressed in national courts or by 
special-purpose ad-hoc bodies established to respond to the 
results of a particular conflict situation.  The U.S. believed 
that the Rome Statute had gone too far, could be manipulated 
for political purposes, and infringe on national sovereignty 
issues. 
 
 
7.  (C) COMMENT:  MFA opposes Article 98 and is not in any 
hurry to convene an Inter-Ministerial Committee.  We will 
again raise President Obasanjo's mid-February instruction with 
Obe in the near future.  However, progress in a positive 
direction is very unlikely as long as the war in Iraq 
continues.  We do not think the threat of ASPA sanctions will 
motivate the GON to conclude an agreement with us.  Obasanjo, 
who seemed not to fully understand the ICC's mandate ("The 
International Criminal Court is fine for drug traffickers, 
money launderers and the like, but I'm not sure it's right for 
the military."), clearly was open to considering an Article 98 
Agreement with the U.S. 
 
 
8.  (C) For now, our approach will be to prod the various 
players gently to gather in their Inter-Ministerial forum and 
discuss Article 98 in the context of Nigeria's role in PKOs in 
Africa and beyond.  We will, of course, ensure that they are 
aware of the provisions of ASPA, but we will not make these 
provisions a central theme. 
JETER