US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU507

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000507 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL/ERIEDEL 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2008 
TAGS: PINS, PTER, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL:  MAOISTS POSTURING FOR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 
 
REF: KATHMANDU 480 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Michael E. Malinowski for reasons 1.5 (d). 
 
Summary 
======= 
 
1.  (SBU) On March 19, the Ambassador met with Kul Chandra 
Gautam, Deputy Executive Director with UNICEF in New York, 
and a Nepali visiting the country for personal and 
professional reasons.  Gautam related a conversation with the 
Maoists' second-in-command regarding the latter's desire for 
a constituent assembly and his expectations for the form it 
should take.  Gautam's conversation is reflective of the 
Maoists' ongoing charm offensive, in which they are trying to 
project the image of a democratic party.  As reported in 
reftel, however, there is no evidence the Maoists have 
abandoned their basic goal of gaining power in Nepal at the 
head of a communist, single-party state.  End summary. 
 
Content Is Less Important than Form 
=================================== 
 
2. (SBU) On March 19, the Ambassador met with Kul Chandra 
Gautam, Deputy Executive Director with UNICEF in New York, 
and a Nepali visiting the country out of personal and 
professional concerns.  Gautam described his meetings with a 
range of political leaders, including phone calls with Maoist 
second-in-command, Baburam Bhattarai, about the political 
future of Nepal. 
 
3.  (C) According to Gautam, Bhattarai stated that the 
process for resolving Nepal's conflict is as important as the 
content of the final resolution.  Even if the King issued a 
"progressive" constitution, in doing so he would undermine 
the people's sovereignty, Bhattarai argued.  Gautam reported 
Bhattarai's contention that resolution of Nepal's domestic 
conflict can come only through a constituent assembly. 
Bhattarai claims the Maoists are on a winning streak. 
However, the Maoist leadership cannot satisfy the demands of 
its cadres with promises of only amendments to the present 
constitution.  For Maoist leaders to satisfy their followers, 
they must persuade the government to accede to a sovereign 
constituent assembly.  (Note:  The term "sovereign" was not 
defined during the discussion and could refer either to the 
people's sovereignty as defined by the existing constitution 
or to an agreement that the conclusions of the constituent 
assembly have sovereign status.) 
 
Maoists as Supposed Defenders of Democracy? 
=========================================== 
 
4.  (C) As reported by Gautam, Bhattarai expects elections to 
be held for representation to a constituent assembly.  During 
the campaign, all parties, including the Maoists, should be 
allowed to compete on their respective platforms.  For the 
Maoists, this includes calling for the establishment of a 
communist republic.  Bhattarai, according to Gautam, stated 
that if the Maoists' vision is not accepted by the people 
during the constituent assembly elections, they will abide by 
the will of the people.  Gautam's own opinion is that all 
parties should contest constituent assembly elections because 
that mechanism would either resolve the conflict through 
democratic means or serve to "call the Maoists's bluff." 
 
Comment 
======= 
 
5.  (C) The conversation related by Gautam appears to reflect 
part of an ongoing charm offensive by the Maoists to improve 
their stature as a legitimate political party--a strategy 
made necessary by their loss of public support due to their 
violent excesses over the past year.  Gautam's contact with 
Bhattarai provides insight into the Maoists' political 
strategy, particularly in light of evidence that they 
continue to pursue their fundamental goal of the creation of 
a communist republic (reftel).  Bhattarai's promise to abide 
by the electorate's free choice of delegates to a constituent 
assembly is credible only as a tactic to curry favor among 
political party leaders, human rights advocates, and the 
international community.  By reaching out to political 
parties, in particular, the Maoists may hope to muster enough 
support in a constituent assembly to engineer a new 
constitution that would marginalize the monarchy and make the 
army susceptible to Maoist infiltration and eventual control. 
MALINOWSKI