US embassy cable - 03ANKARA1706

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 ANKARA 001706 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
 
DEPT FOR PRM/ANE, EUR/SE AND NEA/NGA 
DEPT PASS USAID FOR BHA/OFDA - WGARVELINK/RLIBBY AND FFP 
EUCOM FOR JE, JR, J5, SOJ7 AND POLAD 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
CENTCOM FOR J3, J5 AND POLAD 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2013 
TAGS: EAID, IZ, MOPS, PREF, PREL, TU, WFP 
SUBJECT: PRM A/S DEWEY'S MEETINGS WITH GOT AND HUMANITARIAN 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
REF: E 
 
 
(U) Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission Robert Deutsch for 
reasons 1.5 (B) and (D). 
 
 
Summary: 
-------- 
 
 
1. (C) An interagency delegation led by PRM Assistant 
Secretary Arthur Dewey discussed a range of Iraq-related 
 
SIPDIS 
humanitarian planning issues with the GOT, humanitarian 
organizations and representatives of the two 
Kurdish-administered areas of northern Iraq.  Dewey 
emphasized the U.S. interest in working through UN agencies 
in providing relief, and sought Turkish cooperation in 
allowing transit of humanitarian relief to Iraq.  He also 
maintained that any role for the Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) 
in northern Iraq would have to be coordinated with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and with the 
UN.  Dewey proposed to MFA a tripartite, civilian mechanism 
with representatives of the GOT, UN, USG and possibly other 
humanitarian organizations and donors to coordinate aid 
through Turkey.  MFA responded favorably to the proposal, but 
advised that it would need to consult with other agencies 
before providing an authoritative response.  MFA also agreed 
that ICRC and UN agencies would have the mandate for relief 
in northern Iraq.  Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Kurdistan 
Democratic Party and UNICEF representatives emphasized the 
hostility of the population in northern Iraq to Turkish 
intervention.  The International Federation of Red Cross/Red 
Crescent Societies representative said he has raised concerns 
about the TRC,s planned role in northern Iraq with the TRC 
leadership, but fears that the Turkish military may force 
TRC,s hand.  UN representatives raised a number of concerns, 
including anticipated delays in restarting the Oil for Food 
Program after the onset of a conflict.  End Summary. 
 
 
2. (SBU) Assistant Secretary for Population, Migration and 
Refugees Arthur Dewey, accompanied by Lawrence Bartlett, 
Deputy Director, PRM/ANE; Dr. Joseph Collins, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense; William Garvelink, USAID 
Deputy Assistant Administrator; Richard Owens, Deputy 
Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance, Defense Department 
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance; and 
David Tarantino, Office of the Secretary of Defense; 
discussed contingency planning and humanitarian assistance 
issues in Ankara March 12 and 13.  Military Coordination and 
Liaison Command (MCLC) Commanding General Peter Osman joined 
in the delegation,s meetings with the GOT.  The group met 
with a GOT interagency group led by the Deputy Undersecretary 
of Foreign Affairs Nabi Sensoy; Major General Suphi Acar, 
Turkish General Staff, J-5; UN agency representatives in a 
meeting led by Resident Coordinator Alfredo Witschi-Cestari; 
and Turkish Red Crescent President Ertan Gonen.  A/S Dewey 
also met with Carl Naucler, Head of Delegation, International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC); 
Safeen Dizayee, Ankara Representative, Kurdistan Democratic 
Party (KDP), and Bahros Galali, Ankara Representative, 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); and Jean-Marie Fakhouri, 
UNHCR Regional Coordinator for the Iraq Situation, Amin Awad, 
UNHCR Deputy Regional Coordinator for the Iraq Situation, and 
Gesche Karrenbrock, UNHCR Turkey Representative on March 13. 
 
 
GOT Interagency Meeting 
----------------------- 
 
 
3. (SBU) The U.S. delegation held a wide-ranging discussion 
on assistance issues with an interagency group chaired by 
Deputy Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Nabi Sensoy.  The 
Turkish side included representatives of the Prime 
Ministry,s Emergency Management General Directorate, TGS, 
and Customs, but only MFA officials addressed our delegation. 
 
 
4. (SBU) Outlining USG priorities in humanitarian assistance 
for Iraq and its neighbors, A/S Dewey stated that the U.S. 
sought to share the costs of providing aid with other donors, 
primarily through the UN system.  He noted that the UN 
Regional Humanitarian Coordination Office in Cyprus, which he 
had just visited, is now in place, and that the USG sought to 
create the conditions which would allow a swift return of UN 
personnel to Iraq after the potential conflict is over. 
Dewey maintained that the World Food Program (WFP) would be 
critical in restarting the Oil for Food (OFF) Program, which 
would likely be disrupted with the onset of hostilities.  The 
key problem now is funding the relief effort.  He noted that 
solving the food issue and ensuring that the Iraqis feel 
secure that relief will come to them timely is essential to 
preventing mass population movements. 
 
 
5. (SBU) Coordination Mechanism:  Dewey also noted that the 
U.S. ) Kuwaiti Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) had been 
activated and would help the humanitarian effort, but that a 
different mechanism should be adopted in Turkey.  He 
suggested a civilian, trilateral mechanism with the GOT, UN 
agencies and USG as the key participants, but which could 
include other relevant humanitarian organizations and donors. 
 Dewey suggested that the group meet at the policy level in 
Ankara, and that subgroups working on more operational issues 
meet in Diyarbakir and perhaps Silopi.  Sensoy responded that 
the GOT would consider the issue and respond to us quickly. 
Note:  MFA officials subsequently told us that they accepted 
this proposal, but needed to consult within the GOT before 
providing us with a definitive response.  End Note. 
 
 
6. (C) Sensoy noted that, following the March 1 vote on 
deployment of U.S. troops, Turkey,s role in the Iraq crisis 
was not clear, but he assured us that regardless of whether 
Turkey is a member of the military coalition or not, the GOT 
would like to cooperate on humanitarian issues.  He also 
provided an overview of humanitarian logistics and routes, 
and passed us list of storage facilities, ports, airports, 
and roads designated for HA (septel). 
 
 
7. (C) Turkish Plans for Camps in Northern Iraq:  Recalling 
Turkey,s refugee debacle in 1991, Sensoy maintained that the 
GOT was determined to prevent a recurrence.  He noted the 
geographic limitation to Turkey's accession to the Geneva 
Refugee Convention, and said the Turks expect third countries 
to resettle refugees/asylum-seekers entering Turkey from 
Iraq.  MFA confirmed the GOT intends to set up 12 camps 
(Humanitarian Assistance Collection Zones ) HACZs) inside 
Iraq, and six additional camps in Turkey as a last resort. 
In response to a question from the U.S. delegation, Sensoy 
stated that the 12 camps in Iraq would be located 45 to 50 
kilometers away from the Turkish border, unless Turkey is not 
part of the military coalition.  In that case, the camps 
would be located in the immediate vicinity of the border. 
 
 
8. (C) Sensoy said the GOT plans to assist up to 138,000 to 
170,000 displaced persons (DPs).  This will utilize about 60 
percent of the Turk Red Crescent (TRC) resources.  TRC will 
hold back other 40 percent for domestic natural disaster 
contingencies.  TRC may dip into these stocks if it receives 
guarantees of replenishment from IFRC or another source. 
Note:  The GOT has said it is planning the capacity to 
provide for 276,000 DPs.  Sensoy,s figure of 170,000, which 
is just over 60 percent of 276,000, probably corresponds to 
TRC,s need to reserve 40 percent of capacity.  End Note. 
 
 
9. (SBU) NGO Access:  NGOs seeking to assist in the HACZs 
must apply to MFA and sign an MOU defining their activities 
with the GOT.  Sensoy emphasized that MFA would be 
&selective8 with respect to security concerns in vetting 
NGOs.  NGOs intending to cross the frontier to provide goods 
and assistance in Iraq beyond Turkey,s camps must apply to 
MFA, but will not need to sign an MOU. 
 
 
10. (C) Northern Iraq Relief Mandate:  Dewey laid down the 
marker that the ICRC and UNHCR would have the mandate for 
relief activity on the Iraqi side of the border, and that any 
TRC assistance would have to proceed in coordination with 
those organizations.  Sensoy stated that the GOT would 
coordinate with ICRC and UNHCR, and that it would only build 
camps in northern Iraq if they were needed. 
 
 
11. (C) HDRs:  Turks Propose Local Procurement:  Collins 
raised longstanding U.S. request to site one million 
humanitarian daily rations (HDRs) in Turkey.  Sensoy 
responded that Turkey had the ability to produce HDRs locally 
and that this would likely be more cost-effective.  The 
Turkish delegation provided a brochure issued by Unifo Food 
Industry and Trading Company describing its Meals Ready to 
Eat (MREs).  He suggested the USG buy Turkish HDRs as part of 
the economic compensation package (which he claimed had not 
been finalized).  Dewey agreed that we would look at this 
possibility, but asked for an answer on our HDR request. 
Note:  MFA subsequently told us orally that they are inclined 
to approve siting of HDRs, but that further intra-GOT 
consultation was required on this issue before the Turks can 
provide a definitive answer.  End Note. 
 
 
12. (SBU) WFP Issues:  Dewey raised several potential 
problems facing the WFP's plan to supply food via Turkey to 
Iraq.  He noted that WFP planned to import wheat for milling 
in Turkey, and urged that Turkey facilitate this as much as 
possible by reducing bureaucratic formalities and by 
refraining from collection of customs or other duties.  He 
also raised a potential problem with truck standards. 
Finally, Dewey suggested that it might become useful to 
channel WFP supplies through Turkey but using Syrian ports, 
and asked the MFA to consider this.  Sensoy responded that he 
did not foresee customs problems with wheat imports.  Turkey 
had sufficient trucks meeting Turkish standards to carry out 
WFP,s mission.  Sensoy added that he would have to look into 
the question of shipping through Syrian ports.  While Mersin 
and Iskenderun ports are now designated for aid use, Sensoy 
raised the possibility that WFP activities might have to 
shift from either or both ports, if they were needed for 
military use, to other facilities, such as Toros (private 
port). 
 
 
Turkish General Staff 
--------------------- 
 
 
13. (C) A/S Dewey, accompanied by MCLC Maj. General Osman, 
met with Maj. General Suphi Acar, of the Turkish General 
Staff J5.  Acar seemed reluctant to discuss humanitarian 
planning and Turkish intentions in northern Iraq, and a 
junior MFA representative who was present in the meeting 
repeatedly took the initiative in responding to the U.S. 
delegation.  Acar stated that the Turkish army did not plan 
to go &too deep8 into Iraq, but that its role would be 
limited to protecting the Turcoman and fighting terrorists. 
He added that TGS would like to coordinate with the USG on 
humanitarian assistance and more generally on its presence in 
northern Iraq.  A/S Dewey emphasized that the USG will 
coordinate its humanitarian assistance through the UN 
agencies and ICRC. 
 
 
Turkish Red Crescent (TRC) 
-------------------------- 
 
 
14. (SBU) TRC President Ertan Gonen told A/S Dewey that his 
organization was capable of providing blankets, heating, food 
and hygiene kits for 100,000 DPs.  He explained that, if all 
TRC resources were deployed, the organization could handle 
276,000 DPs, but that TRC needed to keep a portion of its 
resources in reserve for domestic contingencies.  Gonen 
acknowledged ICRC,s mandate to provide aid in conflict 
zones, and said that if ICRC lacked resources, TRC stood 
ready to assist.  He maintained that security (e.g. 
terrorism) was Turkey,s greatest concern in connection with 
any DP crisis, based on the experience of 1991.  Gonen also 
said that a protocol with UN agencies might be signed March 
14.  Note:  The protocol has not yet been signed.  End Note. 
Gonen told A/S Dewey that TRC enjoyed close cooperation with 
the American Red Cross, and that U.S. NGO Americare had 
visited TRC recently. 
 
 
Update on UN Agencies, Contingency Planning 
------------------------------------------- 
 
 
15. (U) The U.S. delegation met over lunch with members of UN 
Turkey,s country team, led by Resident Coordinator Alfredo 
Witschi-Cestari.  Andre LaPerriere, UNICEF Northern Iraq 
Erbil Office Coordinator, Jean-Marie Fakhouri, UNHCR Regional 
Coordinator for the Iraq Situation, and Amin Awad, UNHCR 
Deputy Regional Coordinator for the Iraq Situation, also 
participated. 
 
 
16. (SBU) Coordination:  Witschi-Cestari told the delegation 
that the UN is concerned about security, and that it asked 
U.S. military not to site its offices (possible Humanitarian 
Assistance Coordination Center ) HACC) in Dyarbakir in the 
same building now housing UN emergency offices.  Dewey 
described his proposal to set up a civilian coordination 
mechanism including the GOT, UN agencies and the USG. 
 
 
17. (SBU) UNICEF on Northern Iraq:  LaPerriere said that 
UNICEF had developed a plan for northern Iraq that sought to 
make each of the three governorates self-sustaining in the 
event of a disruption in the supply chain.  He noted that the 
Syrian route may be a problem as the GOS has been insisting 
on a fee of USD 400 per truck for transit.  In northern Iraq, 
there are five sites for prepositioned supplies (medicine, 
blankets, winter clothes, water purification equipment). 
LaPerriere said that the estimated displacement in the north 
was likely to amount to about 250,000 persons, with the 
greatest problems in Zakho and Mosul.  He estimated that 
about 40 percent of these DPs could be absorbed by local 
families.   Shelter, fuel, and water are now the chief 
concerns, though the Iranians may be able to supply some 
fuel.  UNICEF said that each governorate in N. Iraq has an 
emergency committee and they have worked with UNICEF to train 
people for emergency response. 
 
 
18. (C) LaPerriere emphasized Kurdish hostility to Turkish 
intervention in the region, opining that the Kurds in 
northern Iraq would prefer to be subject to the Baghdad 
regime than to the Turks.  He stated the Turks are in fact 
building some camps in northern Iraq, and that some appeared 
to be completed, but UN staff were denied access to them. 
(See also septel on USAID/DART meeting with LaPerriere.) 
 
 
19. (SBU) World Food Program Issues in Turkey:  WFP Emergency 
Coordinator John Murray stated that WFP's registration in 
Turkey lapsed in the 1990,s and that WFP was experiencing 
significant delays in its attempt to reregister.  However, 
WFP has been able to operate effectively in Turkey under UNDP 
cover.  Murray said that WFP planned to import wheat flour, 
rather than wheat, in the first two months following 
disruption of the OFF Program.  WFP inquired with the Turkish 
Grain Board about procuring wheat locally, but it has not 
received a response from the agency.  Murray said that there 
may be tax consequences for WFP if it mills wheat in Turkey. 
He also noted the intermittent closure of the Turkish-Iraqi 
border to WFP trucks, and said that only 28 of its 41 trucks 
had made it across. 
 
 
20. (SBU) Kirkuk/Mosul:  In a follow up meeting on March 13, 
Jean-Marie Fakhouri, UNHCR Regional Coordinator for the Iraq 
Situation, Amin Awad, UNHCR Deputy Regional Coordinator for 
the Iraq Situation, told A/S Dewey that the return of 
primarily Kurdish displaced persons to Kirkuk and Mosul could 
spark conflict.  Fakhouri said that available information 
indicated that some 100,000 to 200,000 DPs have made 
preparations and are poised to move quickly.  He asked the 
USG to provide advance warning of those movements if at all 
possible. 
 
 
21. (C) UN Responsibilities in Iraq:  On the UN plan to give 
the UN Office of Project Services (UN OPS) protection 
responsibilities for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in 
northern Iraq and IOM responsibility for the center and 
south, Fakhouri expressed some skepticism that these agencies 
were prepared for these duties.  (In his meeting with the 
previous day, Witschi-Cestari shared the same concerns about 
IOM and UN Habitat.  Habitat would have responsibility to 
provide some shelter for IDPs.  Neither UN OPS nor UN Habitat 
has extensive experience as an emergency responder.  IOM has 
no international staff inside Iraq, and will have to rely on 
local agents to implement their mandate to protect IDPs.) 
Fakhouri said that UNHCR has been focused on its mission to 
provide assistance and protection in neighboring countries 
and along Iraq,s borders to refugees and displaced persons, 
but it is not well prepared to deal with DPs in Iraq and 
would prefer to work through the ICRC there.  Nonetheless, he 
noted that the Secretary General may task UNHCR to redirect 
its aid from the borders to IDPs within Iraq.  Fakhouri also 
expressed concern about restarting the OFF Program during and 
after the conflict, noting that it would take about 8 weeks 
for the UN WFP to take over the program from the GOI.  WFP,s 
planned 120,000 tons per month of food rations are a fraction 
of the current 500,000 tons imported and not all households 
have laid aside food reserves.  Food shortages are possible 
before the OFF is fully operational again.  Fakhouri pointed 
to the potential for terrorist activity in Kuwait, which 
could launch an unexpected movement of persons within Kuwait 
and from Kuwait to Saudi Arabia. 
 
 
IFRC on Turkish Red Crescent, ICRC Relations with the GOT 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
 
22. (SBU) A/S Dewey met with Carl Naucler, Head of 
Delegation, International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies (IFRC), on March 13 to discuss TRC,s role 
in providing humanitarian assistance in northern Iraq, and 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, (ICRC,) 
relations with the GOT.  Naucler told us that IFRC had 
pressed TRC President Gonen not to cross into northern Iraq 
to provide aid in violation of the rules and principles of 
the Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, but opined that TRC 
could be &pushed8 into northern Iraq by the GOT. 
23. (SBU) Naucler said the ICRC had sent a letter to TRC 
explaining that a TRC presence in Iraq would be fully legal 
only under the following circumstances:  as a uniformed 
auxiliary to the Turkish armed forces responsible only for 
medical support; with the consent of the Iraqi Red Crescent 
(which he noted is completely hostile to a TRC presence in 
Iraq); or in coordination with the ICRC.  The letter reminded 
TRC that, even with ICRC permission, TRC would merely have 
the status of a &Participating National Society8 and could 
be one of several national societies authorized to provide 
relief.  According to Naucler, TRC,s written reply 
acknowledged the requirement to coordinate with the ICRC, but 
said it would do so when IFRC provided logistical support, 
implying that TRC did not fully understand or accept ICRC,s 
lead role.  Naucler has suggested to Gonen that he get in 
touch with ICRC to discuss TRC,s possible role in providing 
aid. 
 
 
24. (SBU) Naucler told Dewey that IFRC would not support TRC 
activities in northern Iraq unless it obtains a clear mandate 
to operate there, although he hinted that IFRC could show 
flexibility if TRC operated close to the frontier and if the 
circumstances (difficult terrain, lack of alternatives) 
required TRC to respond on Iraqi rather than Turkish 
territory.  He said IFRC would primarily have a 
monitoring/reporting role for other donors with respect to 
TRC, and might also deploy several media and logistical 
specialists. 
 
 
25. (SBU) ICRC Status:  Naucler told us that the GOT agreed 
to ICRC,s request to open a temporary office in Turkey, but 
imposed a number of conditions that would make it impossible 
for ICRC to fulfill its mandate.  He said that ICRC would 
post someone to Turkey during a possible conflict in Iraq, 
with or without formal status from the GOT. 
 
 
26. (SBU) TRC Preparedness:  According to Naucler, TRC staff 
are prepared and well-trained to cope with disasters, but he 
fears that they are susceptible to Turkish military 
interference.  He said TRC has not moved supplies into 
northern Iraq, but has stockpiled goods in Silopi. 
Naucler,s deputy, who is in Silopi, reported that some of 
the camp locations on Turkish territory are now under two 
meters of snow and are not suitable locations. 
 
 
27. (SBU) IFRC also criticized the TRC,s/GOT,s 
uncoordinated appeal for relief supplies.  Naucler noted that 
the Turks had requested tents from NATO to shelter 276,000 
persons, and had also requested supplies from other donors 
(septel). 
 
 
KDP/PUK on Possible Turkish Military Intervention, Appeal for 
Humanitarian Supplies 
-------- 
 
 
28. (C) Safeen Diyazee, Ankara Representative, Kurdistan 
Democratic Party, and Bahros Galali, Ankara Representative, 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, expressed concern about 
possible Turkish intervention in northern Iraq and outlined 
their humanitarian contingency planning.   Galali noted that 
the Turks cite Kurdish designs on Kirkuk and Mosul as a 
rationale for Turkish military intervention.  However, he 
emphasized that some 250,000 displaced Kurds are only seeking 
return to their homes, that the KDP and PUK do not oppose the 
return of Iraqis of Arab, Turkmen and other ethnic origin to 
their homes in Kirkuk and Mosul, and that the oil resources 
of this region belong to all the people of Iraq.  Diyazee 
told Dewey that the Turks were using humanitarian concern as 
a pretext for intervention, and that there would be no wave 
of displaced persons from the PUK and KDP regions.  He added 
that Turkish intervention was an unnecessary distraction from 
the war against Baghdad.  Based on their contacts with senior 
Iraqi military officers, Dizayee does believe the Iraqi army 
would destroy the oilfields in Kirkuk and Mosul. 
 
 
29. (SBU) Dizayee said that the KDP had developed extensive 
contingency plans for humanitarian assistance and that these 
had been shared with USAID and the Humanitarian Planning 
Team, but emphasized that resources were urgently needed. 
KDP has identified potential camp locations for displaced 
persons from central Iraq as well as for Iraqi POWs and 
defectors.  Dizayee pointed out that Baghdad has blocked some 
supplies (particularly food and fuel) for northern Iraq under 
the OFF Program, and that the north has thus not been able to 
build stocks in preparation for a possible conflict.  He 
added that non-emergency medical treatment was being deferred 
to conserve medicine.  Dizayee stated that Peace Wind, a 
Japanese NGO, had pledged USD 2.6 million in assistance in 
the event of a crisis.  He said KDP had provided an inventory 
of needed relief materials to USAID and said he expected help 
in filling those gaps. 
 
 
Comment/Recommendation 
---------------------- 
 
 
30. (C) Embassy will follow up with MFA and resident UN 
agencies to secure agreement to the proposed humanitarian 
coordination mechanism and to storing HDRs in Turkey, but the 
GOT may not formally respond and go on a crisis footing until 
and unless hostilities in Iraq begin.  Fakhouri,s comment 
that delays in restarting the OFF under WFP management could 
leave the Iraqi population short of food is worrisome and we 
would encourage Washington agencies to address the issue on 
an urgent basis. 
PEARSON