US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU480

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000480 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL/ERIEDEL 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/11/2008 
TAGS: PINS, PTER, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: NEPAL'S CEASE-FIRE:  HINTS OF MAOIST STRATEGY FROM 
THE MIDWEST 
 
REF: A. A. KATHMANDU 312 
 
     B. B. KATHMANDU 477 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
======= 
 
1.  (SBU) Econoff visited Nepalgunj and Jumla districts of 
midwestern Nepal from March 4 to 7 to assess the effects of 
the cease-fire.  Despite statements from the Maoists at the 
national level (Ref A), insurgents in the Midwest Development 
Region are still using rhetoric calling for the establishment 
of a communist republic, the dissolution of the Royal 
Nepalese Army, and elimination of the constitutional 
monarchy.  Despite the cease-fire, Maoists continue to hold 
mass meetings, extort funds, and carry weapons in the 
midwest.  The activities of the Maoists in rural parts of the 
country raise serious questions regarding the sustainability 
of the cease-fire and the success of future negotiations. 
(Note: This is the second in a series of reports on this 
recent trip.  See Ref B for first report.)  End summary. 
 
Away from the Center, Maoist Rhetoric Differs 
============================================= 
 
2. (C) Econoff visited Nepalgunj and Jumla districts of 
midwestern Nepal from March 4 to 7 to assess the effects of 
the cease-fire.  According to a number of reliable sources, 
including businessmen, politicians, government officials, 
social activists, and local residents, the Maoists in the 
Midwest Development Region, often called the Maoist 
heartland, made strikingly different statements from those of 
the Maoist leadership.  For example, during preliminary 
negotiations in Kathmandu, the Maoists have indicated that 
they are willing to support the principles of multi-party 
democracy and constitutional monarchy (Ref A).  However, 
Rajendra Mohat, Jumla Local Representative of the 
non-governmental organization (NGO) INSEC, summarized the 
insurgents' objectives, as expressed to him by local Maoists, 
as: 
-- 1. Secure the leadership of Baburam Bhattarai, head of the 
Maoist negotiating team and the Maoists' number two 
ideologue, in a constituent assembly; 
-- 2. Use Maoist leadership of the constituent assembly to 
transform Nepal into a communist republic; 
-- 3. Dissolve the Royal Nepal Army and re-establish the 
national armed forces on the Maoist militia model; and 
-- 4. Offer the King a position of respect "without 
facilities," meaning a title without authority, budget, or 
official residence. 
 
Is the Cease-Fire a Tactic? 
=========================== 
 
3.  (C) Most government officers without regular, direct 
interaction with the Maoists had similar impressions of 
Maoist intent.  Dilli Raj Joshi, Chief District Officer of 
Banke, the midwest's economic center, stated that 
negotiations were doomed to fail as the Maoists had not given 
up their main objective of attaining power by building a 
communist republic.  The Senior Superintendent of Police in 
Jumla, Madan Khadka, also learned through his sources that 
the Maoists at the grass-roots level are continuing to call 
for a republic.  He surmises that Maoist-Government 
negotiations at the national level are a tactic to buy time. 
It is the consensus of both police and government officers in 
Jumla that it is only a matter of time before the cease-fire 
collapses and Jumla will be one of the first sites attacked 
again. 
 
4.  (C) During econoff's visit, only Him Gurung, Deputy 
Inspector General of Police for the region in Nepalgunj, was 
optimistic about the prospects for the peace process.  He 
opined that the Maoists have exhausted themselves and now 
must return to the political process.  He believes that the 
Maoists have eroded their public support and must use 
coercion to maintain their political base.  Other 
interlocutors echoed his perception that the Maoists were 
exhausted, due to various causes, e.g., increased Indian 
security along the border, Maoist losses incurred in 
November, and pressure from the international community. 
However, Gurung's belief that the Maoists can muster support 
only through the threat of force was not repeated by other 
sources. 
Talking Peace, Maintaining Force 
================================ 
 
5.  (C) The Maoists continue to hold mass meetings, extort 
funds, and openly carry weapons in Jumla.  Three major trails 
from the north, west and east enter the district headquarters 
(there are no motorable roads).  On all of these axes, the 
Maoists continue to demonstrate their strength.  According to 
Jumla's Police and INSEC Representative, the Maoists have 
massed several hundred cadres with weapons, including 
explosives, three hours to the west in Tatopani.  Villagers 
coming to the district headquarters to buy government rice 
report that Maoists have established a gate and a bridge two 
kilometers east of Jumla.  The villagers added that the 
Maoists had stopped harassing them since the beginning of the 
cease-fire.  In Sinja, one day's walk to the north, Major 
Khanal, the Company Commander of the local Royal Nepal Army 
garrison, stated that the Maoists had recently held a mass 
meeting with weapons.  During his visit, econoff observed 
Maoist flags surrounding the district headquarters.  The 
flags had been planted on the anniversary of the launching of 
the Maoist "People's War" (February 13) and, according to 
local residents, demarcate Maoist-controlled territory. 
 
Comment 
======= 
 
6.  (C) The information gathered on this recent trip exposes 
some glaring differences in Maoist rhetoric at the national 
and local levels.  This inconsistency reinforces the 
suspicion of many at senior levels of Nepal's security forces 
that the cease-fire is a Maoist tactic to buy time and 
attempt to achieve revolutionary goals through manipulation 
of the fractious political setup at the center.  The 
insurgents' ambitious objectives, as described by INSEC's 
local representative, present some difficult negotiating 
challenges--if not obstacles--for the Nepali government.  Any 
delay or refusal to accede on the part of the government 
could serve as a pretext for the Maoists to call an end to 
the cease-fire. 
MALINOWSKI