US embassy cable - 03KATHMANDU477

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000477 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
LONDON FOR POL/ERIEDEL 
NSC FOR MILLARD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2008 
TAGS: PINS, PTER, NP, Maoist Insurgency 
SUBJECT: MAOISTS IN WESTERN NEPAL DISCUSS TERMS OF 
CEASE-FIRE 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert K. Boggs for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
Summary 
======= 
 
1.  (SBU) On March 4, a non-governmental organization held a 
meeting with Maoist, government, and social organization 
representatives in Jumla, a district headquarters in Nepal's 
mid-western hills.  The Maoists tentatively agreed to end 
extortion and allow for the free movement of political 
parties and the resumption of development programs, although 
these concessions must be approved by top Maoist leaders 
before being operative.  The Maoists refused to put aside 
their arms or to quit holding mass meetings, while the army 
and police refused to return to their barracks.  Notably, 
local government and Maoist representatives agreed to resolve 
potential flash-points through discussion, although the 
details of this mechanism have yet to be finalized.  End 
Summary. 
 
Talks on Talks: INSEC Brings 25 Parties to the Table in Jumla 
============================================= ================ 
 
2.  (SBU) On March 4, Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC), 
a non-governmental organization (NGO) affiliated with the 
Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (UML), held 
a meeting with a regional Maoist leader and 25 government and 
social organizations.  The meeting was held in the Local 
Development Office in Jumla district headquarters.  A 
spontaneous crowd of 200 people gathered at the site to watch 
the interaction.  (Note: The police speculate that armed 
Maoist security personnel were hiding among the spectators.) 
Econoff arrived the following day and was able to talk with 
many of the participants, including the Local Representative 
of INSEC and organizer of the meeting; the Chief District 
Officer (CDO); the Deputy Superintendent of Police; and a 
local spokesperson for the UML.  The Maoists were represented 
by the Chief of the District Intellectual Committee. 
 
3.  (SBU) The INSEC organizer reported that it had taken him 
ten days to forge an agreement to meet between the Maoists 
and the Chief District Office.  Most of that time was spent 
in working through the hierarchy of Maoist contacts.  An 
agenda was not approved in advance, and the INSEC forum was 
open for all participants to air their grievances. 
 
Local Code of Conduct: A Reflection of National Debate 
============================================= ========= 
 
4.  (SBU) During his opening remarks, the Maoists' 
representative objected to the presence of an armed police 
officer, but agreed to proceed.  (Note: The meeting was held 
100 feet from the officer's home and adjacent to the police 
headquarters.)  The attendees then presented a list of 
demands to the Maoists, including: 
-- Freedom of movement for mainstream political party members; 
-- Non-interference with development projects; and 
-- An end to Maoist extortion, carrying of arms, and mass 
meetings. 
The Maoists in response requested that the Royal Nepal Army 
(RNA), not represented at the meeting, and the police return 
to their barracks and allow the Maoists free movement in all 
areas of the district. 
 
5.  (U) The UML representative demanded an apology from the 
Maoists for the November attack on Jumla and an explanation 
of what the Maoists had expected to gain.  His request was 
met by silence.  The representative of the lower castes took 
the opportunity to protest the Maoist practice of impressing 
low-caste people into work as porters.  If people do not 
agree to work for the Maoists, they will be killed; if they 
do, they could be shot by security forces as Maoist 
sympathizers, he complained.  The Maoist representative 
stated only that there was no longer a need for porter 
services during the cease-fire. 
 
6.  (SBU) According to the INSEC organizer, the Maoists 
conceded in principle to the free movement of political party 
members; to non-interference in development projects, if they 
are given sufficient notice; and to stop fund raising. 
However, the Maoist refused to put aside weapons or stop 
organizing mass meetings.  Most importantly, the police and 
the Maoists agreed to put in place a mechanism through which 
disputes in the field can be resolved through dialogue rather 
than violence.  The details of the mechanism, including the 
forum, ground rules, and representatives, have yet to be 
established.  The Maoist told the other participants that the 
concessions requested of them must be reviewed by the central 
Maoist leadership before agreement could be confirmed.  He 
would schedule a mass meeting the next week, he said, to 
announce the decisions of the Maoist party. 
 
UML Touting the Party Line Despite Threats 
========================================== 
 
7.  (C) The UML representative told econoff that during the 
meeting the Maoists demonstrated flexibility, while the 
government did not.  He accused the local government 
representatives and the King of undermining the cease-fire by 
not taking "positive steps."  When asked what those steps 
were, he repeated the UML's standard demand for an all-party 
interim government to replace the "illegitimate" government 
of Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand.  Both the UML and 
INSEC representatives related that the Maoists accused the 
UML of undermining the peace process.  The Maoists reportedly 
expect to become more powerful politically than the UML 
through negotiations.  The Maoists suspect that the only way 
for the UML to prevent this outcome is for the UML to 
undermine the cease-fire.  The UML representative said he 
fears for his life and the lives of UML cadre; therefore UML 
cadres no longer venture outside Jumla and have developed 
plans to leave the district if the cease-fire breaks down. 
 
More to Come 
============ 
 
8.  (SBU) The INSEC organizer was very happy with the outcome 
of the March 4 session and is working with the regional INSEC 
office in Nepalgunj in the southwestern lowlands to organize 
a mass interaction after the first round of anticipated peace 
talks in Kathmandu.  The purpose will be to air the 
grievances of all parties affected by the conflict in order 
to make the peace agreement as broad based as possible. 
 
Comment 
======= 
 
9.  (C) Since the January 29 announcement of the cease-fire, 
local Maoist representatives have held meetings with 
politicians and members of civil society in a number of 
districts as a way to improve their public image, which had 
been badly damaged by a year of violent excesses.  The March 
4 meeting in Jumla, although organized by an NGO, is another 
example of the Maoists' efforts to project themselves as a 
responsible political party.  It is unlikely that the 
discussions in Jumla have any implications for talks at the 
national level, as many of the concessions reached in Jumla 
had already been agreed to by the central Maoist leadership. 
Too little time has elapsed to evaluate whether the 
concessions on mass meetings and extorting funds will hold. 
 
10.  (C) Despite speculation by the vernacular press and 
Embassy contacts of emerging political factions within the 
Maoist movement, the near mirror-image demands of the Maoists 
at local and national levels and the need for the local 
representative to refer back to the center for approval 
demonstrate a highly centralized political organization. 
Whatever initiatives may be developed at the local level, 
little progress can be made without the imprimatur of the 
Maoist political hierarchy.  In any case, this example of 
peaceful interaction between local Maoists and their recent 
victims bears testimony to Maoist seriousness so far about 
above-ground negotiations. 
MALINOWSKI