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| Identifier: | 03SANAA503 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 03SANAA503 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Sanaa |
| Created: | 2003-03-17 11:42:00 |
| Classification: | SECRET//NOFORN |
| Tags: | CVIS ETTC EFIN PTER PREL KVPR YM TERFIN |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SANAA 000503 SIPDIS NOFORN STATE FOR EB/ESC/ESP (GGLASS), S/CT (FOX), NEA (GRAPO AND HEFFERNAN), TREASURY FOR GENERAL COUNSEL (DAUFHAUSER), OFAC DIRECTOR (RNEWCOMB), DAS FOR TERRORISM AND VIOLENT CRIMES (JZARATE), AND TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM FINANCING E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2013 TAGS: CVIS, ETTC, EFIN, PTER, PREL, KVPR, YM, TERFIN SUBJECT: TERRORIST FINANCE: NEXT STEPS REGARDING SABAA BANK REF: 2002 STATE 252456 Classified By: AMB: EJHULL FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D) 1. (S/NF) Embassy Sanaa has now reviewed the targeting report noted in para three/reftel. While the report cited several disturbing examples that may implicate Saba Islamic Bank (SIB) in supporting terrorist financing, the report also stated that the USG had information only on a few specific transactions through SIB by terrorists and that these did not specify complicity of bank officials. Embassy Sanaa believes that it would not/not be prudent to designate SIB without more and better information to substantiate its possible role in terrorist financing. 2. (S/NF) Embassy Sanaa will review and follow up on the various sub-reports cited in the targeting report; we note that these were submitted over several years and may involve issues of context, changed circumstances, and information overtaken by events. We will seek additional,up-to-date information on the ownership of SIB and the activities of Hamid Al-Ahmar in particular. 3. (S/NF) We assume as well that U.S. investigators working the cases of Sheikh Mohammed Hasan Ali Al-Moayad and the so-called "Yemeni money-laundering" ring in the U.S. will be seeking any information that might substantiate SIB and Al-Ahmar activities in terrorist financing. We note that the targeting report, which was compiled prior to the arrest of Sheikh Al-Moayad and to publication of news about the money-laundering case, made reference to both of these. Further investigation along these lines may therefore be directly relevant. 4. (S/NF) As Embassy Sanaa noted in our previous message on this issue (2002 Sanaa 3726), we believe that designation of Shaykh 'Abd al-Majid Al-Zindani could serve U.S. counter-terrorism interests, especially if we can tie him to Al-Qa'ida, and get UN endorsement. Our belief is that USG efforts should give primary focus to Shaykh Al-Zindani's history and activities, and that this is more likely to produce results that could lead to ROYG decisions in our mutual interests. Hamid Al-Ahmar and Sabaa Islamic Bank may be secondary/secondary targets for subsequent action as further supporting information becomes available. In any event, prior to possible designation of Al-Zindani, Hamid Al-Ahmar, and/or Sabaa Islamic Bank, we need to develop additional evidence, and follow where that evidence may lead with appropriate decisions. HULL
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