US embassy cable - 03ISTANBUL349

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ISTANBUL 000349 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2013 
TAGS: PGOV, SOCI, KISL, TK, Istanbul 
SUBJECT: RECEP TAYYIP ERDOGAN: CLUES FROM ISTANBUL 
 
REF: A. 02 ISTANBUL 449 
     B. 02 ISTANBUL 390 
 
 
Classified By: Consul General David Arnett for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
 
 
 
1. (U) Summary: In assessing the outlook for the new 
government to be led by Justice and Development (AK) Party 
leader Tayyip Erdogan, we look back at his only major 
previous government experience --- as Istanbul Mayor from 
1994 to 1998.  End Summary. 
 
 
Refah and Grassroots Politics 
----------------------------- 
2. (U) Erdogan ran for Istanbul Mayor in 1994 with little 
prior political experience.  However, he had benefited from 
his work in the milieu of Islamist leader Erbakan's National 
View (Milli Gorus) Movement, Erbakan's Refah Party (RP), and 
his own natural political skills and personal charisma.  A 
graduate of a preacher (Imam-Hatip) high school, Erdogan 
worked his way up through the RP system and ran for Istanbul 
Mayor from the platform of RP Chairman for Istanbul.  At that 
time, Refah had pioneered pervasive grassroots political 
organization, door-to-door campaigning, charitable donations, 
and other techniques now widely emulated by other political 
parties in Istanbul.  Such tactics proved to be particularly 
successful in the populous Istanbul districts of 
Gaziosmanpasa, Umraniye, Fatih, and Bagcilar districts --- 
poor, migrant neighborhoods that were rapidly expanding as 
Turkey underwent massive urbanization.  The newcomers came 
from the poorest parts of Anatolia in search of jobs and 
economic stability.  But Istanbul's inability to absorb them 
combined with years of chronic high inflation left most 
living in dire economic conditions, adding to the swelling 
ranks of the urban poor.  Mostly conservative and religious, 
they were welcomed by similarly conservative local RP 
activists, mostly head-scarved women, who provided them with 
donations of food and coal, as well as advice on how to find 
homes and jobs.  Largely on the basis of their support, RP 
had made steady in-roads in these and other neighborhoods of 
Istanbul since 1984, winning an increasing share of the vote 
and minor victories, including the Fatih District Mayorship 
in 1989. 
 
 
A Tight Race, A Narrow Mandate 
------------------------------ 
3. (C) The support of the Refah party organization alone, 
however, was not enough.  Erdogan benefited from the fact 
that the Istanbul 1994 election was a tightly contested race 
with strong candidates from several of the other parties. 
The left and left-center votes were divided between 
Democratic Left Party (DSP) candidate Necdet Ozkan (brother 
of Husamettin Ozkan, who later became deputy PM under PM 
Ecevit) and Socalist Democratic People's Party (SHP) 
candidate Zulfu Livaneli.  The votes from the center-right 
were split between Ilhan Kesici from the Motherland Party 
(ANAP) and former Istanbul Mayor Bedrettin Dalan, who 
abandoned ANAP and ran on the True Path Party (DYP) ticket. 
Dalan told us recently that he had been promised the ANAP 
nomination only to have it personally rescinded by ANAP 
Chairman Mesut Yilmaz.  Dalan says that he then accepted the 
DYP nomination with no expectation of victory (Note: DYP is 
traditionally very weak in Istanbul. End Note), hoping merely 
to split the center-right vote, deny victory to Kesici, and 
thereby spite Yilmaz and ANAP.  The final results suggest 
that he may have succeeded.  Erdogan edged out Kesici by a 
little more than 40,000 votes with only 25.6 percent to 
Kesici's 24.6 percent.  Livaneli finished third with 17.4 
percent and Dalan "the spoiler" finished with 12.5 percent. 
 
 
Erdogan the Man 
--------------- 
4. (U) Although impossible to quantify, Erdogan's charisma 
and political savvy have also been key factors in his success 
as a politician (see ref A for more detail).  Erdogan has 
supporters throughout Istanbul and in all walks of life. 
When asked why they like him, the most common response is 
that he is someone they can trust.  Erdogan was a fresh face, 
a talented football player, and came from humble beginnings 
-- all political assets in a country that is chronically 
disappointed with its politicians, as was the case with 
Erdogan's predecessor, Nurettin Sozen.  Most Istanbul 
residents also respected Erdogan's faith and devotion, 
although his Islamist credentials were somewhat alarming and 
controversial among the secularist establishment and public 
media.  This controversy was fueled by pre-election promises 
to build a mosque in Taksim square and close the city's 
brothels, as well as by Mayor Erdogan's decisions to ban 
alcohol in municipal facilities and to close the cafeterias 
during Ramadan. 
 
 
Targeting the Urban Poor 
------------------------ 
5. (C) Once in office, however, Erdogan worked quickly to 
bolster his public support and reward those who elected him 
by devoting his efforts to addressing the needs of the urban 
poor.  The standard mantra used by Erdogan supporters to 
characterize his term is one in which corruption was replaced 
by honest administration and city services were actually 
delivered.  This view enjoys much popular resonance.  When 
before the election we asked Erdogan supporters why they 
backed him, we most often heard the refrain that "he got 
things done in Istanbul."  Erdogan himself pointed to his 
success in such areas as increasing water fee collections 
25-fold to 25 million USD, thereby enabling the city to wean 
itself from reliance on foreign donors to provide this 
essential service.  More generally, Erdogan supporters 
stressed the city's improving budget picture during his 
tenure, in which a 2 billion USD deficit was transformed into 
a surplus and civic investments expanded dramatically. 
Scrutiny of Istanbul's budget books confirm some but not all 
of these points.  In contrast to earlier periods, Istanbul 
under Erdogan consistently ran a budget surplus.  Public 
investments were not sacrificed to meet day-to-day 
obligations, but were largely realized at the same rate as 
the rest of the budget. 
 
 
6. (C)  Many of our interlocutors point to the roads, gas, 
and water networks built in the poor suburbs, crediting 
Erdogan with improving the quality of life for millions of 
Istanbul residents.  Erdogan gets less praise from middle and 
upper-class Istanbul residents, many of whom live in the 
richer neighborhoods of Besiktas, Bakirkoy, and Kadikoy, 
which continued to experience the chronic urban challenges of 
pollution and congestion.  Here, too, however, Erdogan is 
often credited with completing the first line of Istanbul's 
underground metro, cleaning up the Golden Horn, and 
constructing an extensive natural gas network.  Former Mayor 
Dalan claims that Erdogan had no "vision" and failed to 
implement any major, new projects, merely executing those 
that had been in the pipeline for years.  He says that 
Erdogan called him to personally apologize for abandoning 
Dalan's plan to revamp Taksim Square by rerouting traffic 
through underground tunnels.  But even Dalan admits that 
Erdogan was significantly better than his predecessor Sozen 
and concedes that Erdogan "tried."  Rusen Cakir, a veteran 
journalist with the Vatan daily newspaper and author of a 
book on the Refah Party and a biography of Erdogan himself, 
told poloff that from the beginning Erdogan saw Istanbul as a 
platform for higher political ambitions.  As a result, 
Erdogan worked hard to cultivate a broad constituency and 
develop a reputation as an honest, effective administrator. 
 
 
Corruption 
---------- 
7. (C) If there is agreement that the depiction of Erdogan as 
a mayor who got things done has a strong base in reality, 
more questions surround the argument that he ran a clean (or 
"ak") government.  Views differ as to Erdogan's personal 
complicity in the various corruption scandals of his 
administration, but there are few who would deny that "where 
there is smoke, there is fire."  And while it is certainly 
possible that the prosecution of the cases against Erdogan 
may have been politically motivated, the public evidence and 
what we have heard from Istanbul contacts in a position to 
know point to an extensive pattern of corruption (see refs A 
and B for further details).  The major scandals involved 
corruption in the awarding of public tenders for the city 
natural gas distribution system, the underground metro, 
cleaning up the Golden Horn, trash collection, municipal 
shuttle bus service, and planting trees in public spaces. 
Erdogan was also charged with misappropriating funds by 
manipulating data on the electronic tickets used for the 
city's transportation services and for renting out municipal 
advertisement billboards for below-market prices.  He has 
been acquitted from all but one of these cases, although 
there is still a possibility that other cases could still be 
opened. 
 
 
8. (C) Former Istanbul CHP Chairman Mehmet Boluk, who was at 
least partially responsible for collecting the evidence that 
led to these cases, told us that major corruption in Istanbul 
began under Dalan, continued under Sozen, but reached new 
heights under Erdogan.  Rusen Cakir disagrees, arguing that 
while corruption took place under Erdogan, it was much more 
centralized and controlled (and therefore less in absolute 
terms) than under Dalan and Sozen. In any case, the pattern 
of corruption has been the same.  Mayors have used their 
power to award and cancel public tenders to funnel money to 
favored companies.  These companies, presumably, return the 
favor by making payments into personal bank accounts or to 
favored charities.  Another well-informed observer of Turkish 
politics told us that in many cases political parties simply 
send their campaign expenses to such companies, which then 
pay them and conceal the payments as assorted business 
expenses.  Rusen Cakir and others have told us that the 
proceeds of corruption during Erdogan's administration were 
primarily directed to charities and a select group of people, 
and not widely disbursed through the city administration. 
9. (C) How did Erdogan manage to keep his hands clean and 
escape responsibility?  Boluk, who is also a former 
investigative journalist (who also gathered and presented 
evidence against Erdogan's CHP predecessor Sozen), believes 
that the various cases have been dropped largely as a result 
of political pressure from Erdogan and his supporters.  Boluk 
cited the AKBIL (electronic ticket) case as an example. 
After failing to appear for three consecutive court dates, 
Erdogan finally came to court with a new legal team that 
included two retired judges from the same court.  Without 
explanation, the prosecutor himself asked that the charges be 
dropped.  In other cases, unexplained delays in procedural 
matters have led to charges being dropped due to a statute of 
limitations clause. There are still outstanding charges 
related to the IGDAS case, for example, but the prosecutor 
has kept the file on his desk for months. 
 
 
10. (C) Among the public, the cases have lacked traction 
because of the widely-shared belief, stemming from Erdogan's 
1997 conviction for "Islamist sedition", that Turkey's 
secular establishment was hounding him and using the legal 
system to pursue political ends.  In addition, unlike the 
"mainstream" politicians who ran Istanbul, Erdogan still 
benefits from a perception, almost uniquely applied to 
Islamist politicians, that corruptly-attained funds were 
plowed back either into city services-- via purchases of 
ambulances, garbage trucks, and other amenities for 
impoverished districts-- or in party/movement building rather 
than venal pocket-lining.  (Note: As ref A notes, our 
"establishment" contacts confirm that this perception had an 
important basis in reality, and that ironically they would 
have preferred the older system to being forced to contribute 
to causes in which they did not believe.  End Note.)  AK's 
move away from piously Islamic rhetoric to more mainstream 
issues, coupled with its recruitment of shady though 
presumably more traditional political figures, has made it 
harder for Erdogan to maintain this political teflon. 
 
 
Erdogan's Cronies 
----------------- 
11. (C) Many of the other defendants and people who 
presumably profited from these scandals have accompanied 
Erdogan and the AK party to Ankara.  The president of a think 
tank with close links to the Turkish government and state 
told us that although other AK parliamentarians and party 
people may be fiercely ideological, he believes that this 
group is motivated primarily by its loyalty to Erdogan. 
Transportation Minister Binali Yildirim, formerly the General 
Director of the Istanbul Sea Bus, was removed from office on 
corruption charges that took place under Erdogan.  Energy 
Minister Mehmet Hilmi Guler was an adviser to Erdogan and an 
IGDAS (Istanbul Natural Gas Distribution Company) board 
member and a defendant in the natural gas corruption case. 
Among those who are rumored to be added to a new Erdogan 
cabinet next week are Idris Naim Sahin and Akif Gulle, both 
of whom worked with Erdogan in Istanbul and were implicated 
in various corruption scandals.  There are also more than a 
dozen other AK parliamentarians that were implicated in the 
various Erdogan corruption scandals.  Separately, the heads 
of several major city-managed firms during Erdogan's tenure 
and other Erdogan advisers have since been newly appointed to 
lucrative positions as the heads of state-owned companies, 
including Turkish Airlines, the State Water Works, Turkish 
Petroleum Refineries Corporation, and the General Foundations 
Directorate. 
 
 
Comment 
------- 
12. (C) Was Erdogan a successful mayor?  The answer depends 
on whom you talk to and what constitutes success in their 
minds.  One thing is clear, however.  Despite his narrow 
mandate, the corruption scandals, and unrelenting criticism 
regarding his Islamic leanings, Erdogan remained loyal to the 
constituency that elected him.  He had little time for 
grandiose new plans, instead devoting the bulk of his efforts 
to providing municipal services to the urban poor.  In the 
process he may well have enriched a circle of friends and 
supporters, thereby laying important groundwork for the 
eventual establishment of the AK Party and its success at the 
polls in 2002.  Among the AK parliamentarians and other 
power-brokers that have relocated to Ankara, it is likely 
that there is a sizable group that is motivated more by 
loyalty to Erdogan (and perhaps by simple greed) than by 
ideological considerations.  As for Erdogan himself, if his 
service as Istanbul Mayor is any guide, his efforts as Prime 
Minister will be primarily devoted to solidifying and 
expanding AK's voter base.  And although that base has 
expanded considerably beyond the urban poor of Istanbul, it 
still remains largely disenfranchised and conservative. 
Satisfying this segment of the Turkish population while 
operating under the rigid austerity of Turkey's IMF program 
will be among Erdogan's greatest challenges.  End Comment. 
ARNETT