US embassy cable - 03ANKARA1631

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001631 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2013 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TU, IZ 
SUBJECT: TURKISH KURDS: "WHY DO YOU NEED TURKEY?" 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 1624 
     B. ANKARA 1470 
     C. ANKARA 1341 
 
 
(U) Classified by PolCouns John Kunstadter; reasons: 1.5 (b) 
and (d). 
 
 
1. (C) In March 13 conversation with poloffs, a close Embassy 
contact and opposition CHP M.P. discussed Kurdish 
perspectives of a possible operation in Iraq.  The M.P., a 
leader of the Kurdish Dostki tribe with extensive political 
ties in Turkey's southeast, tribal ties in Iraq, and previous 
service in Parliament, lamented U.S. reliance on Turkey for 
any operation in Iraq. 
 
 
2. (C) He explained to us that none of his constituents or 
family members wants Turkish troops to deploy to Iraq.  They 
fear an intensifying crackdown on Kurds on both sides of the 
border, a consequence of "the Turkish State's racist 
underpinnings." 
 
 
3. (C) On the other hand, Kurds, he emphasized, will welcome 
U.S. troops: "we realize that the U.S. is our only friend in 
the world."  Numerous protesters are out on the street 
chanting "Savasa Hayir" -- no to war, he noted.  "I say, 
'Savasa Evet'" (Yes to War). 
 
 
4. (C) When poloffs tested him by noting their respect for 
Turkey in general and shared USG-GOT interests, our contact's 
face froze in a way we have seen countless times in 
discussing Turkey with Turkish Kurds.  "Why do you need 
Turkey?" he asked.  The Turkish State has a woeful reputation 
among Kurds everywhere, he noted.  Turkish support for an 
operation would, therefore, actually harm rather than enhance 
USG equities in Iraq and elsewhere. 
 
 
5. (C) Our contact is concerned that an operation in Iraq 
will provide an excuse for the Turkish State to re-impose 
OHAL (State of Emergency) or some other quasi-martial law 
regime in Turkey's Southeast.  A legal expert on State 
Security Courts and member of Parliament's Justice Committee, 
he explained that, given well established Turkish practice: 
1) the NSC (read: the military) will set the emergency rule 
policy; 2) the military by itself will produce the actual 
draft law, relying primarily on military lawyers working 
directly for TGS; 3) the completed draft will then be passed 
to the relevant Parliamentary committees, which will present 
the draft as their own work. 
 
 
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Comment 
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6. (C) These comments are particularly striking coming from a 
representative of the Party of Ataturk -- which is rabidly 
opposed to USG intervention in Iraq.  On earlier occasions, 
our contact told us of his concern lest he be branded a 
"traitor" to Turkey for his support of a possible US-led war 
against Saddam.  More important, his comments reflect what we 
are hearing privately from numerous other Kurdish contacts 
across the political spectrum (reftels and previous). 
Despite their different party and other affiliations, our 
Kurdish contacts are largely united in their conviction that 
the Turkish State's policy in N. Iraq and toward its own 
ethnically Kurdish citizens is deeply flawed and risks 
promoting regional instability.  In this regard, they fear 
that the palpably pro-war sentiment of many leading Kurds 
will fuel Kemalist neuralgia in Ankara power centers (septel). 
PEARSON