US embassy cable - 03SANAA489

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

SANAA EAC MEETING MARCH 12

Identifier: 03SANAA489
Wikileaks: View 03SANAA489 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Sanaa
Created: 2003-03-13 13:58:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: ASEC AMGT PREL PTER AADP CASC YM EAC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 SANAA 000489 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA, NEA/ARP, NEA/EX, S/CT, CA, DS/DSS, 
DS/IP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/ICI/PII, CENTCOM FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2013 
TAGS: ASEC, AMGT, PREL, PTER, AADP, CASC, YM, EAC 
SUBJECT: SANAA EAC MEETING MARCH 12 
 
Classified By: Pol/Econ Deputy Chief Catherine J. Westley for Reasons 1 
.5 (b and d) 
 
 1.  (S/NF)  Begin Summary:  The Ambassador convened an 
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) meeting on March 12 to 
assess threat information and discuss ongoing security 
measures, contingency planning for a possible conflict with 
Iraq and other security-related matters.  Key offices and 
personnel represented at the meeting included: AMB, DCM, 
POL/ECON, CONS, ADMIN, PD, RSO, ORCA, OMC, SOC YEMEN, RMO, 
FPD AND FBI.  End summary. 
 
------------------------- 
Current Threat Assessment 
------------------------- 
 
2.  (S/NF)  EAC discussed the current threat environment. 
DCM said that Sanaa is the only Embassy on the Arabian 
Peninsula not under authorized departure, primarily because 
of excellent security cooperation from the Yemeni government 
and long-standing security measures already in place.  ORCA 
briefed on recent intel relating to potential threats from 
al-Qaeda and Iraq, noting that no evidence of a new imminent 
and specific threat exists but that Sanaa continues to face a 
high potential threat. 
 
3.  (C)  Ambassador asked whether EAC members thought that 
requesting authorized departure status should be considered 
in light of the regional situation and current threat 
profile.  EAC unanimously decided that it was not warranted 
at this time. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Ongoing Security Measures and Contingency Planning 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
4.  (C)  EAC discussed ongoing security measures, 
consultations and contingency planning.  They include: 
 
-- DCM 3/10 discussion with Foreign Minister al-Qirbi urging 
resolution to the issues of civilian (i.e., non-diplomatic) 
license plates for embassy vehicles and facilitating entry 
into Yemen of increased numbers of armored vehicles.  Embassy 
faces ROYG restrictions on the numbers of non-diplomatic 
license plates ("blue plates") and armored vehicles, and is 
waiting ROYG response on pending requests. 
 
-- Acting as a force multiplier for the Regional Security 
Office, Force Protection Detachment (FPD) will conduct a 
follow-on visit to Jibla, where Americans are still working 
at the hospital, to conduct scheduled security consultations 
on March 14-15.  FPD will travel in an armored vehicle with a 
Thuraya satellite phone to ensure safety and good 
communication should events in the region warrant their 
immediate return. 
 
-- Training for Local Guard Force (LGF), Marine Detachment 
and Yemeni guard force on receiving demonstration petitions 
safely, a follow-up to recent DCM meetings with the LGF. 
 
-- Training of female perimeter guards stationed to conduct 
security checks of women, particularly those in abayas that 
could hide dangerous items. 
 
-- DCM and RSO lunch scheduled March 15 with Sheraton Hotel 
management and Yemeni security forces to consolidate 
adjustments recently made at Embassy suggestion to Sheraton 
security.  These changes include instituting ordinance 
testing, building guard shacks and inspecting vehicles 
thoroughly and politely. 
 
--  RSO and Consular Section to assess security implications 
of the increase in consular waiting lines in recent days, and 
to take further security steps as needed. 
 
-- More frequent radio checks that have increased community 
participation to almost 100%. 
 
-- Distribution of the latest update of Embassy's telephone 
cascade system for emergency use. 
 
-- The importance of keeping the StandFast employee list 
complete and up-to-date. 
-- Reiterating the importance of proper mail handling 
procedures to ensure that no unscreened mail enters the 
chancery under any circumstances. 
 
-- Further consultations with the American community on 
contingency planning for a possible outbreak of war, 
including RSO meetings with Fulbright students, NDI, ADRA and 
Amideast this week. 
---------------------------------- 
Vaccinations and Disaster Response 
---------------------------------- 
5.  (SBU)  RMO briefed EAC on the successful conclusion of 
the smallpox vaccination program, noting that a cable with 
full details would be forthcoming.  22 staff members so far 
have taken advantage of the anthrax immunization program. 
 
6.  (SBU)  EAC discussed the visiting chem/bio response team 
training of First Responders and all Embassy staff March 
11-13. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Security Incidents and Future Demonstrations 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
7.  (SBU)  EAC discussed security of local areas frequented 
by Embassy personnel.  Two minor incidents at Bab al-Yemen, 
the main shopping market, were briefed.  In one incident, FPD 
personnel were cased by a young man who asked the young boy 
assisting FPD with shopping whether they were Americans and 
where they were going.  FPD personnel secured themselves 
within a store and were told by the boy and the store owner 
that the young man was a well-known thief.  Nothing further 
occurred.  In another incident, an Embassy employee was spit 
upon.  RSO raised both incidents with the Ministry of 
Interior.  Based on the nature of the incidents and 
discussions with MOI, no further restrictions on going to Bab 
al-Yemen were deemed necessary at this time, although 
increased caution was urged. 
 
8.  (U)  In light of expected demonstrations in the coming 
days, including President Saleh's call for one on March 15, 
EAC discussed the necessity of coordinating with the ROYG to 
ensure that Post is informed on the location and scope of 
demonstrations to ensure the safety of anyone traveling near 
those areas. 
HULL 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04