US embassy cable - 03COLOMBO421

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 COLOMBO 000421 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SA, SA/INS, SA/PD; NSC FOR E. MILLARD 
 
LONDON FOR POL/RIEDEL 
 
E.O. 12958:  DECL:  03-12-13 
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PHUM, ECON, KPAO, CE, NO, JA, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT:  Snapshot of a sour, suspicious Jaffna 
 
Refs:  (A) Colombo 410 
-      (B) USDAO IIR 6816005403 Colombo CE 
-      (C) Colombo 218, and previous 
 
(U) Classified by Ambassador E. Ashley Wills. 
Reasons 1.5 (b, d). 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador visited Jaffna, March 11. 
The March 10 sinking of a LTTE arms resupply ship was on 
everyone's minds, with the military and Tamils in sharp 
discord on the GSL's action.  The military, which was 
highly critical of the LTTE, defended the size of its 
security zones.  Tamils, meanwhile, complained about the 
zones and the lack of economic progress in Jaffna.  One 
sign of hope was the reconstructed Jaffna library.  The 
Ambassador urged both sides to stay the course and 
exercise more patience.  Media coverage of the visit was 
positive.  Overall, Jaffna seemed in a sour, suspicious 
mood.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------- 
Visit to Jaffna 
--------------- 
 
2.  (U) Ambassador Wills led a Mission team on a March 11 
visit to Jaffna.  DAO, PAO, A/RSO, and polchief 
accompanied the Ambassador.  During the one-day visit, 
the Ambassador met with Major General Sarath Fonseka, 
the commander of Sri Lankan military forces in Jaffna, 
at his Palaly airbase office.  In Jaffna city, he had 
lunch with several local representatives of non- 
governmental organizations and held a separate meeting 
with several Tamil National Alliance (TNA) MPs.  The 
visit wrapped up with a stop at the newly reconstructed 
Jaffna library.  Before departing for Colombo from 
Palaly, the Ambassador met briefly with Fonseka. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Sharp Disagreement over March 10 Incident 
----------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) The Ambassador asked General Fonseka about the 
March 10 sinking of a Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) ship off Sri Lanka's northeast coast by the Sri 
Lankan navy (see Refs A-B).  Fonseka replied that, based 
on what he had heard, the LTTE ship was a very large one 
and was clearly carrying a large amount of arms, 
although the exact type was not known.  The Ambassador 
noted dryly that it, indeed, appeared as if the ship was 
not carrying "books for the Jaffna library."  It was 
positive, Fonseka noted, that the GSL had decided to 
challenge the LTTE by taking action against the group's 
resupply efforts.  Introducing a theme he would keep 
coming back to (see Paras 5-7), Fonseka remarked that 
the incident highlighted why he thought it was so 
difficult to trust the LTTE. 
 
4.  (C) Tamil politicians had a completely different 
take on the incident.  M. Senathirajah, a TNA 
parliamentarian with close links to the LTTE, was 
particularly vociferous in his denunciation of the 
government's action.  Senethirajah said the incident was 
a very, very "serious" one, complaining that the GSL had 
no right to attack a LTTE ship in international waters. 
(Note:  Per Ref B, the ship was intercepted 
approximately 175 nautical miles off the northeast coast 
in international waters, but within Sri Lanka's 
exclusive economic zone, "EEZ.")  While underscoring 
that he believed the LTTE wanted the peace process to 
continue despite the incident, Senethirajah averred that 
nothing good could come from the government's action. 
(Note:  The Tamil politicians seemed to believe they had 
a relatively good handle on LTTE views re the incident, 
as all of them had just met LTTE officials, including 
chief negotiator Anton Balasingham, during a visit to 
the Tiger-controlled Wanni region earlier in the day.) 
The Ambassador replied that the U.S. certainly hoped 
that the LTTE continued its involvement in the peace 
process.  Arms smuggling by the Tigers was a very 
serious matter, however.  Such activities gave rise to 
very, very serious doubts about the group's commitment 
to peace, the Ambassador said. 
------------------------- 
Military Hits out at LTTE 
------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) Asked about the overall situation in Jaffna, 
General Fonseka expressed deep concerns about the 
pattern of LTTE activities.  The group continued to 
recruit, and to harass and intimidate Tamils that did 
not agree with it.  On multiple occasions, for example, 
the Tigers had attacked the Jaffna offices and personnel 
of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), an anti- 
LTTE grouping.  For Tamils, the situation was very tense 
and, according to General Fonseka, "worse than before 
the ceasefire" because they had "to bow" to LTTE 
pressure and could not exercise their political rights. 
The LTTE's local political cadre were also very active 
in instigating marches and demonstrations against the 
GSL and the military.  In one current case, for example, 
the Minister of Education was visiting Jaffna and the 
Tigers had launched a "black armband" campaign among 
students protesting his presence.  Soldiers were also 
sometimes spat at, or harassed by motorcycle drivers, 
who drove around them in circles, revving their engines, 
trying to incite an incident. 
 
6.  (C) Summing up, Fonseka said the military was doing 
its best to keep its cool in the face of LTTE 
provocations.  It was really quite difficult to deal 
with the group and to believe simultaneously that it was 
totally sincere about the peace process, he commented. 
While taking note of the difficult circumstances the 
military found itself in, the Ambassador stressed that 
it was important for the sake of the peace process that 
the military continue to exercise restraint to the full 
extent possible. 
 
7.  (C) In response to a question, Fonseka commented 
that he and his officers met at times with the LTTE's 
high-level officials in Jaffna.  In general, contacts at 
this level, including with Jaffna political chief 
Ilamparuthi, were relatively cordial.  It was at the 
lower levels that contacts were difficult.  Many of the 
LTTE's political cadre in Jaffna were hard-liners, who 
made clear they did not want the military to remain on 
the peninsula.  These cadre made the situation 
especially tense.  Fonseka went on to discount reports 
of a split between Jaffna and eastern LTTE cadre, 
asserting that the group was essentially entirely loyal 
to LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran.  (Note:  DATT will report 
further on Fonseka's comments re the LTTE and the 
military situation in Jaffna.) 
 
8.  (C) Not surprisingly, most Tamil interlocutors 
perceived the LTTE in a different light.  The Tamil 
politicians, in particular, defended the LTTE and its 
activities, often harking back to decades old incidents 
to justify Tamil anger toward the south.  Most NGO 
representatives also defended the LTTE, though in less 
stentorian tones.  That said, in a private conversation 
with A/RSO, two Tamil NGO representatives, S. Nicoline 
of CARE and Saroja Sivachandran of the Center for 
Women's Development, complained about the LTTE, 
asserting that the GSL had "lost control" of the group 
and was allowing it to run rampant in the peninsula. 
The two women also asserted that the group's taxation of 
goods and commerce was helping to smother the Jaffna 
economy. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Disagreement over Security Zones 
-------------------------------- 
 
9.  (C) When asked about the long-standing controversy 
over the "high security zones" in Jaffna, Fonseka 
underscored that the military needed the zones to defend 
itself properly.  (Note:  The security zones comprise 
about 18 percent of the Jaffna peninsula.  The LTTE and 
many Tamils have been agitating for their reduction in 
size.)  Fonseka pointed to the pattern of Tiger 
activities he had reviewed earlier as proof that the 
LTTE simply could not be trusted.  Surprisingly, Fonseka 
did not see the zones as crucial to defending his forces 
by giving them in-depth protection from Tamil Tiger 
long-range artillery attack.  Instead, he felt that the 
zones were crucial in providing his forces protection 
from large-scale LTTE infiltration of the military's 
positions.  In stating this, Fonseka stressed that the 
army did not have sensors, night vision or other 
equipment, as the U.S. military used.  Given this 
situation, the army was reliant on old-fashioned, 
strategically placed pickets and guard posts for its 
defense. 
 
10.  (C) With Tamil interlocutors, the size of the 
security zones was clearly a serious bone of contention, 
but none urged that the miltary completely withdraw from 
the peninsula.  NGO representatives underlined that 
Tamils were reliant on cash crops, such as onions and 
tobacco, for their livelihoods.  The security zones, 
however, were preventing displaced persons from 
resettling their "golden lands" inside the security 
zones.  This was preventing them from growing the crops 
that would fuel the income generation that was so badly 
needed.  (Note:  In response to this point, Fonseka 
commented that he thought Tamils vastly overplayed the 
importance of the land in the security zones.  There was 
some good land, but not that much of it, and the fact 
that it was fallow was not the main source of Jaffna's 
economic problems.)  Tamils also stressed their concerns 
that the government was doing little by way of economic 
development in Jaffna.  While electricity had been 
recently restored to part of the peninsula, not much 
else had been done.  In addition, restrictions on 
fishing still remained in place.  (Note:  Queried about 
the complaints about continued restrictions on fishing, 
Fonseka responded that the military had done its best to 
comply with the terms of the February ceasefire accord 
in this area.  Despite all of the complaints, Fonseka 
asserted that Tamil fishermen were not fully taking 
advantage of the relaxation in restrictions.) 
 
11.  (C) The Ambassador told Tamil interlocutors that he 
sympathized with the lot of their community and realized 
that much more had to be done.  Patience was crucially 
important, however.  The government was trying to 
improve conditions and knew it was not doing a perfect 
job.  The U.S. and others in the international community 
were committed to trying to help, and would be meeting 
in Tokyo in June on development plans.  In sum, it would 
take time, but the situation would improve.  In the 
meantime, it was important to stay the course and 
support the peace process. 
 
12.  (C) In addition, while emphasizing that the U.S. 
was not directly involved in the negotiations, the 
Ambassador suggested that it might be possible to do 
something about the security zones if the Tigers took 
some sort of confidence-building step.  The group could, 
for example, announce that it was committed to ending 
violence, or that it was disbanding its "Black Tiger" 
suicide squads, or that it was willing to turn over its 
long-range artillery to independent monitors.   If the 
Tigers took any of these steps, the GSL might take that 
as a sign that the zones could be reduced in size as a 
matter of reciprocity.  In response, none of the Tamil 
politicians took the bait, preferring to continue to 
defend the LTTE and criticize the government. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Jaffna Library:  One Sign of Hope 
--------------------------------- 
13.  (C) Amid all the mutual recriminations and 
distrust, one sign of hope in Jaffna was the newly 
reconstructed Jaffna library.  Totally destroyed in 
fighting in the 1980s, the library has long been an 
important cultural symbol for Tamils.  The government, 
determined to make a gesture of reconciliation, has 
funded reconstruction efforts at the site for the past 
several years.  The Ambassador was given a tour of the 
facility, which -- smelling of paint and lacquer -- was 
close to complete, with bookshelves being hauled in and 
floors being polished.  The Ambassador also visited the 
library's spanking new computer room, which had been 
funded by UNESCO.  When asked about the recent 
controversy over the issue, the head of the library was 
not certain when the formal reopening ceremony would 
take place.  (Note:  In February, the LTTE forced the 
Jaffna municipal council to postpone the planned 
reopening of the library.  The LTTE's overt rationale 
was that the library was not yet 100 percent finished. 
It is believed, however, that the group stopped the 
opening ceremony because it did not want anyone to draw 
attention to signs of government-Tamil amity at this 
time.) 
 
-------------- 
Media Coverage 
-------------- 
 
14.  (SBU) The Ambassador's visit received modest, but 
positive coverage in the English and Sinhala dailies on 
March 12.  Coverage in the Tamil dailies was massive, 
but equally positive.  The Ambassador's call for support 
for the peace process and patience resonated in both the 
English and vernacular press. 
 
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COMMENT 
------- 
 
15.  (C) Jaffna's recent history has been very troubled. 
As happens in places that are truly desperate, initial 
moves toward peace and seeming normality were greeted in 
Jaffna with something just short of euphoria. 
Unfortunately, but inevitably, that sense of euphoria is 
dying off.  Compared with recent visits (see Ref C, for 
example), Jaffna seemed to be in a sour, suspicious 
mood, with the military and Tamils sharply at odds.  In 
particular, the issue of what to do about the security 
zones continues to bedevil the situation, with both 
sides not sure how to move forward toward resolution on 
that core issue.  Moreover, based on what Mission saw 
and heard, precious little of any sort of economic 
"peace dividend" has been lavished on Jaffna.  The 
region remains poor and marginalized, especially when 
compared to the wealth of Colombo, and there is a lot of 
frustration (and envy) among Tamils over that fact. 
 
16.  (C) Hanging over the whole situation is the 
question of the Tamil Tigers.  The LTTE is clearly 
calling a lot of shots in Jaffna's Tamil community at 
this point and, based on what we heard, its grip is not 
a relaxed one.  In our estimation, the situation at rock 
bottom cannot really improve in Jaffna until the LTTE 
wants it to.  While the group has had opportunities to 
change its brutal image, it seems intent on proving once 
again that it does not have the true interests of the 
Tamil community at heart.  END COMMENT. 
 
17.  (U) Minimize considered. 
 
WILLS