US embassy cable - 03KUWAIT858

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000858 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ARN, NEA/ARP, INR/B 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2013 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, EAID, JO, IZ, KU 
SUBJECT: (C) OIL FOR JORDAN:  GOK AWAITS SPECIFIC REQUEST 
 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR RICHARD H. JONES; REASON 1.5 (B,D) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah told the 
Ambassador March 10 that Kuwait still awaits a specific 
request for support from Jordan (whose FM Muasher was due 
here later in the day).  He spoke ambiguously about whether 
Kuwait's $100 million deposit in the Jordanian Central Bank 
is just a deposit or an unofficial grant.  On Iraq, Shaykh 
Sabah said "do it quickly"; he repeatedly requested that his 
government receive formal notification "at least one or two 
days" in advance of hostilities.  He urged the USG to be 
sensitive to Saudi Arabia's need for discretion in its 
cooperation with us.  Shaykh Sabah regretted that the UAE had 
not done more to push its proposal that Saddam leave office. 
He also regretted disunity on the UN Security Council, but 
blamed France, which he said would be "crazy" to veto the 
latest draft resolution.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U) The Ambassador, accompanied by Pol Chief (Notetaker), 
met with First Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 
Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jabir al-Sabah March 10.  MFA 
Undersecretary Amb. Khaled al-Jarallah sat in along with Amb. 
Khaled al-Babtain, Director of the Americas Department, and 
Amb. Ahmed al-Fahd, Director of the Minister's Office. 
 
(C) OIL FOR JORDAN 
------------------ 
3.  (C)  The Ambassador said he had an instruction to urge 
GOK support for Jordan in the event the supply of oil from 
Iraq is cut off.  Shaykh Sabah said Kuwait has taken no 
decision on providing oil, awaiting a specific request from 
King Abdullah to the Amir.  (Jordan's FM Marwan Muasher was 
due to arrive in Kuwait later in the day, and the Kuwaitis 
seemed to expect him to bring a message from the King.) 
Meanwhile, Shaykh Sabah noted, the GOK has deposited $100 
million in Jordan's Central Bank.  He laughed that the GOJ 
had asked if it could use that money, and Kuwait replied: 
"it's yours; why did we put it in your name?"  The Ambassador 
sought to clarify whether this meant the money -- which we 
had always understood was just a deposit, a form of 
balance-of-payments support --  was in effect a grant. 
Shaykh Sabah responded ambiguously:  "We told them, if you 
can't use it, why did you take it?"  (COMMENT:  This may be a 
signal that the $100 million is a de facto, off-budget grant, 
but we do not consider that clearly established.  END 
COMMENT.) 
 
(C) IRAQ:  "DO IT QUICKLY" 
-------------------------- 
4.  (C) There was considerable discussion about Iraq.  The 
Ambassador reiterated the USG's deep appreciation for all of 
Kuwait's support, noting that he had publicly described it as 
"1000 percent of our wildest dreams."  Several times during 
the conversation, Shaykh Sabah underscored his desire that we 
act quickly to eliminate Saddam's regime:  dragging out the 
process only allows opposition and complications to snowball, 
he emphasized.  Similarly, he urged that we move as fast as 
possible to hand the governing of Iraq back to Iraqis.  He 
specifically -- and repeatedly -- requested that the USG give 
the GOK "at least one or two days' official notice" in 
advance of hostilities. 
 
5.  (C) He also went out of his way to urge the USG to be 
sensitive to Saudi Arabia's need for discretion in its 
cooperation with us, noting that Kuwait "will never forget" 
the Saudi role in liberating it from the Iraqi invasion.  He 
was gratified that there are now some 5,000 Saudi troops in 
Kuwait, along with about 4,000 from the UAE.  He was pleased 
with the UAE's initiative in proposing that Saddam step down 
to avert war, but regretted that the UAE had not been more 
active in pushing the proposal, leaving Kuwait to do most of 
the diplomatic work. 
 
(C) AFTER THE WAR 
----------------- 
6.  (C) The Minister asserted that Kuwait feels a duty to 
help the Iraqi people and is giving facilities to the UN 
"upon request."  He said Kuwait is "ready" with sufficient 
stocks to meet the UN's requests for humanitarian supplies, 
which he cited from memory as 20,000 MT wheat, 20,000 MT 
flour, and 1 million loaves of bread/day.  The Ambassador 
praised Kuwait's role in establishing the Humanitarian 
Operations Center (HOC), whose formal inauguration he had 
just attended.  He also mentioned the Office of 
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), and 
promised to introduce its head, LTG (Ret.) Jay Garner, to GOK 
officials when he comes to Kuwait next week.  Shaykh Sabah 
was confident that Iraq, "the richest country in the Arab 
world, and I'm not just talking about oil," could fund its 
own reconstruction/development in the medium to long term. 
He said he would contact his old friend Adnan Pachachi to 
urge him to act for the greater good of Iraq.  In the 
Shaykh's view, what the Iraqi people need most is to feel 
free; he argued against forcing our notions of democracy on 
them too quickly. 
 
(C) DEPLORING UNSC DISUNITY 
--------------------------- 
7.  (C) Shaykh Sabah lamented the disunity of the UN Security 
Council, noting that Kuwait always wants international 
organizations to be united:  otherwise "the big fish are 
eating the small fish."  When the Ambassador assured him that 
we are trying to strengthen the UN, but that we will proceed 
with or without a new UNSCR, the Shaykh remarked that it is 
far too late for us to back down now in any case.  He said he 
had liked UK FM Jack Straw's reply to his French counterpart. 
 France, he added, would be "crazy" if it vetoed the latest 
draft UNSCR. 
 
8.  (C) The Ambassador remarked that the "coalition of the 
willing" is larger than many people realize:  it includes not 
only the UK and Australia, but the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, 
Romanians, Ukrainians, and perhaps the Bulgarians and 
Albanians, not to mention the countries of the region that 
are allowing use of facilities.  Shaykh Sabah remarked that 
the GOK had given permission to the Ukrainians.  (This has 
not yet filtered down to the working level, however, since 
Ukrainian Ambassador reports he still does not have 
confirmation of Kuwaiti acceptance of the Ukrainian draft 
SOFA.) 
 
9.  (C) COMMENT:  Shaykh Sabah's bottom line was pretty 
clear:  move quickly, get rid of Saddam and his regime, then 
give Iraq back to the Iraqis as soon as possible, without 
trying to mold it in our image.  On support for Jordan, the 
key appears to be a specific GOJ request at the highest level. 
JONES